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The Honorable Patrick Leahy
Chair
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property
United States Senate
437 Russell Senate Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
The Honorable Thom Tillis
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property
United States Senate
113 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
August 31, 2021
Dear Chairman Leahy and Ranking Member Tillis:
On behalf of the United States Copyright Office, I am pleased to deliver a copy of
a report entitled Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity, which is available to the
public on the Office’s website.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v. Cooper, you requested that the
Copyright Office undertake a study to determine whether, consistent with the
Court’s analysis, Congress could legislatively abrogate state sovereign immunity
to suits in federal court for damages for copyright infringement.
In response to your request, the Office solicited the views of interested
stakeholders and held roundtables to amplify the record. The Office received
comments from many copyright owners who believed that their works had been
infringed by state entities. A number of state entities provided information
about their policies on copyright, and views regarding allegations of
infringement and the possible effect of abrogation on their operations. The
Office also conducted extensive research into the legal standards governing
abrogation in the context of copyright infringement.

After carefully evaluating the information provided, the Office can report that
the number of allegations of state infringement provided in the course of this
study is substantially greater than the number Congress considered when it
adopted its prior abrogation legislation, and greater than the evidence found
insufficient in prior intellectual property cases. Although few of the
infringement allegations provided to the Office were adjudicated on the merits,
the evidence indicates that state infringement represents a legitimate concern for
copyright owners. Given the demands of the current legal standard, however,
and some ambiguity in its application, we cannot conclude with certainty that
even the current more robust record would be found sufficient to meet the
constitutional test for abrogation.
The Office nevertheless continues to believe that infringement by state entities is
an issue worthy of congressional action. While many such entities take care to
respect copyright, and engage in activities likely to fall under copyright
exceptions, others may use copyrighted works for a variety of marketsubstituting purposes. There would seem to be little justification for immunizing
these types of entities from damages if they intentionally engage in the same
conduct for which a private party could be held liable. Therefore, if Congress
decides not to proceed with abrogation legislation, the Office would support
consideration of alternative approaches to address this issue.
Please do not hesitate to let me know if you have any questions regarding the
report or its findings and conclusions.

Respectfully,

Enclosure

Shira Perlmutter
Register of Copyrights and Director
U.S. Copyright Office
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In March 2020, the Supreme Court held in Allen v. Cooper that Congress had exceeded its
constitutional authority when it enacted legislation authorizing copyright infringement
suits for damages against states.1 The Court based its decision on the legal doctrine of
sovereign immunity, which generally precludes a federal court from hearing a suit
against a state without the state’s consent. The Court noted that Congress has the power
to abrogate state immunity, including to prevent or remedy deprivations of property
without due process in violation of the Constitution. To do so, however, Congress
generally must develop a legislative record demonstrating a pattern of unconstitutional
conduct by states for which there are no adequate state remedies. Following the
decision, Senators Thom Tillis and Patrick Leahy requested that the Copyright Office
study the extent to which copyright owners are experiencing infringement by state
entities without adequate remedies under state law. Over the past year, the Office has
solicited public comments, held public roundtables, and conducted legal research on this
issue. This report presents the Office’s findings and conclusions.
Part I of the report describes the history of this study, and Part II summarizes the
relevant legal background. The text of the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal suits
against states by non-residents, and courts have interpreted the Amendment to also bar
suits filed by residents of the state being sued. The Supreme Court nevertheless permits
federal suits for damages against nonconsenting states where Congress has validly
abrogated state immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, Congress
must ensure that there is congruence and proportionality between the constitutional
injury and the means adopted to prevent or remedy it. Abrogation provisions that fail to
meet this standard have been struck down by the Court.
For most of American history, copyright law did not expressly address the liability of
states, and courts were divided as to whether they could be subject to infringement suits
for damages.2 In 1990, Congress amended the Copyright Act to provide that states could
be liable for infringement to the same extent as nongovernmental entities. In Allen,
however, the Court struck down that legislation, holding that it failed to satisfy the
congruence-and-proportionality standard because Congress had not identified a pattern
of state copyright infringements that rose to the level of a constitutional violation. To
rise to that level, an infringement must be committed intentionally or at least recklessly;
a negligent act does not suffice.
Part III of this report discusses the evidence of state infringement submitted in
connection with this study. Copyright owners provided comments and testimony
1

140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).

As discussed in this report, suits seeking only injunctive relief can be brought against state officials in
federal court under the Ex parte Young doctrine.
2
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alleging that states have infringed a variety of copyrighted works, including
photographs, books, and news articles. Two commenters provided lists totaling over
130 copyright lawsuits filed against state entities. A copyright advocacy group
submitted the results of a survey in which copyright owners were asked about their
experience with infringement by states. Out of 657 survey respondents, 115 stated that
their works had been used by state entities in a way that constituted copyright
infringement, and many provided additional information identifying the relevant states
and the frequency of the alleged infringement. In addition, the Office received
comments from approximately a dozen copyright owners describing specific instances
of alleged infringement by state entities. Commenters representing state entities
questioned the reliability of the submitted evidence and noted that the allegations of
infringement did not account for potential defenses such as fair use. These commenters
also argued that the allegations, even if true, were insufficient to establish a pattern of
unconstitutional conduct sufficient to warrant abrogation of sovereign immunity.
Part IV describes information provided by representatives of state entities regarding
their policies for preventing and responding to copyright infringement. These
commenters, mostly from educational institutions, reported that many state entities have
adopted a variety of policies, practices, and cultural norms to minimize the risk of
infringement by state actors. For example, commenters noted that a number of state
institutions have established dedicated offices to provide guidelines and educational
resources on compliance with copyright law.
Part V examines the extent to which copyright owners may have other legal remedies
against infringing states if they are unable to bring suits for damages in federal courts.
Where a state has waived immunity from tort or contract claims, copyright owners may
seek to recover under those causes of action in state court. The availability of such
remedies, however, is limited by language in the Copyright Act preempting state-law
claims involving rights that are the “equivalent” of those protected by federal copyright
law. Alternatively, some courts have suggested that copyright owners may be able to
assert that state infringement amounts to a taking of property without compensation, in
violation of the federal or state constitutions. This theory, however, has rarely been
tested and was recently rejected by the Texas Supreme Court. In addition, copyright
owners may bring suits for injunctive relief against state officers in federal court, but this
does not provide an avenue to recover money damages. Finally, copyright owners may
bring suit against individual state officials in their personal capacity, but such officials
are protected by qualified immunity and, even if found liable, may be unable to satisfy a
damages award.
Part VI sets out the Office’s evaluation of the submitted evidence under the Supreme
Court’s standards for legislation abrogating state immunity. At the outset, the Office
notes that the record of alleged state infringements provided in the course of this study
is substantially greater than the record before Congress when it enacted its prior
2
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abrogation legislation. Moreover, while many state institutions have taken significant
steps to ensure respect for copyright, it seems clear that state infringements do in fact
occur and that states’ immunity from damages leaves copyright owners with inadequate
remedies in many such cases. Further, the Office is aware that the existence of sovereign
immunity itself hampers the development of a more conclusive evidentiary record, as it
often prevents claims from being brought or assessed on the merits.
It is unclear, however, whether the evidence gathered in this study would be found
sufficient to abrogate state immunity under the Supreme Court’s precedents. Although
the Court has said little regarding the nature and volume of evidence that is needed, the
case law indicates that the violations by states must be sufficiently numerous and
serious to constitute a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. While the infringement
allegations provided to the Office are substantial in number, few have been corroborated
or substantively analyzed by a court. Among the litigated cases cited by commenters,
only about half resulted in written decisions, and the majority of those were dismissed
on sovereign immunity grounds without addressing the merits. The Office itself cannot
assess the validity of the examples of infringement in the submitted survey responses.
Given that the evidence gathered here far exceeds that underlying the CRCA, Congress
may still choose to proceed with adopting new abrogation legislation. In light of the
foregoing concerns, however, there is a material risk that a court could find even this
more robust record insufficient to meet the constitutional abrogation standard. The
Office nevertheless continues to believe that the ability of copyright owners to obtain
adequate relief when their rights are violated—including by state entities—is important
to the balance of interests struck by the Copyright Act. While many such entities take
care to respect copyright, and engage in activities likely to fall under copyright
exceptions, others may use copyrighted works for a variety of market-substituting
purposes. If Congress decides not to proceed with new abrogation legislation, the Office
therefore would support consideration of alternative approaches to address this issue.

3
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INTRODUCTION AND STUDY HISTORY

On March 23, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Allen v. Cooper,3 which
struck down as unconstitutional the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990
(“CRCA”). The CRCA subjected states to liability for copyright infringement to the
same extent as other parties. The Court held that the law was an invalid exercise of
Congress’s power to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity against suit in federal court.
The Court reaffirmed that under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
Congress may abrogate states’ immunity in order to redress unconstitutional conduct.4
But it concluded that the legislative record at the time of the CRCA’s enactment was
insufficient to support abrogation.5 The Court noted, however, that its decision “need
not prevent Congress from passing a valid copyright abrogation law in the future.”6 It
observed that, in adopting the CRCA, “Congress likely did not appreciate the
importance of linking the scope of its abrogation to the redress or prevention of
unconstitutional injuries—and of creating a legislative record to back up that
connection.”7 The Court thus made clear that Congress may validly abrogate sovereign
immunity if it has a sufficient record of unconstitutional infringement by states.8
Senators Thom Tillis and Patrick Leahy subsequently sent a letter to the Copyright
Office noting that the Allen decision has “created a situation in which copyright owners
are without remedy if a State infringes their copyright and claims State sovereign
immunity,” and expressing concern about the “impact this may have on American
creators and innovators.”9 The letter asked the Office to study the issue “to determine
whether there is sufficient basis for federal legislation abrogating State sovereign
immunity when States infringe copyrights.”10 In conducting its analysis, the Office was
asked to “study the extent to which copyright owners are experiencing infringements by
state entities without adequate remedies under state law,” and to “consider the extent to
which such infringements appear to be based on intentional or reckless conduct.”11 The

3

140 S. Ct. 994.

4

Id. at 1003.

5

Id. at 1006–07.

6

Id. at 1007.

7

Id.

8

Id.

Letter from Sens. Thom Tillis & Patrick Leahy to Maria Strong, Acting Register of Copyrights, U.S.
Copyright Office at 1 (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.copyright.gov/rulemaking/state-sovereignimmunity/letter.pdf (“Request Letter”). The letter requesting the study is provided in Appendix A.
9

10

Id.

11

Id. at 2.
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Senators asked that the Office “provide a public report summarizing the findings of this
study, as well as the facts and analyses upon which those findings are based.”12
On June 3, 2020, the Office issued a notice of inquiry inviting written comments and
empirical research on (1) specific instances of infringing conduct committed by a state
government entity, officer, or employee; (2) the extent to which state sovereign immunity
affects the licensing or sale of copies of copyrighted works to state entities; (3) the
remedies available for copyright owners when states infringe their works; (4) the metrics
Congress should use to determine whether infringement by state entities is common or
infrequent; (5) whether the prevalence of infringement by state entities has increased in
recent years; (6) how different state entities handle claims of infringement; and (7) any
other pertinent issues the Office should consider when conducting the study.13 On June
24, 2020, the Office invited a second round of written comments and any additional
empirical research.14 In response, the Office received forty-eight responsive comments
from individuals, copyright practitioners, organizations, and state entities.15
On November 5, 2020, the Office announced that it would conduct public roundtables
via Zoom, addressing the following topics: (1) evidence of actual or threatened
copyright infringement by states; (2) state policies and practices for minimizing
copyright infringement and addressing infringement claims; and (3) alternative
remedies under state law for copyright infringement.16 Members of the public were
invited to submit requests to participate in sessions on each topic. The roundtables were
held on December 11, 2020. Participants included copyright owners, as well as
representatives of state universities, large and small businesses, industry organizations,
and offices of state attorneys general.17 The roundtables included an audience
participation session, during which members of the public were able to provide
additional comments for the record. The Office also provided certain individuals with
Request Letter at 1. Senators Tillis and Leahy also requested that the Patent and Trademark Office
complete a study on the issue of patent and trademark infringement by state entities.
12

Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,252 (June 3, 2020)
(“NOI”). The Federal Register notices in this study are collected in Appendix B.
13

14

Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,961 (June 24, 2020).

Comments received in response to the notices of inquiry, as well as other background material on the
Study, are available at https://www.copyright.gov/policy/state-sovereign-immunity/. References to these
comments are by party name (abbreviated where appropriate) followed by either “Initial Comments” or
“Renewal Comments.” A list of the parties who responded to the Office’s notices is provided in Appendix
C.
15

16

Sovereign Immunity Study: Announcement of Public Roundtables, 85 Fed. Reg. 70,654 (Nov. 5, 2020).

Recordings of the public roundtables are available at https://www.copyright.gov/policy/state-sovereignimmunity/recordings/, and a transcript of the public roundtables is available at
https://www.copyright.gov/policy/state-sovereign-immunity/2020.12.11-roundtable-transcript.pdf. A copy
of the agenda for the roundtables is provided in Appendix D.
17
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the opportunity to submit ex parte letters, due to technical difficulties during the open
mic session or to ensure a more comprehensive record.

II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Eleventh Amendment and Its Origins

The doctrine of state sovereign immunity is rooted in the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution, which states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.18
The Amendment was drafted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v.
Georgia, holding that the U.S. Constitution permits a state to be sued in federal court by a
citizen of another state.19 The text explicitly prevents states from being sued in federal
court only by citizens of other states or of another country.20 In Hans v. Louisiana,
however, the Supreme Court interpreted it to prevent states from being sued in federal
court by their own citizens as well, even for claims arising under federal law.21 The
Court’s subsequent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has adhered to that
interpretation.22
While the text of the Amendment references “any suit,” in Ex parte Young the Court held
that suits seeking injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacity may be
brought in federal court.23 This means that a plaintiff may obtain an injunction against a
state official to “end a continuing violation of federal law” by a state entity even when
the state cannot be sued directly.24

18

U.S. CONST., amend. XI.

2 U.S. 419, 451 (1793) (the “Constitution most certainly contemplates . . . the maintaining a jurisdiction
against a State, as Defendant”).
19

In Cohens v. Virginia, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that a suit brought by citizens of Virginia against
the state of Virginia was not “within the [Eleventh] Amendment,” which only prohibited suits in federal
court against states by citizens of other states or other countries. 19 U.S. 264, 412 (1821).
20

21

134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).

See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama State
Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944); Duhne v. New
Jersey, 251 U.S. 311, 313–14 (1920).
22

23

209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908). Part V of this report discusses Ex parte Young suits in greater detail.

24

Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73 (citation omitted).
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B. Bases for Suits against States
The first step in evaluating the case law regarding state sovereign immunity with respect
to copyright infringement claims is understanding the development of state sovereign
immunity jurisprudence generally. Since the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment,
plaintiffs have advanced a number of legal theories in an effort to overcome state
sovereign immunity and bring claims for damages against states in federal court. These
theories range from purported waivers of sovereign immunity by the state to assertions
that Congress has abrogated states’ immunity. This section discusses the Supreme
Court’s analysis of these varied arguments over time.

Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
A state can be sued for damages in federal court if it waives or abandons its sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. A state can waive its immunity through its
constitution or legislation, or by entering into a consensual agreement with one or more
other states under the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution.25 Actions by properly
authorized state officials may also constitute waiver, including appearing in federal
litigation, removing a case from state court to federal court, or agreeing in a contract to
have disputes resolved in federal court.26
In the absence of an express waiver or an action signifying waiver, plaintiffs have argued
that states constructively waived their immunity. In Edelman v. Jordan, the Supreme
Court rejected the theory that a state could constructively waive its immunity simply by
participating in a federal program. The Court explained:
Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the
surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here. In
deciding whether a State has waived its constitutional protection
under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver only where stated
“by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications

See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (stating that a state statute or constitutional
provision that specifies the state’s intention to subject itself to suit in federal court would constitute waiver);
Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Co., 359 U.S. 275, 789–790 (1959) (compact entered into by two states under
the Compact Clause giving states right to be sued waived sovereign immunity).
25

Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. System of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002) (state’s removal of case from state
court to federal court waives sovereign immunity); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 46869 (1945) (stating that state legislature or a properly authorized executive or administrative officer of the
state could waive state immunity); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883) (general appearance by state
in federal litigation waives sovereign immunity).
26
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from the text as (will) leave no room for any other reasonable
construction.”27
For some time, the Court recognized constructive waiver in a narrow set of
circumstances in which Congress had clearly expressed an intent to create a private right
of action against states engaged in a certain activity and a state then engaged in that
activity.28 The Court ultimately rejected the concept of constructive waiver of sovereign
immunity in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board.29 The plaintiffs argued that Florida Prepaid (an agency of the state of Florida) had
constructively waived its immunity by marketing and administering its college tuition
prepayment program after the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (“TRCA”) made
clear that such activity could subject states to suit.30 A majority of the Court held that the
doctrine of constructive waiver “stands as an anomaly in the jurisprudence of sovereign
immunity, and indeed in the jurisprudence of constitutional law.”31 The Court
explained:
The whole point of requiring a “clear declaration” by the State of its
waiver is to be certain that the State in fact consents to suit. But there is
little reason to assume actual consent based upon the State’s mere
presence in a field subject to congressional regulation. There is a
fundamental difference between a State’s expressing unequivocally that it
waives its immunity and Congress’s expressing unequivocally its
intention that if the State takes certain action it shall be deemed to have
waived that immunity.32
Thus, under the current jurisprudence, a plaintiff who seeks to bring a suit for damages
against a state can rely on a theory of waiver of sovereign immunity only if the state has
expressly waived its immunity or taken an official action that signifies waiver (e.g., an
appearance in federal litigation).

27

415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171(1909)).

See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (holding that by
operating a railroad in interstate commerce after Congress had conditioned that right upon amenability to
suit in federal court, Alabama must have accepted the condition and consented to suit in federal court).
28

29

527 U.S. 666, 680 (1999).

30

Id. at 670–72.

31

Id. at 679–80.

Id. at 680–81 (emphasis in original). The Court noted that Congress, in the exercise of its power under the
Spending Clause, could continue to make waiver of sovereign immunity an express condition of eligibility
to receive federal funding. Id. at 686–87.
32
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Congressional Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity
Another way a state can be sued for damages in federal court is if Congress has
abrogated states’ sovereign immunity. The Court has considered the circumstances
under which Congress may abrogate states’ immunity, focusing on two potential sources
of congressional authority: Article I of the Constitution and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

a. Article I
Early cases rested on the theory that Congress has the authority to abrogate states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity under Article I of the Constitution. The theory was that
“the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the
power to regulate commerce.”33 The Court embraced this theory in Parden, holding that
because Congress enacted legislation that included a private right of action against staterun railroads pursuant to its authority to regulate commerce, “it must follow that
application of the Act to such a railroad cannot be precluded by sovereign immunity.34
Therefore, the Court held, a state that chooses to act within “the realm of congressional
regulation” consents to any conditions that Congress was authorized by the Constitution
to impose, including a private right of action against the state.35
This approach, which is reminiscent of the constructive waiver arguments that were
ultimately rejected in Florida Prepaid, showed signs of splintering in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co.36 In an opinion by Justice Brennan, four Justices concluded that Congress may
abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to its authority under the Commerce Clause,
relying on substantially the same rationale articulated in Parden.37 The plurality
concluded that “to the extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate
commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in
exercising this authority, to render them liable.”38 In a separate opinion, Justice White
agreed that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate states’ immunity, but
disagreed with “much of [Justice Brennan’s] reasoning.”39 Four dissenters would have
held that Article I is not a basis for abrogation because “state immunity from suit in

33

377 U.S. at 191–92.

34

Id. at 192.

35

Id. at 196.

36

491 U.S. 1 (1989).

37

Id. at 19–20.

38

Id. at 19–20.

39

Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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federal courts is a structural component of federalism, and not merely a default
disposition that can be altered by action of Congress pursuant to its Article I powers.”40
The Court ultimately overruled both Union Gas and Parden in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, in which it held that “[e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress complete
law making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.”41
The Court concluded that Justice Brennan’s opinion to the contrary in Union Gas
“deviated sharply” from established federalism jurisprudence and “eviscerated”
the Hans decision by eroding the bedrock principle that sovereign immunity is a
limitation on the judicial authority conferred on federal courts in Article III.42 The Court
accordingly held that “Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction” by sovereign immunity.43 Thus, after 1996,
the general rule has been that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity
based on its Article I powers.
In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, the Court was asked to decide whether a
proceeding initiated by a bankruptcy trustee to set aside preferential transfers by the
debtor to state agencies was barred by sovereign immunity.44 The Court held that the
unique history of the Bankruptcy Clause and legislation enacted shortly after ratification
showed that the Clause “was intended not just as a grant of legislative authority to
Congress, but also to authorize limited subordination of state sovereign immunity in the
bankruptcy arena.”45 Specifically, the Court determined that the drafters of the
Constitution were aware of the important role of federal courts as the country replaced
“the patchwork of insolvency and bankruptcy laws” with a federal bankruptcy system.46
The Court held that “those who crafted the Bankruptcy Clause would have understood
it to give Congress the power to authorize courts to avoid preferential transfers and to
recover the transferred property” from states that laid claim to it.47 Thus, states agreed
in the plan of the Convention not to assert immunity in bankruptcy proceedings relating

40

Id. at 38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996). The statute at issue, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, was enacted pursuant to
the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I, but the Court held there was “no principled distinction in favor of
the States to be drawn between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause,” and its
holding was with respect to Article I generally. Id. at 63.
41

42

Id. at 64.

43

Id. at 72–73.

44

546 U.S. 356 (2006).

45

Id. at 362–63.

46

Id. at 366.

47

Id. at 372.
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to the turnover of such transfers.48 Legislation enacted shortly after ratification of the
Constitution also explicitly granted federal courts the authority to issue writs of habeas
corpus to release debtors from state prisons.49 In the particular context of the
Bankruptcy Clause, therefore, the Court has recognized an exception to the “general rule
that Article I cannot justify haling a State into federal court.”50

b. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiffs also have sought to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for
congressional abrogation of state immunity. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”51 To secure this guarantee, section 5 provides that “Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”52 The
Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions to permit Congress to abrogate
sovereign immunity to remedy deprivations of constitutional rights by states, subject to
two requirements.
The first requirement, articulated in the Court’s 1985 decision in Atascadero State Hospital
v. Scanlon,53 is that Congress must use an “unequivocal expression” of intent to abrogate
state immunity in the statutory text. The Court had previously required such “an
unequivocal expression of congressional intent,”54 but had not made explicit that the
expression must appear in the statutory text.55 In Atascadero, the statute provided that no
person with a disability shall be “subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”56 The Court held that this general
authorization to sue did not abrogate state immunity because “States are not like any

48

Id.

49

Id. at 374.

50

Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1002.

51

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.

52

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5.

53

473 U.S. 234 (1985).

Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (“although Congress has power with
respect to the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity, we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to overturn the
constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States”) (quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342
(1979)).
54

See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243 (finding requirement that Congress use “unmistakable language in the
statute itself” “consistent with” past precedent).
55

56

29 U.S.C. § 794.
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other class of recipients of federal aid,” and Congress must “express its intention to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself.”57
The second requirement for abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment is that the
remedy must be sufficiently “congruent and proportional” to the constitutional harm
Congress seeks to prevent. This requirement originated with City of Boerne v. Flores,58
where the Court considered whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”)
was a proper exercise of Congress’s power under section 5. RFRA created a cause of
action against state actors if a state law substantially burdened religious exercise.59 The
Court held that Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers authorized
only remedial or preventative measures.60 As such, there “must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted
to that end.”61
Applying that standard to RFRA, the Court held that the statute was “so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”62 The Court
specifically pointed to the statute’s breadth and the lack of historical evidence of state
hostility to the exercise of religion. RFRA applied to all laws of all agencies and
employees of federal, state and local governments, with no geographic limitations or
termination date or mechanism.63 This broad application was not supported by the
record before Congress, which was devoid of any examples of state legislation enacted
“due to animus or hostility to the burdened religious practices” that would rise to the
level of a constitutional violation.64 As a result, the Court held that RFRA exceeded
Congress’s powers under section 5.65
Since City of Boerne was decided, the Court has applied the “congruence and
proportionality” test to uphold abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment on two
occasions. In Tennessee v. Lane, the Court applied the test to Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act and concluded that the statutory remedy was congruent and

57

Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243, 246.

58

521 U.S. 507 (1997).

Id. at 515–16 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(2), which stated that law’s purpose is “to provide a claim or
defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government”).
59

60

Id. at 524–29.

61

Id. at 519–20.

62

Id. at 532.

63

Id. at 533.

64

Id. at 530–31.

65

Id. at 536.
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proportional to the harm being addressed: discriminatory access to the courts.66 And in
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court found the family leave
provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act congruent and proportional to the goal
of preventing gender discrimination in the workplace.67
As in City of Boerne, the Court’s analysis in these cases focused both on the evidence
before Congress of a pattern of constitutional violations by states and on the scope of the
remedial scheme to address those violations. In Lane, the Court noted that Congress
held thirteen hearings, assembled a task force “that gathered evidence from every State
in the Union,” and found “hundreds of examples of unequal treatment of persons with
disabilities by States and their political subdivisions,” the overwhelming majority of
which occurred in the administration of public programs and services.68 Based on this
evidence, as well as a report showing that “76% of public services and programs housed
in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to and unusable by persons with
disabilities,” the Court found Congress had ample evidence of widespread
unconstitutional disability discrimination by the states.69
Similarly, in Hibbs, the record before Congress included an array of evidence showing
widespread sex discrimination by states. For example, nineteen states had laws limiting
how many hours women could work, and many states offered their employees different
durations of parental leave depending on the sex of the parent.70 Additional evidence in
congressional reports and hearings demonstrated that “even where state laws and
policies were not facially discriminatory, they were applied in discriminatory ways.”71
Based on this combination of evidence, the Court found that Congress had amassed
significant evidence of widespread sex discrimination by states.72
In contrast, the Court has found that Congress did not have a sufficient record when it
enacted the abrogating legislation without evidence of pervasive unconstitutional
conduct by states. In Board of Trustees v. Garrett, the Court struck the abrogation
provisions in Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act because “the great majority”

541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004) (finding “Title II’s requirement of program accessibility[] is congruent and
proportional to its object of enforcing the right of access to the courts”).
66

538 U.S. 721, 729–31 (2003) (noting a record of states participating in and contributing to gender-based
discrimination in connection with providing leave benefits).
67

68

Lane, 541 U.S. at 516, 526 (internal citations omitted).

69

Lane, 541 U.S. at 527.

Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729–31 (noting that “differential leave policies were not attributable to any differential
physical needs of men and women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family
members is women’s work”).
70

71

Id. at 732.

72

Id.
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of the record before Congress related to discrimination by private employers, not by
states.73 The “half a dozen examples” that involved state discrimination “f[e]ll far short
of even suggesting [a] pattern of unconstitutional discrimination,” particularly in light of
the estimated 43 million Americans with disabilities.74 Similarly, in Kimel v. Florida Board
of Regents, the Court struck down the abrogation provisions in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act because the evidence before Congress “almost entirely consist[ed] of
isolated sentences clipped from floor debates and legislative reports.”75 The Court
accordingly concluded that Congress “never identified any pattern of age discrimination
by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of
constitutional violation.”76

C. Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity from Copyright
Infringement Claims
This section discusses how courts, Congress, and the Copyright Office have analyzed
over time whether states are immune from suits for damages for copyright infringement
specifically. It first describes how courts historically analyzed sovereign immunity in the
context of copyright cases. It then details Congress’s attempt to abrogate sovereign
immunity through the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act after receiving a report from
the Copyright Office describing the scope of copyright infringement by state entities.
Finally, it discusses the Court’s recent decision in Allen v. Cooper, which held that
Congress’s attempt at abrogation was invalid and that states therefore are currently
immune from suits for copyright infringement damages in federal court.

Early Treatment of State Infringement
For most of American history, copyright law did not expressly address the liability of
states. Instead, the law provided that “anyone” or “any person” who infringed a
copyright was subject to liability. For example, the 1909 Act stated that “if any person
shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of the
United States, such person shall be liable” for an injunction or damages.77 And when
Congress enacted the 1976 Act, the text stated that “[a]nyone who violates any of the

73

531 U.S. 356, 369–72 (2001).

74

Id. at 369–72.

528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000). The Court found that evidence of discrimination in the private sector was
insufficient to establish that states committed the same conduct, and it also rejected a California state report
on age discrimination in its public agencies as an insufficient basis for imposing liability on “every State of
the Union.” Id. at 90–91.
75

76

Id. at 89.

77

1909 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 60–349, § 25, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (1909).
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exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of copyright” subject to
remedies.78
In the absence of statutory guidance, courts looked to the Supreme Court’s abrogation
jurisprudence to determine whether states could be subject to infringement claims. The
early cases—which preceded the ruling in Seminole Tribe that Article I is not a valid basis
for abrogation for most claims—came to inconsistent conclusions. In a 1962 case, Wihtol
v. Crow,79 the Eighth Circuit dismissed a copyright claim against a school district because
the district was “an instrumentality of the State of Iowa, constituting a part of its
educational system and engaged in performing a state governmental function under
state law and at state expense,” and Eleventh Amendment case law provided that “a
state could not be sued without its consent.”80 The court did not discuss the basis for the
abrogation or whether the Congress had made its intent to abrogate sufficiently clear in
the statutory text.81
The Ninth Circuit took a different approach in Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona,82 where it
affirmed an award of copyright damages under the 1909 Act. The court reasoned that
the “sweeping and without apparent limitation” language in the statute subjecting to
damages “any person [who] shall infringe” should be broadly construed.83 In the court’s
view, that broad language provided “sufficient indication of the intent to include states
within the class of defendants,” which was enough to abrogate state immunity.84 The
court considered abrogation authority to be “inherent” in Congress’s power under
Article I, section 8 (the “Intellectual Property Clause”) to legislate in the area of
copyrights and patents,85 and concluded that “a state may neither abrogate nor in any
way diminish the federally granted and protected rights of a copyright holder.”86

78

1976 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94–553, § 501(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2584 (1976).

79

309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962).

80

Id. at 781–82.

See id. at 782 (concluding without analysis that plaintiffs could not “obtain a judgment against the School
District for damages payable out of public funds” and citing several cases that did not consider whether
Congress had abrogated state immunity).
81

82

591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979).

83

Id. at 1284–85.

84

Id. at 1285.

Id.; see U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries”).
85

Mills Music, Inc., 591 F.2d at 1285 (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552 (1973) (applying
copyright preemption to a state criminal statute because states “cannot exercise a sovereign power which,
under the Constitution, they have relinquished to the Federal Government for its exclusive exercise”)).
86
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A few years later, a district court in Virginia was faced with reconciling these two
approaches. In Johnson v. University of Virginia,87 the court had to determine whether the
1976 Copyright Act permitted suits for damages against states. The court concluded that
the reasoning of Mills Music was more persuasive, noting that Wihtol “provides little
more than a conclusory statement that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the
states,” while Mills Music “includes a thoughtful examination of the 1909 Act and the
recent Supreme Court opinions concerning the Eleventh Amendment, particularly
Edelman v. Jordan.”88 The court then found that the Mills Music holding was “equally
compelling, if not more compelling with respect to the 1976 Act” because whereas the
1909 Act applied to “any person” infringing a copyright, the 1976 Act applied to
“anyone” infringing a copyright—language “at least as sweeping, and probably more
sweeping, than the language of the 1909 Act in identifying the class of defendants
subject to copyright infringement suits.”89 Thus, the court permitted a claim for
damages to go forward against a state university.

The Oman Report
While the language in the 1976 Copyright Act was deemed sufficient to abrogate
sovereign immunity by two courts, in 1985, the Atascadero Court held that abrogation of
state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment requires “unequivocal”
language making that intention explicit.90 In 1987, the House Judiciary Committee,
concerned that the 1976 Act’s “anyone” language was insufficiently clear, asked the
Copyright Office, led by then-Register Ralph Oman, to study and issue a report on “the
interplay between copyright infringement and the Eleventh Amendment.”91 Thus, the
Office was asked to examine “the practical problems relative to the enforcement of
copyright against state governments” and produce a green paper on the state of the law
and any limits on congressional action.92

87

606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985).

88

Id. at 323.

89

Id. at 324.

90

473 U.S. at 246–47.

Letter from Reps. Robert W. Kastenmeier & Carlos Moorhead, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and
the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights, U.S.
Copyright Office 1 (Aug. 3, 1987).
91

92

Id.
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The Copyright Office issued a Request for Information seeking public comment93 and
received over 600 pages of submissions.94 Most public comments expressed concern
about potential infringement by state actors in the future if Congress failed to clarify that
states were subject to suits for damages for copyright infringement,95 but a few
mentioned instances in the past where states had committed copyright infringement and
relied on their Eleventh Amendment immunity to avoid being sued. For example, the
American Journal of Nursing Company submitted a comment stating that after a
nursing home run by Minnesota copied the journal’s publications and resold them for a
fee, the journal sought legal counsel and was advised that nothing could be done
because the nursing home “would be considered a state agency and hence be immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.”96 And a company that made training videos
for equipment maintenance commented that when it found a Texas prison copying
videos provided for marketing purposes, the prison stated that “they normally make
copies of such tapes [and] they were permitted by law to do so.”97
A handful of state entities also submitted comments expressing the position that states
were immune from suits for damages for copyright infringement under the Eleventh
Amendment. The Virginia Attorney General wrote that he “strongly feels that recent
Eleventh Amendment precedent compels the conclusion that the states are immune from
claims for money damages for copyright infringement,”98 and the Massachusetts
Attorney General wrote that the “weight of current case law supports the position that a
state retains its Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit commenced under the
Copyright Act.”99

93

Request for Information: Eleventh Amendment, 52 Fed. Reg. 42,045 (Nov. 2, 1987).

The Office’s report is available at: https://www.copyright.gov/reports/copyright-liability-of-states1988.pdf. A scan of the comments was uploaded to the Internet Archive at https://archive.org/details/
Copyright11thAmendmentStudyComments.
94

See, e.g., McGraw-Hill, Inc. Comments at 1–2, Comment No. 11 (Jan. 27, 1988) (stating that, because over
40% of its School Division’s textbook sales and 75% of its College Division’s textbook sales are to state
agencies, state immunity from copyright infringement would be “crippling” to its business); The American
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (“ASCAP”) Comments at 5, 10 (Feb. 1, 1988) (stating that
ASCAP had approximately 870 licenses with state universities and in its experience “the availability of
monetary damages in an infringement action is a necessary condition for successful licensing”); Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, Inc. Comments at 1 (Feb. 1, 1988) (stating that the publisher receives 70% in total
revenue from state institutions and asking “[i]f state agencies are free to copy material at will, how will the
authors of the copied works be compensated?”).
95

96

Am. J. of Nursing Co. Comments at 1–2 (Jan. 28, 1988).

97

Law Offices of Alan Ruderman Comments at 1 (Dec. 21, 1987).

98

Va. Attorney Gen. Comments at 1, Comment No. 7 (Jan. 7, 1988).

99

Mass. Attorney Gen. Comments at 1, Comment No. 40 (Feb. 4, 1988).
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In June 1988, the Copyright Office published its final report (the “Oman Report”)
addressing the House Judiciary Committee’s questions. The Oman Report reviewed the
public comments, provided a lengthy analysis of Eleventh Amendment case law, and
attached a 50-state survey by the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) examining
state waivers of sovereign immunity.100 Summarizing the comments, the Report noted
that only “five copyright proprietors document actual problems faced in attempting to
enforce their claims against state government infringers.”101
The bulk of the Oman Report summarized relevant Eleventh Amendment case law and
concluded that the Copyright Act’s text was not sufficiently clear in expressing an intent
to subject states to suits for damages. As a result, the Report recommended that
Congress amend the Act “to clarify its intent to abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity.”102 In reaching this conclusion, the Report noted that the Supreme Court had
recently granted certiorari in Union Gas after the Third Circuit held that Congress could
abrogate state sovereign immunity based on its Article I powers.103 If Union Gas were
reversed and the Court were to find that state immunity could not be abrogated under
Article I, the Report suggested that Congress consider amending 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a),
which grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear copyright cases, to permit
copyright suits against states to be brought in state court.104 The Oman Report did not
make specific recommendations as to how Congress could abrogate state immunity
based on the Fourteenth Amendment, because it had not yet been established that
abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment involved a different standard than
abrogation under Article I.105

The Copyright Remedy Clarification Act
Following the Oman Report, the CRCA was introduced in Congress in February 1989.
Initially, the bill proposed to amend section 501(a) of the Copyright Act to clarify that the
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT LIABILITY OF STATES AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: A REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (June 1988) (“Oman Report”).
100

101

Oman Report at 7.

102

Oman Report at 104.

103

U.S. v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1356 (3d Cir. 1987).

Oman Report at 104–05. Though bringing a copyright suit in state court would likely still require the
consent of the state, permitting suits in state court would remove the Eleventh Amendment barrier for
copyright owners.
104

105

The Oman Report preceded by nearly ten years the decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, where the Court
held for the first time that the Fourteenth Amendment may provide a basis for abrogation only when the
law passed by Congress is sufficiently “congruent and proportional” to the constitutional harm Congress
seeks to prevent. See Oman Report at 76 (citing Matter of McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 315–16 (7th Cir.
1987) (considering whether “there is some constitutionally significant way of distinguishing Congress’
Fourteenth Amendment power from its Article I powers,” and concluding there was none).
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term “anyone” included states and state instrumentalities. It provided: “As used in this
subsection, the term ‘anyone’ includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any
officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official
capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject
to the provisions of this title in the same manner and to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entity.”106
The bill was introduced while Union Gas was pending, and within a few months, the
Supreme Court issued its plurality opinion in that case, which called into question
whether Article I would be deemed a valid basis for abrogation in the future.107 Register
Oman then submitted a supplemental statement to Congress, recommending that
additional language be added to the bill, in light of the “fragile” holding in Union Gas, to
make clear that States are subject to the money damages and attorney’s fees provisions
of the Copyright Act.108 Though Register Oman believed the initial draft of the bill
satisfied the Atascadero requirement that Congress use an “unequivocal expression” of
intent to abrogate, he suggested the new language would strengthen the bill in light of
other recent Supreme Court cases involving the Eleventh Amendment.109
Following Register Oman’s invitation, the CRCA was amended to add section 511 to the
Copyright Act, titled “Liability of States, instrumentalities of Sates, and State officials for
infringement of copyright.” Section 511 states that such actors “shall not be immune
under the Eleventh Amendment” and would be liable for remedies “to the same extent”
as private actors.110 Congress modeled this language on a previous law that the
Supreme Court had “twice cited as an example of Congress’s ability to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment when it wanted to do so.”111 The final version of the CRCA,

Copyright Remedy Clarification Act and Copyright Office Report on Copyright Liability of States: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 3 (1989) (“House Hearings”).
106

107

491 U.S. 1 (1989).

108

House Hearings at 46 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).

Id. at 40–46. In the same month it decided Union Gas, the Court issued three additional opinions
interpreting Atascadero. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65–66 (1989) (citing Atascadero and
holding state officials acting in their official capacity are not “persons” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
because Congress had not used sufficiently clear language); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230–31 (1989)
(holding that federal law requiring tuition reimbursement by state was invalid under Atascadero because
statute did not “address abrogation in even oblique terms, much less with the clarity Atascadero requires,”
and holding that legislative history is irrelevant to the analysis); Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maint., 492
U.S. 96, 101 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that statutory language was insufficiently clear to abrogate
under Atascadero).
109

110

Pub. L. No. 101–553, sec. 2(a)(2), 101 Stat. 2749 (1990).

111

H.R. REP. 101-282 at 12.
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containing both the clarification of the term “anyone” in section 501(a) and the new
section 511, was signed into law on November 15, 1990.

Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank
Nine years after enactment of the CRCA, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,112 a case challenging
the abrogation provisions in the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act (“Patent Remedy Act”), which are similar to those of the CRCA. The
Court noted at the outset that Seminole Tribe had held that Article I could not be a basis
for abrogation and that the petitioner and the United States “d[id] not contend
otherwise.”113 Thus, the question was whether Congress had abrogated state immunity
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis applied the intent test from Atascadero and
the “congruence and proportionality” test from City of Boerne. The Court found the first
test satisfied, agreeing that Congress had made its intent to abrogate unmistakably clear
through the Patent Act’s language that “[a]ny State . . . shall not be immune . . . for
infringement of a patent.”114 It held, however, that the statute was not congruent and
proportional to the constitutional violations Congress sought to remedy.115
The Court determined that in enacting the Patent Remedy Act, Congress had not
identified a pattern of unconstitutional infringement and tailored its abrogation to that
pattern. The Court pointed to the statute’s legislative history, finding that (1) Congress
had “little evidence of infringing conduct” by state actors;116 (2) Congress had “barely
considered” the adequacy of state-law remedies for patent infringement by the state;117
(3) the legislative record did not reflect a pattern of intentional or reckless infringements,
but instead consisted only of “a handful of instances of state patent infringement that do
not necessarily violate the Constitution”;118 and (4) the legislation was not limited to
“cases involving arguable constitutional violations, such as where a State refuses to offer
any state-court remedy,” or cases where the infringement was not negligent or was

112

527 U.S. 627 (1999).

Id. at 635–36 (“Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers;
hence the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under either the Commerce Clause or the [Intellectual
Property] Clause.”).
113

114

Id. at 635 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 296(a)).

115

Id. at 639.

116

Id. at 640.

Id. at 643–44 (noting that witnesses did not testify as to inadequacy of state remedies, but only
inconvenience).
117

118

Id. at 645–66.
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authorized pursuant to state policy.119 Thus, Congress’s effort to abrogate was not
sufficiently congruent and proportional to a constitutional harm to be a valid exercise of
its power under the Fourteenth Amendment. This holding called into question whether
Congress had enacted the CRCA based on a sufficient record of unconstitutional
conduct by states, and, therefore, whether state entities could be sued for damages in
federal court for copyright infringement.

Chavez v. Arte Publico Press
During the mid-1990s, Texas challenged the constitutionality of the CRCA in a case
involving the University of Houston’s printing of unauthorized copies of a set of short
stories. The Department of Justice intervened in the case to defend the constitutionality
of the abrogation provisions. In 1995, a Fifth Circuit panel held that the CRCA was a
valid abrogation under Congress’s Article I powers. The court concluded that “the
University had notice that its continued participation in the publishing business for
profit was conditioned by Congress upon a waiver of its immunity from suit in federal
court for violations of the Copyright Act.”120
Texas petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. After Seminole Tribe was decided in
1996, the Court remanded Chavez for further consideration in light of the new decision.121
The Fifth Circuit then issued a new panel opinion holding that a “fair reading” of
Seminole Tribe meant that abrogating state immunity was “outside of Congress’s power
under Article I.”122 The panel rejected the possibility that Congress abrogated state
immunity under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, reasoning that if property
rights created under Congress’s Article I powers could be “property” for due process
purposes, Congress would have “a direct end-run around Seminole’s holding that Article
I powers may not be employed to avoid the Eleventh Amendment’s limit on the federal
judicial power.”123 The copyright owner petitioned for, and was granted, en banc
review.124
Prior to oral argument, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Florida Prepaid. After
reviewing the decision, the Department of Justice sent a letter advising Congress that it
would no longer defend the CRCA’s constitutionality because it believed the legislative
history of the CRCA “is not materially better than was the record in the Florida Prepaid
119

Id. at 646–47.

Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 547 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded sub nom. University of
Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184 (1996).
120
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University of Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184 (1996).

122

Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 287 (5th Cir. 1998).

123

Id. at 289.
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178 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 1998).
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case.”125 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid, the en banc Fifth
Circuit remanded the case back to the panel for reconsideration.126 On remand, the
panel held that the CRCA was not a valid abrogation of state immunity under the
Fourteenth Amendment.127 The court’s analysis tracked that of Florida Prepaid and
concluded that the CRCA failed the congruence and proportionality test because “the
record does not indicate that Congress was responding to the kind of massive
constitutional violations that have prompted proper remedial legislation, that it
considered the adequacy of state remedies that might have provided the required due
process of law, or that it sought to limit the coverage to arguably constitutional
violations.”128
Following Chavez, the Department declined to defend the CRCA in subsequent cases,
advising Congress that “the current legislative record does not support a defense of the
constitutionality of that statute in its current breadth.”129

Allen v. Cooper
The constitutionality of Congress’s effort to abrogate state sovereign immunity through
the CRCA ultimately reached the Supreme Court in Allen v. Cooper,130 which involved
allegations that North Carolina published copyrighted videos and photographs of the
recovery of the pirate Blackbeard’s ship without authorization. The district court held
that the CRCA was an effective abrogation of state immunity because “Congress was
clearly responding to a pattern of current and anticipated abuse by the states of the
copyrights held by their citizens.”131 The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that Congress
had not invoked its Fourteenth Amendment powers to abrogate in enacting the CRCA,
and even if it had, the abrogation was ineffective because the CRCA had “a similar

Letter from Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, to Dennis Hastert, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives
4 (Oct. 13, 1999), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/10-13-1999.pdf.
125

126

Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 180 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc).

127

Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 2000).

Id. at 607. The court declined to adopt the previous holding that copyrights are not “property” under the
Fourteenth Amendment, noting that under Florida Prepaid, “patent is a form of property protectable against
the states, [and] copyright would seem to be so too.” Id. at 605 n.6.
128

Letter from Loretta Lynch, U.S. Attorney General, to Paul D. Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives 1 (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/osg-530dletters/11_21_2016/download (regarding Wolf v. Oakland University Board of Trustees, et al., No.2:15-cv-13560
(E.D. Mich., filed Oct. 9, 2015)); Letter from Jeffrey B. Wall, Acting U.S. Solicitor General, to Paul D. Ryan,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 1 (May 5, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/osg_530d_letters_5_5_2017/download (regarding TC Reiner v. Saginaw Valley State University, et al.,
No. 2:16-cv-11728 (E.D. Mich., filed May 16, 2016)).
129

130

140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).

131

Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525, 535 (E.D.N.C. 2017).
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legislative record and an equally broad enactment” as the patent abrogation provision
struck down in Florida Prepaid.132
Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued two bases for abrogation of state
immunity. First, he argued that Congress had the power to abrogate under Article I
because, like the Bankruptcy Clause discussed in Katz, the Intellectual Property Clause
allowed for abrogation as part of the constitutional scheme.133 The Court rejected this
argument, holding that Seminole Tribe established that Congress could not abrogate state
sovereign immunity under Article I, despite Congress’s goal of providing uniform
remedies for intellectual property infringement.134 The Court limited the holding in Katz
to the Bankruptcy Clause, which was the product of a “‘unique history’” and “emerged
from a felt need to curb the States’ authority” at the time of the country’s founding.135
Second, the petitioner argued that the statutory text and legislative record of the CRCA
demonstrated the requisite intent to abrogate and satisfied the congruence and
proportionality test, so that the abrogation was a proper exercise of Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment powers. The Court applied a similar analysis to that of Florida
Prepaid and reached the same conclusion. Focusing on the legislative record, the Court
found the evidence of copyright infringement supporting the CRCA to be “scarcely
more impressive than what the Florida Prepaid Court saw,” amounting to “only a dozen
possible examples of state infringement.”136 The Court also pointed to congressional
testimony and Member statements suggesting that copyright infringement by states was
not a widespread problem.137
The Court further held that Congress had failed to make a sufficient showing of
unconstitutional infringement by states, finding the record of such conduct to be
“exceedingly slight.”138 It noted that only two of the infringements cited in the
legislative record appeared to be intentional, “as they must be to raise a constitutional
issue.”139 Because the Court had not determined in prior cases whether intentional
conduct includes reckless acts, it stated that for purposes of the legislative record, “an
infringement must be intentional, or at least reckless, to come within the reach of the

132

Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337, 350–52 (4th Cir. 2018).

As discussed, Katz had held that the Bankruptcy Clause enables Congress to subject nonconsenting States
to bankruptcy proceedings. Katz, 546 U.S. at 377–78.
133

134

Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1001–02.

135

Id. at 1002 (quoting Katz, 546 U.S. at 369 n.9).

136

Id. at 1006.

137

Id.

138

Id. at 1007.

139

Id. at 1006.
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Due Process Clause.”140 Moreover, the record contained “no information about the
availability of state-law remedies for copyright infringement (such as contract or unjust
enrichment suits)—even though they might themselves satisfy due process.”141 The
Court also found it problematic that the statute extended to “every infringement case
against a State,” concluding that its “‘indiscriminate scope’ [was] ‘out of proportion’ to
any due process problem.”142
The Court closed its opinion by noting that Congress had enacted the CRCA before the
Court created the ‘congruence and proportionality’ test, and therefore it “likely did not
appreciate the importance of linking the scope of its abrogation to the redress or
prevention of unconstitutional injuries—and of creating a legislative record to back up
that connection.”143 With the standard now more clear, the Court suggested that
Congress could pass future legislation that complied with the constitutional
requirements and properly abrogated state immunity.144

III.

RECORD WITH RESPECT TO STATE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDUCT

Following the Court’s decision in Allen, the Office issued an NOI requesting public
comments and soliciting examples of copyright infringement by state government
entities, officers, or employees. The sections below summarize the information
submitted in response to the NOI.

A. Evidentiary Standard
As discussed above, the Court in Allen held that the legislative record underlying the
CRCA was insufficient for abrogation because “Congress did not identify a pattern of
unconstitutional . . . infringement.”145 While a merely negligent act does not constitute
an unconstitutional deprivation of property, the Court has reserved deciding whether
reckless conduct suffices.146 Depending on future guidance from the Court, the relevant
evidence of state infringement “must be intentional, or at least reckless, to come within
the reach of the Due Process Clause.”147 In accordance with that standard, the NOI
Id. at 1004 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986) and noting that Daniels “reserve[ed]
whether reckless conduct suffices”).
140

141

Id. at 1006–07.

142

Id. at 1007 (quoting Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646–47).

143

Id.

144

Id.

145

140 S. Ct. at 1005.

146

Id. at 1004 (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n.3).

147

Id.
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requested not only information relating to the frequency of alleged infringements by
states, but also any evidence that such actions were taken intentionally or recklessly.148
Commenters disagreed as to the showing necessary to meet the intentionality standard
articulated by the Court. The American Intellectual Property Law Association
(“AIPLA”) argued that the standard merely requires “something beyond negligence” on
the part of the state.149 It contrasted that showing with the standard for establishing
willful infringement under section 504 of the Copyright Act. In AIPLA’s view, the latter
involves a higher burden of proof, requiring the plaintiff to establish that the defendant
had actual or constructive knowledge that the activity constituted infringement.150
Noting that such intent “is difficult to prove,” AIPLA urged the Office to consider to
consider “whether some non-willful acts of infringement may also unconstitutionally
deprive copyright owners of their property without due process of law.”151
The National Press Photographers Association (“NPPA”) argued that the intentionality
standard generally turns on whether the state investigated a work’s copyright status
prior to use. It pointed to case law holding that “a party may act recklessly by refusing,
as a matter of policy, to even investigate or attempt to determine whether particular
[works] are subject to copyright protections.”152 As a result, NPPA argued that “absent
other factors, copyright infringement that occurs without inquiry as to the copyrightable
status of a work is an intentional infringement, or at least ‘reckless.’”153
During the roundtables, representatives of state entities advocated for a higher standard,
under which there must be evidence that a state official had knowledge that the conduct
was infringing.154 A representative of the University of Illinois suggested focusing on
affirmative conduct by state actors, such as “removing protective watermarks and
copyright notices,” that could demonstrate whether the infringement was intentional.155
See, e.g., NOI at 34,255 (requesting information about whether state infringement “was intentional or
reckless, and the basis for that conclusion,” as well as how Congress can determine “whether copyright
infringement by a state is common or infrequent”).
148

149

AIPLA Initial Comments at 6.

150

Id.

151

Id. at 7.

NPPA Initial Comments at 10 (quoting Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 992 (9th Cir.
2017)) (alteration in original).
152

153

NPPA Initial Comments at 11.

Roundtable Tr. at 113:07–114:01 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Molnar, Ohio Attorney General’s Office) (generally
agreeing with statement that “the state actor has to know what they’re doing is unlawful and . . . do it
anyway”).
154

Roundtable Tr. at 55:01–21 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Benson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). But see
id. at 115:11–18 (Laiho, Colorado Attorney General’s Office) (“even in instances like that where it may appear
on its face that there was intent because copyright information had been removed from an image, that it’s
155
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Others argued that the analysis should focus on official acts and policies of the state
entity as an institution, rather than the unratified acts of an individual employee.156
Because the Court has yet to determine whether reckless conduct can violate the Due
Process Clause, this study takes no position on the question. In discussing the record
evidence, the Office has attempted, where possible, to indicate the extent to which the
alleged infringements “appear to be based on intentional or reckless conduct,” as
Congress requested.157 To the extent, however, that the conduct may rise only to the
level of recklessness, Congress should be mindful of the legal uncertainty in this area.

B. Evidence Submitted
Cases Filed
In the NOI, the Office asked commenters to provide examples of copyright infringement
suits brought against state entities and to specify “where the case was filed, what
claim(s) were brought regarding the infringement, whether the case remains pending,
and if not, how it was resolved.”158 In response, the Office received two lists of cases.
AIPLA submitted a list of nineteen cases that it concluded “demonstrate just a portion of
the public-record case law supporting widespread, unremedied copyright infringement
by state actors.”159 And an individual commenter, Michael Bynum, submitted a list of
158 cases that he identified as copyright infringement lawsuits for “intentional
infringement” filed after the Fifth Circuit’s Chavez decision in 2000.160 Ten cases appear
on both lists; they thus include a combined total of 167 cases.
State representatives raised concerns that these lists “are not entirely probative for the
Copyright Office’s inquiry.”161 They identified three potential deficiencies. First, they
often the case that it is not . . . a state employee who’s actually done that removal, and that they’ve
innocently obtained the image from a different website”).
Roundtable Tr. at 26:06–23 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Thro, University of Kentucky) (advocating for focus on
whether “the governmental entity has adopted a policy that actually results in a constitutional violation,”
such as “if a university had a policy that we will always violate copyright and never pay any attention to
it”); id. at 26:24–27:04 (Thro, University of Kentucky) (“[T]he fact that one in 15,000 employees at the
University of Kentucky inadvertently violates someone’s copyright, or even intentionally violates their
copyright, does not necessarily mean that the University of Kentucky has committed a constitutional
violation.”); id. at 59:03–09 (Smith, University of Kansas) (arguing that intent standard requires “find[ing
state] policy that was intentional that enabled infringement”).
156

157

Request Letter at 2.

158

NOI at 34,255.

159

AIPLA Initial Comments at 1–3.

160

Michael Bynum Reply Comments (Oct. 8, 2020).

Roundtable Tr. at 84:15–17 (Dec. 11, 2020) (MacDonald, University of California); see also University of
Michigan Library Reply Comments at 1 (asserting that “[c]omments submitted by . . . the American
161
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observed that the lists are not accompanied by “any proof, or evidence, or a
determination that, setting aside 11th Amendment sovereign immunity, the state
defendants did not have meritorious, or at least plausible, defenses that, had they been
fully litigated, . . . may have prevailed.”162 They noted that, although a case may be
dismissed based on sovereign immunity, “there are typically many meritorious defenses
that are raised . . . aside from sovereign immunity,” which “need to be carefully looked
at” to adequately probe whether there is a pervasive pattern or practice of
infringement.163 To that point, the University of Michigan Library highlighted that
“several of the[] cases were dismissed on grounds other than sovereign immunity, such
as statute of limitations.”164 Second, state representatives contended that the lists do not
“actually establish that any of the[] alleged infringements, at the time of the alleged
infringement, were done with intentional or reckless intent.”165 Finally, noting that since
1987, “over 50,000 copyright opinions were issued by U.S. courts,” state representatives
argued that the cases identified by the AIPLA, which “make up only .04% of the
copyright cases filed . . . cannot be considered widespread.”166
In response to these concerns, the Office sought to identify additional publicly available
information that would allow for a more complete analysis of the claims in these cases.
As part of that effort, the Office entered into an academic partnership with the George
Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School’s Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic.
Under the supervision of Office attorneys, law students reviewed the available public
dockets for the listed cases and recorded the following information: the state and year in
which the case was filed, the type of state defendant(s) sued, the class of work at issue, a
brief summary of the allegations as stated in the complaint, whether the plaintiff(s)
alleged “intentional,” “willful,” or “reckless” infringement, the cause(s) of action
brought, whether plaintiff(s) sought money damages, the defenses asserted, whether the
docket indicated that the parties reached a settlement agreement, whether there was a
written decision (including a brief summary of the holding), and whether the written
decision addressed sovereign immunity.

Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) unsuccessfully attempt to show widespread, intentional and
reckless copyright infringement”).
162

Roundtable Tr. at 84:17–23 (Dec. 11, 2020) (MacDonald, University of California).

163

Id. at 89:25–91:01 (MacDonald, University of California).

University of Michigan Library Reply Comments at 2 & n.8 (citing Reiner v. Canale, 301 F. Supp. 3d 727
(E.D. Mich. 2018)).
164

Roundtable Tr. at 85:10–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (MacDonald, University of California); see also University of
Michigan Library Reply Comments at 2 (stating that the cases provided by AIPLA “were not litigated on the
merits”).
165

University of Michigan Library Reply Comments at 2; see also Roundtable Tr. at 249:01–04 (Dec. 11, 2020)
(Xu, University of Michigan Library) (“[L]ast year state actors contributed 11 percent of the total GDP. And
how many state infringement[s] do we see? It’s far less than one percent.”).
166
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The results of this research are summarized below. As an initial matter, the Office notes
that, out of the 167 cases in total, only 132 are included in the analysis. The excluded
cases either were unavailable in searches of federal public records or did not involve
copyright infringement disputes.

a. General Findings
The Office’s review of the relevant cases revealed the following:
•

The 132 cases were filed between 1986 and 2020. Approximately 97% of the cases
(128) were filed between 2000 and 2020, after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Florida Prepaid.

•

The cases were filed against state entities in thirty-six states. Of the 132 cases
examined, California (14), New York (13), and Texas (12) were the states in which
infringement cases were filed the most frequently.

•

Approximately 58% of the cases (76) were brought against state-funded
educational institutions such as universities, colleges, and school districts.
Approximately 20% (27) were brought against state agencies or the state itself.
Twenty-seven cases involved claims against multiple kinds of state defendants,
including state employees in their individual capacities.

•

Literary works (58% or 77 cases) and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works (30%
or 40 cases) were the most common classes of works at issue.

•

Plaintiffs sought money damages in approximately 88% of the cases examined
(116).

•

Approximately 53% of the cases (70) resulted in written decisions.

•

Approximately 32% of the cases (42) resulted in written decisions dismissing
copyright claims on sovereign immunity grounds.

b. Allegations of Intentional Infringement
Of the cases examined, the complaints in approximately 59% (or 78 cases) included
specific allegations of intentional infringement. An additional four cases involved
allegations that defendants “knowingly” infringed or “should have known” that
infringement had occurred,167 but the pleadings were unclear as to whether these
amounted to allegations of intentional or willful infringement.
See Complaint ¶ 25, Collins v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham, No. 2:09-cv-00856-JEO (N.D. Ala. May 1, 2009),
ECF. No. 1; Complaint ¶ 17, Rescue Training Assoc. v. La. State Univ., No. 9:05-cv-81146-DTKH (S.D. Fla. Dec.
29, 2005), ECF No. 1; Complaint ¶ 22, Bergen v. County of Middlesex, New Jersey, No. 2:04-cv-03015 (D.N.J. June
167
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The Office also examined whether the filings indicated that the parties settled and, if so,
whether the settlement involved any admissions of wrongdoing. At least 27% of the
cases (32) appeared to have resulted in settlements. An additional 11% (15 cases) were
voluntarily dismissed, but it was unclear whether the actions were dismissed pursuant
to a settlement agreement. None of the cases examined indicated that the settlement
agreements contained any factual or legal admissions.
The Office found that the parties reached a settlement in 28% of the cases that involved
allegations of intentional or willful infringement (22 out of 78 cases). In several cases,
however, the actions were settled after the state entities were removed as defendants due
to sovereign immunity.168

c. Causes of Action
To assess “the extent to which copyright owners are experiencing infringements by state
entities without adequate remedies under state law,”169 the Office also recorded other
causes of action brought against state defendants in copyright infringement cases.
While all 132 cases involved allegations of copyright infringement, approximately 58%
(76 cases) included state law causes of action, such as breach of contract, deceptive trade
practices, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference. In approximately 36% of the
cases where plaintiffs brought additional causes of action (27 out of 76 cases), the courts
dismissed the copyright claims due to sovereign immunity, and the parties did not have
the opportunity to litigate the state law claims. For example, approximately 15% (20
cases) included contract-related causes of action. But in most of those cases, state
defendants succeeded on motions to dismiss the contract claims on preemption
grounds.170

25, 2004), ECF No. 1; Complaint ¶ 21, Abramowitz v. State of New Jersey, 2:03-cv-01663 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2003),
ECF No. 1.
See Campinha-Bacote v. Bleidt, No. CIV.A. H-10-3481, 2011 WL 679913 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2011) (dismissing
Texas A&M University as defendant and permitting claims against other defendants; the action against nonstate defendants was ultimately settled); Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ. Sys., 552 F.
Supp. 2d 1088, 1095–96 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing claims against university trustees, but allowing claims
against employee in individual capacity; the latter claim was settled).
168

169

Request Letter at 2.

See Maisha v. Univ. of N. Carolina, No. 1:12-CV-371, 2013 WL 1232947 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2013) (citing
sovereign immunity, court dismissed university defendant from non-copyright causes of action and
dismissed copyright claim because plaintiff had no registration), aff’d, 641 F. App’x 246 (4th Cir. 2016); Ass’n
for Info. Media & Equip. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, No. CV 10-9378 CBM MANX, 2011 WL 7447148, at
*3, *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2011) (court dismissed state university from case citing sovereign immunity and held
that contract claims were preempted); Jacobs v. Memphis Convention & Visitors Bureau, 710 F. Supp. 2d 663, 682
(W.D. Tenn. 2010) (citing sovereign immunity, court granted Tennessee tourism agency’s motion to dismiss
in case where plaintiff alleged defendants infringed copyright in photographs; Applied Pro. Training, Inc. v.
Mira Costa Coll., No. 10CV1372 DMS (POR), 2010 WL 11463186, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010) (citing
170

29

U.S. Copyright Office

Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity

d. Sovereign Immunity and Other Defenses
Finally, the Office examined both the defenses asserted by state defendants in pleadings
and the courts’ written decisions to probe whether sovereign immunity prevented the
parties from litigating the merits of the allegations. State defendants raised “sovereign
immunity” or “government immunity” as a defense in their answers in approximately
38% of the cases (50). The dockets also indicated that sovereign immunity was often
raised in motions to dismiss filed in lieu of answers, or in motions for summary
judgment. Of the seventy cases resulting in written decisions, courts dismissed the
copyright claims against state entities on sovereign immunity grounds in forty-two cases
(60%).171
Of the approximately twenty-eight written decisions that did not address sovereign
immunity, twenty-four were decided in favor of the state on either procedural or
substantive grounds.172 Only one of the written decisions addressed fair use,173 which
state defendants raised in twenty-seven cases (20%).

sovereign immunity, court granted college’s motion to dismiss in case where plaintiff alleged defendants
infringed copyright in textual works); Parker v. Dufresne, No. 09-CV-1859, 2010 WL 2671578, at *4 (W.D. La.
May 18, 2010) (citing sovereign immunity, magistrate judge recommended that claims against university be
dismissed), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV.A. 09-1859, 2010 WL 2671567 (W.D. La. June 29, 2010).
See, e.g., Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ. Sys., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093–96 (S.D.
Cal. 2008) (dismissing copyright claim against state defendant but permitting claim against state employee
in individual capacity); InfoMath, Inc. v. Univ. of Ark., 633 F. Supp. 2d 674, 678, 680–81 (E.D. Ark. 2007)
(dismissing claim for monetary damages against state defendant but permitting suit for injunctive relief); De
Romero v. Inst. of Puerto Rican Culture, 466 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421 (D.P.R. 2006) (dismissing claims against state
defendant due to sovereign immunity); Rescue Training Assocs. v. La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., No.
05-81146-CIV, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109148, at *4–6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2006) (dismissing copyright claims
against state defendants due to sovereign immunity and holding state claims preempted); Lopez v. Johnson,
No. CV 02-1572 LH/LFG, 2004 WL 7338284, at *3 (D.N.M. Jan. 22, 2004) (dismissing claims against state
employees in their official capacities due to sovereign immunity); Salerno v. City Univ. of N.Y., 191 F. Supp. 2d
352, 335–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing copyright claim on Eleventh Amendment grounds, but permitting
claims for injunctive relief against individual defendants to proceed).
171

See, e.g., Demartino v. Golston, No. 4:12-cv-372, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160242, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2013)
(adopting magistrate’s recommendation and dismissing plaintiff’s claim for failure to prosecute); MacSwan
v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, No. 2:12-CV-1404-HRH, 2013 WL 12096526, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2013)
(dismissing plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim on finding that plaintiff created the works within the
scope of their employment and thus failed to adequately allege an ownership interest in the works at issue);
Brown v. Fox Sports Net, Inc., No. SACV 08-833CJC (CTx), 2008 WL 11422121, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2008)
(dismissing copyright claim on finding that defendants were copyright owners of works at issue pursuant to
transfer agreement).
172

Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on fair use grounds), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 755 F.3d 87, 105 (2d Cir.
2014).
173
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Survey Evidence
In its notice of inquiry, the Office invited submissions of empirical studies analyzing the
degree to which copyright owners are experiencing infringement by state entities
without adequate remedies under state law, as well as the extent to which these
infringements are based on intentional or reckless conduct.174 The Office received one
such study, from the Copyright Alliance—the results of a public survey that
incorporated questions from the NOI.175 The survey solicited “feedback from copyright
owners on their experiences with copyright infringement by states and states’ claims of
sovereign immunity.”176

a. Survey Design and Methodology
The Copyright Alliance’s survey was comprised of thirty-six questions geared towards
identifying specific instances of copyright infringement by states and/or state entities.177
It was designed “in a way that [the Copyright Alliance] believed would solicit the most
accurate responses from creators and copyright owners who may not have a legal
background.”178 The survey was made available to the public on the SurveyMonkey
online platform from June 22 to August 10, 2020, and there were 657 respondents,179
consisting primarily of “small businesses or individual creators.”180

b. Survey Results
For the purposes of this report, the Office has grouped the Copyright Alliance’s survey
results into five general areas discussed in detail below.

174

NOI, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34,255 (June 3, 2020).

A copy of the Copyright Alliance’s survey is available at https://www.copyright.gov/policy/statesovereign-immunity/additional-record-materials/copyright-alliance-response-jan-15-2021.pdf.
175

Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 6; see also Roundtable Tr. at 12:05–11 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan,
Copyright Alliance).
176

For example, two questions asked, “Have you ever had a state government entity (e.g., state agency, state
university, etc.) copy, distribute or otherwise use your copyrighted work without permission in a manner
that you believed to constitute copyright infringement?” and “Has a state entity ever asserted immunity to
claims of copyright infringement in the context of a contract negotiation with you?” COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE,
COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE SURVEY RESULTS 1, 63 (2021), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/state-sovereignimmunity/additional-record-materials/copyright-alliance-response-jan-15-2021.pdf (“Copyright Alliance
Survey”).
177

Copyright Alliance Survey (Cover Page); Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7 (accord); see also
Roundtable Tr. at 12:11–14 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance).
178

179

Copyright Alliance Survey (Cover Page).

180

Roundtable Tr. at 17:09–10 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance).
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Frequency of Infringement by State Entities
The Copyright Alliance stated that the survey demonstrated that “creators and
copyright owners . . . encountered thousands of instances of infringement by state
entities.”181 One hundred fifteen respondents answered that they had experienced
infringement by a state or state entity.182 Thirty-two respondents “(29%) said that they
suffered infringement only once, while 21 [respondents] (19%) said they had suffered
infringement twice.”183 Fifty-eight respondents “(52%) responded ‘other,’ and when
asked to specify, the respondents described multiple instances of state infringement.”184
When describing these multiple instances, “people were identifying several instances,
sometimes hundreds each,”185 with respondents using the terms and phrases
“countless,” “at least a dozen,” “several,” “too many to count,” “thousands,” and
“hundreds of times.”186
Respondents were asked to identify the type of work(s) infringed, and were “able to
select as many categories as applicable” from a predetermined list.187 Of the eighty-one
respondents who answered this question, forty (49%) selected “[p]hotographs,” and
thirty-one (38%) selected “[b]ooks/poems/blogs/articles.”188 Thirteen respondents (16%)
selected “[a]udio/sound recordings (including recordings of songs),” while twelve
respondents (15%) selected “[m]ovies/TV shows/videos.”189 All remaining categories
received fewer than ten responses each.190

181

Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7.

182

Copyright Alliance Survey at 1; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7.

183

Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7; see also Copyright Alliance Survey at 1–2.

184

Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7; see also Copyright Alliance Survey at 1–4.

185

Roundtable Tr. at 206:16–18 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance).

186

Copyright Alliance Survey at 3–4.

Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7 n.25 (“Survey respondents were able to select as many
categories as applicable from a list that included: (1) audio/sound recordings (including recordings of
songs), (2) books/poems/blogs/articles, (3) choreography, (4) databases, (5) jewelry/fashion designs, (6)
magazines/newsletters/newspapers/periodicals, (7) movies/tv shows/videos, (8) musical compositions/song
lyrics, (9) paintings/illustrations, graphic designs, (10) photographs, (11) scripts/screenplays, (12) sculptures,
(13) software/codes/video games/apps, and (14) other (please specify).”); see also Copyright Alliance Survey
at 14–16.
187

188

Copyright Alliance Survey; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7.

189

Copyright Alliance Survey at 14–16; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7.

Some of the responses provided in the “Other” category appear to identify non-copyrightable material or
potential violations other than copyright infringement. See Copyright Alliance Survey at 16 (responses
within the “other” category include “[p]rivacy invasion and legal rights as a native American,”
“trademarked phrase ‘Welcome to the D’ used on all World Series promo material,” “[m]y brand name,”
and “[r]adio station name and design”); see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7–8.
190
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When asked to identify the state entity involved in the infringement, forty-eight of the
eighty-four respondents (57%) identified state universities or institutions of higher
learning.191 Respondents also identified “state tourism boards, departments of natural
resources, and museums.”192 Some respondents noted, however, that they could not
“keep track” due to the numerous instances of infringement, were unable to recall or
could not identify the alleged infringer, or were “uncomfortable ‘exposing’” the alleged
infringer.193
The survey also asked respondents to indicate when the alleged infringements occurred.
The responses spanned the period from 1978 through 2020, with an upslope of
infringements reported “starting in the mid-to-late 90s and increasing yearly through the
2000s and 2010s, with the most instances occurring in 2019 (32 instances or 40% of
responses).”194 The Copyright Alliance attributes this increase in cases to the growth of
the internet and “the Florida Prepaid and Chavez cases that challenged the validity of the
CRCA and may have resulted in states taking . . . a more liberal approach to
unauthorized use of copyright-protected works.”195
Respondents were asked whether they monitored for infringement. Two hundred
eighty-three respondents (57%) stated “no,” while 217 respondents (43%) stated “yes.”196
Several respondents who answered “no” noted the difficulty and frustration of
monitoring for infringement.197 The Copyright Alliance interpreted this data to suggest
that the number of actual instances of copyright infringement by a state or state entity is
likely higher than what the survey reflects.198

191

Copyright Alliance Survey at 9–12; see Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 8.

192

Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 8; see also Copyright Alliance Survey at 10–11.

193

Copyright Alliance Survey at 13–14.

Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 8; see also Copyright Alliance Survey at 16–21; Roundtable Tr. at
14:01–07 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance) (discussing the “clear trend of increasing
infringements” starting in the mid-to-late 90s).
194

Roundtable Tr. at 14:08–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); see also Copyright Alliance
Initial Comments at 8.
195

Letter from Copyright Alliance, to U.S. Copyright Office 64 (Jan. 15, 2021); see also Copyright Alliance
Initial Comments at 14. The survey revealed that even if creators and copyright owners were monitoring for
infringement, 182 out of 280 respondents (65%) were unsure that such monitoring efforts would detect state
infringement. Copyright Alliance Survey at 64–65.
196

See Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 15. Respondents stated that “[i]t’s too difficult and timeconsuming”” to monitor for infringement, “[monitoring] was so time-consuming and I rarely got anywhere.
I finally gave up,” and “[t]his. . . is just another David & Goliath situation where the small copyright owner
is the loser.” Copyright Alliance Survey at 68, 69, 74. Others responded that they were not “sure what to do
about copyright infringement” after they “found out [about the infringement] by accident.” Id. at 68.
197

Roundtable Tr. at 13:14–20 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); see also id. at 13:21–25 (Madigan,
Copyright Alliance) (“I would also note that the numbers don’t account for matters settled confidentially out
198
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State Entities’ Intent
The survey asked whether respondents believe the infringement committed by state
entities was intentional. Out of the seventy-two respondents who answered, forty-two
(58%) believed that the infringement was intentional, twenty-two (31%) were unsure of
whether the infringement was intentional or inadvertent, and eight (11%) believed that
the infringement was inadvertent.199
The survey allowed respondents to provide a narrative description as to why they
believed the infringement was intentional. Forty-two responses were provided.200 In the
Copyright Alliance’s view, this information “showed at least non-negligent examples of
infringement.”201 The Copyright Alliance pointed to examples in which respondents
stated that “an attorney’s warnings were ignored, copyright management information
(CMI) on the works was ignored or removed, or use of the works continued when an
entity was aware that a license had expired.”202 Other respondents “recounted situations
where permission was asked by the state entity, and when permission was denied, the
entity went on to make unauthorized use of the work anyway.”203
Response by State Entities
The survey asked whether respondents tried to contact or notify the state entity about
the infringement once it was discovered. Forty-eight respondents (69%) stated that they
tried to notify the state entity, seventeen (24%) said that they did not attempt to do so,
and five (7%) were unsure.204 The survey allowed respondents to provide a narrative
description of the state’s response; forty-eight responses were provided.205 According to
the Copyright Alliance, a majority of respondents “described situations in which they
of court or situations where the owners didn’t pursue enforcement due to the perceived sort of futility of
remedies available when suing states.”); Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 14–15 (“With such a large
number of respondents not monitoring for infringement, it’s likely both that many state infringements are
not discovered and that a majority of copyright owners are unaware of the extent of lost revenue, licensing
opportunities, and other harms associated with state infringement.”).
Copyright Alliance Survey at 25–26; see Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 9; Copyright Alliance
Reply Comments at 3–4.
199

200

See Copyright Alliance Survey at 26–29; Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 9.

Roundtable Tr. at 64:16–20 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); see also id. at 65:05–08 (Madigan,
Copyright Alliance) (stating that the survey shows “intentional, non-negligent instances of infringement”).
201

Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 9; see Copyright Alliance Reply Comments at 4 (similar);
Roundtable Tr. at 64:21–65:03 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); Copyright Alliance Survey at
26–29.
202

Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 9; see also Copyright Alliance Reply Comments at 4; Roundtable
Tr. at 64:21–65:03 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); Copyright Alliance Survey at 26–29.
203

204

Copyright Alliance Survey at 33 (Jan. 15, 2021); see Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12.

205

Copyright Alliance Survey at 33–35.
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were not taken seriously, their concerns were ignored, and the infringement
continued.”206 In some instances, “respondents said that the entity made general claims
about having the ‘right’ to use the work,” while in other cases it was reported that “the
entity ceased the infringing activity or a settlement was reached.”207 In a separate
question, the survey asked whether the state asserted “that it was not liable for the
infringement due to the fact that states are generally immune from being sued under the
11th Amendment to the Constitution.”208 Twenty-one respondents (44%) said that the
state entity asserted sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment, while sixteen
(33%) reported that sovereign immunity was not asserted, and eleven (23%) did not
recall.209
Suits against State Entities
When asked if they sued the state entity for copyright infringement, thirteen out of
seventy respondents (19%) responded “yes.”210 The survey does not indicate how many
suits were filed by each respondent. The Copyright Alliance notes that “[f]or those who
sued, 3 brought claims in Texas, 2 in California, and single cases were brought in 26
other states, U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia.”211 All but one of these suits
were filed between 2014 and 2020.212
Effect of Sovereign Immunity on Infringement and Licensing
A number of survey questions asked about the effect state sovereign immunity may be
having on the licensing of copyrighted materials to states. In response to whether a state
entity has ever asserted sovereign immunity in the context of a contract negotiation,
sixty-seven respondents (88%) answered “no,” and nine (12%) answered “yes.”213 Fiftyeight respondents (76%) answered that they did not change their sales and licensing
practices with states as a result of their immunity from copyright infringement.214
Similarly, a majority of respondents (56%) stated that they do not provide different
licensing or payment terms in transactions with a state entity than are provided to other
Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12; see also Copyright Alliance Survey at 33–35 (listing the fortyeight responses provided by respondents).
206

Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12; see also Copyright Alliance Survey at 33–35 (listing the fortyeight responses provided by respondents).
207

208

Copyright Alliance Survey at 35–36; see Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12.

209

Copyright Alliance Survey at 35–36; see Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12.

210

Copyright Alliance Survey at 36; see Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12.

211

Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12; see Copyright Alliance Survey at 36–43.

212

Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12; see Copyright Alliance Survey at 43–48.

213

Copyright Alliance Survey at 63; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 14.

214

Copyright Alliance Survey at 61–63; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 14.
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parties, while eighteen respondents (23%) answered “yes,” and sixteen respondents
(21%) answered “not sure.”215 Those who answered “yes” provided no further
information.

c. Survey Critiques
Commenters representing state entities challenged the reliability of the Copyright
Alliance’s survey, arguing that it is not probative of widespread, intentional copyright
infringement by states. Several commenters contended that the sample size of 657
respondents was not large enough to be representative, particularly given that the
Copyright Alliance represents over 1.8 million individual creators.216 For example,
noting that “only 115 [of the Copyright Alliance’s] members claimed that they had
experienced copyright infringement by state entities,” the University of Michigan
Library argued that “this means that .006% of their membership has allegedly
experienced copyright infringement by states.”217
These commenters also faulted the survey for its reliance on respondents’ subjective
beliefs that infringement had occurred and that states had acted with the requisite
intent.218 Several noted that the survey did not account for exceptions or defenses other
than sovereign immunity that may have independently precluded liability.219 For
Copyright Alliance Survey at 60–61; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 14; Roundtable Tr. at
67:10–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance) (discussing the survey results for different licensing
or payment terms by respondents to states or state entities).
215

See, e.g., Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (“APLU”) and the Association of American
Universities (“AAU”) Reply Comments at 3 (noting that the Copyright Alliance’s survey is “based on a small
sample size”); Roundtable Tr. at 18:06–20 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Benson, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign) (discussing the issue with total number of respondents in the Copyright Alliance’s survey).
216

University of Michigan Library Reply Comments at 1–2; see also Roundtable Tr. at 205:17–206:03 (Dec. 11,
2020) (Band, Library Copyright Alliance) (discussing the number of alleged infringements reported in the
Copyright Alliance’s survey compared to the size of the Copyright Alliance’s membership).
217

See Association of Southeastern Research Libraries (“ASERL”) and the Greater Western Library Alliance
Reply Comments at 2–3; University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Reply Comments at 1; APLU & AAU
Reply Comments at 4–5 (noting that information was not collected on whether (1) copyrighted works were
registered, a prerequisite to a copyright infringement lawsuit for U.S. works; (2) the works were joint works,
collective works, works made for hire, or transferred or assigned by the original copyright owner; or (3)
whether the party claiming copyright infringement owned the copyright at the time of the alleged
infringement).
218

See Association of University Presses Reply Comments at 2 (discussing cases that were dismissed for
reasons other than sovereign immunity or would likely fall within fair use); id. (“Ms. Kelly’s unsuccessful
litigation against Mississippi was not decided on state sovereign immunity grounds; rather the court there
concluded that, in her zeal, the plaintiff’s pre-publication lawsuit had to be dismissed on grounds of
ripeness.”) (emphasis in original); University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Reply Comments at 1–2
(discussing that there was no evidence in the Copyright Alliance’s survey showing the availability of
defenses or limitations to copyright infringement); APLU & AAU Reply Comments at 12 (noting a list of
defenses that states and state entities can assert against copyright infringement claims).
219
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example, they noted that information was not collected on whether copyright owners
declined to take action against state university libraries or educational institutions
because the uses were protected by the exemptions for such entities under sections 108
and 110 of the Copyright Act.220 Likewise, commenters pointed to the survey’s failure to
address whether the states’ actions may have constituted fair use.221
The Copyright Alliance responded to these critiques in its reply comments and at the
roundtables. In response to the contention that the survey is not probative of
widespread, intentional infringement, the Copyright Alliance pointed to the volume of
the alleged infringements cited by respondents, noting that “people were identifying
several instances, sometimes hundreds each.”222 With respect to criticism that the survey
relied on respondents’ subjective beliefs, the Copyright Alliance asserted that “there was
a pattern shown in the responses to our survey that showed at least non-negligent
examples of infringement.”223 And it argued that concerns regarding exceptions and
limitations are “not entirely relevant” because “whether we abrogate or adjust state
sovereign immunity would have no effect on a state[] entity’s ability to defend itself by
showing fair use or invoking any other limitation and exception.”224

Specific Examples
The Office also received comments describing specific instances of alleged infringement
by state entities. These examples are discussed in the following sections, which are
organized by the type of work at issue.

See APLU & AAU Reply Comments at 5–6; see also Roundtable Tr. at 19:05–10 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Benson,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) (discussing exceptions that apply to university libraries and
educational institutions).
220

See University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Reply Comments at 1–2 (“The survey instrument should
have included a definition of fair use. Similarly, the questions should have added a statement at
the end such as ‘when the use was not a fair use’ to encourage the respondents to consider how
many instances of infringement (absent sovereign immunity) would be actionable in court.”); Roundtable Tr.
at 18:21–19:04, 19:11–22 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Benson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) (discussing the
concern about whether fair use was considered in the Copyright Alliance’s survey).
222 Roundtable Tr. at 206:16–18 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); see also id. at 74:16–19
(Madigan, Copyright Alliance) (“I think it’s important to understand that there’s no magic number of
infringements or a bright line that would trigger congressional action.”).
221

Roundtable Tr. at 64:18–20 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); see also id. at 65:04–08 (Madigan,
Copyright Alliance) (“[W]hile I’m sure there are plenty of inadvertent infringements, there does appear to
also be intentional, non-negligent instances of infringement, which I know some of the authors and creators
can attest to.”); Copyright Alliance Reply Comments at 3–4 (discussing the survey results regarding
intentional or inadvertent infringement).
223

Roundtable Tr. at 22:09–16 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); see also id. at 23:07–19 (Madigan,
Copyright Alliance) (arguing that sovereign immunity “hinders the development of the fair use doctrine”).
224
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a. News Publishing
Commenters representing news publishers contended that their industry has
experienced large-scale infringement by state entities.225 They relied primarily on a
recent instance in which it was alleged that “over 4,000 news outlets suffered from
unauthorized copying and republication of their content by an instrumentality of the
State of California over an eight-year period.”226 Copyright owners argued that this
example alone demonstrates “systematic industrial-scale copyright infringement” by a
state actor.227
As described by commenters, in 2017 multiple news outlets, including Dow Jones &
Company, The Washington Post, The New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and
McClatchy, discovered that the California Public Employee’s Retirement System
(“CalPERS”), a state agency that manages pension and health benefits for more than two
million members,228 “was copying, republishing, and distributing thousands of protected
news articles without having acquired a license or authorization from the publishers.”229
These commenters alleged that CalPERS maintained a publicly accessible website where
it reproduced, without authorization, full-text news articles,230 and that CalPERS sent
daily emails to its senior officials and stakeholders with curated links to full-text articles
reproduced on the CalPERS website.231
Commenters reported that the infringement began in 2009, and continued until it was
discovered in 2017.232 The News Media Alliance asserted that “[i]n total, during the
eight-year period, CalPERS republished approximately 53,000 news articles from
roughly 4,500 news organizations,” including “over 9,000 full-text articles from The Wall
Street Journal, almost 6,900 from The New York Times, over 5,500 from The Los Angeles
Times, almost 3,900 from The Sacramento Bee, and almost 2,000 from The Washington

225

News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 3.

226

Id.

227

Roundtable Tr. at 49:17–24 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Linder, Dow Jones & Company).

About CalPERS: Facts at a Glance for Fiscal Year 2019–20, CALPERS, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/formspublications/facts-about.pdf.
228

News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 3; see Brief for Dow Jones & Company, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 4–5, 8 n.7, Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (No. 18-877); Roundtable Tr. at 51:10–
23 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Munter, News Media Alliance).
229

230

News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 3–4; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 11.

231

News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 4; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 11.

News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 3 (citing Yves Smith, CalPERS Pays $3.4 Million to Dow Jones to
Settle Massive Copyright Infringement That We Exposed, NAKED CAPITALISM, Jul. 26, 2018,
https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2018/07/calpers-pays-3-4-milliondow-jones-settle-massive-copyrightinfringement-exposed.html).
232
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Post.”233 According to the News Media Alliance, “there was no indication that CalPERS
had acquired a license to republish or distribute any of these articles.”234
Copyright owners argued that CalPERS’s actions were deliberate and constituted a
“systematic violation” of news publishers’ copyrights.235 Because of the prolonged and
widespread nature of the infringement, publishers concluded that CalPERS actions must
have been intentional, and not merely accidental or reckless.236 They noted many of the
articles at issue were originally published behind paywalls and on paid news databases,
such that obtaining the articles likely required planning and effort.237
The News Media Alliance reported that several of its members contacted the agency to
alert it to the infringing activity.238 In at least some cases, “CalPERS responded through
the office of the Attorney General, indicating that it had taken down the public website
on June 17, 2017, and that the agency was asserting sovereign immunity for all copyright
claims.”239 The News Media Alliance stated that it is not aware of any publisher that
filed suit against CalPERS; instead, “at least three Alliance members decided to settle the
claims,” with settlement amounts reportedly “var[ying] between low six figures and low
seven figures.”240
In the News Media Alliance’s view, these amounts fall well short of the damages that
could have been obtained had the publishers been able to pursue their claims in court. It
estimated that in one case, CalPERS avoided paying Dow Jones & Company “tens of
millions of dollars” for reproducing 9,000 articles from multiple Dow Jones
publications.241 Despite the estimated value, Dow Jones & Company was only able to
secure a settlement of $3.4 million.242 Publishers expressed concern that even these
reduced amounts will be difficult to obtain in the wake of Allen.243 During the
roundtables, a representative of Dow Jones noted that the company was in the midst of
negotiating a settlement with a government entity in another state that had allegedly
233

News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 4.

234

Id.

235

Id.

236

Id. at 4–5.

237

Id. at 5.

238

Id.

News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 5; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 11 (stating
that, in response to Dow Jones & Company, “CalPERS asserted that sovereign immunity exempted it from
any liability”).
239

240

News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 5.

241

Id. at 4.

242

Id. at 5.

243

Roundtable Tr. at 48:03-11 (Dec. 11. 2020) (Linder, Dow Jones & Company).
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engaged in “industrial reproduction of Dow Jones’ articles without any conceivable fair
use.”244 The representative testified that, in response to the company’s complaint, the
state entity pointed “directly to sovereign immunity,” citing Allen.245

b. Music
SoundExchange, the entity designated to collect and distribute royalties under the
statutory licenses for certain digital public performances of sound recordings, filed
comments describing alleged instances of infringement by state college radio stations.
According to SoundExchange, “public college webcasters have not complied with” the
statutory licensing requirements under sections 112 and 114 of the Copyright Act, “nor,
to our knowledge, obtained direct licenses from copyright owners as an alternative. In
some cases, they have expressly refused to pay statutory royalties on sovereign
immunity grounds.”246
Based on an informal estimate, SoundExchange identified approximately 350 public
campus radio stations “that appear to regularly stream music programming over the
internet.”247 Of those, “only about two thirds (about 245 stations) [had] paid
SoundExchange statutory royalties for 2020.”248 SoundExchange noted that, among the
approximately 100 stations that had not paid, almost 40 had paid in 2019.249 It
speculated that in some cases this change may have been due to “publicity concerning
the sovereign immunity issue occasioned by the Supreme Court’s consideration of Allen
v. Cooper,” but it acknowledged that it had “no direct evidence” of such a link.250
SoundExchange stated that it does not maintain comprehensive records of instances in
which it has contacted public university webcasters about these issues,251 but it provided
specific information regarding two such communications. First, it described
correspondence with WUTK, the college radio station at the University of Tennessee, in
2015 and 2016. After conducting investigative activities that identified WUTK as a
nonpaying service, SoundExchange had “regular contact with WUTK about obtaining

244

Id. at 48:12–18 (Linder, Dow Jones & Company).

245

Id. at 48:17–18 (Linder, Dow Jones & Company).

246

SoundExchange Initial Comments at 1.

247

Id. at 8.

248

Id.

249

Id. at 9.

250

Id. at 9, 11.

Id. at 4; see also id. (“[W]e have occasionally identified college webcasters that are infringing by using
sound recordings without licensing and have contacted them about getting licensed. . . . [T]o the best
recollection of the SoundExchange staff involved, we have contacted public college webcasters about
licensing more than a few times over the years, sometimes with success and sometimes not.”).
251
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license coverage for its webcasting” activities, which “culminat[ed] in a ‘final notice’ sent
in April 2016.”252 While WUTK ultimately paid statutory royalties for 2016, the station
“declined to take steps to address its unlicensed use of copyrighted recordings in prior
years.”253 As an exhibit to its comments, SoundExchange submitted a letter it received
from the University of Tennessee’s general counsel’s office stating that “[t]he University
of Tennessee, as an arm of the State of Tennessee, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity in federal court,” and therefore “there is no jurisdictional basis for
SoundExchange to ‘pursue additional legal measures against WUTK’ regarding any
request for payments to cover past years.”254 SoundExchange reported that WUTK
“subsequently paid statutory royalties for 2017 to 2019,” but had not done so for 2020 as
of the time SoundExchange’s comments were submitted.255
The second public university webcaster identified by SoundExchange is WHCJ, the
college radio station at Savannah State University. According to SoundExchange, WHCJ
has webcast its programming “since at least 2009” and “has never paid statutory
royalties to SoundExchange.”256 After SoundExchange “made repeated attempts to
contact WHCJ to address its infringing transmissions,” it received a letter from Georgia
Department of Law asserting that the Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia, of which Savannah State is a member institution, “has immunity from a suit for
damages” under the Eleventh Amendment.257 The letter stated that the state of Georgia
nevertheless “endeavors to support the law” and that the Department of Law would
contact SoundExchange after investigating the matter further.258 SoundExchange,
however, has “no record of further contact about this matter from the State of
Georgia.”259
Several commenters representing state entities challenged the evidence presented by
SoundExchange, arguing that it reflects only a small number of instances that do not
amount to widespread copyright infringement.260 APLU & AAU asserted that the
252

Id. at 5.

253

Id. at 6.

254

Id. Ex. A at 1–2 (citations omitted).

255

Id. at 6.

256

Id. at 7, 8.

257

Id. at 7, Ex. B at 1.

258

Id. Ex. B at 1.

259

Id. at 8.

See, e.g., University of Michigan Library Reply Comments at 2 (“SoundExchange also relies on shaky
evidence to show widespread infringement. . . . Even if there are actual (and even egregious) examples of
infringement in SoundExchange’s comment, a few examples from one or two state universities are not
evidence of widespread infringement by state universities or other state actors across the country.”)
(footnote omitted).
260
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evidence actually shows that a “supermajority of public schools do pay royalties, which
hardly exposes a pattern of systematic non-compliance.”261 They further challenged
SoundExchange’s suggestion that the lack of statutory royalty payments for 2020 is
attributable to Allen, emphasizing that the March 2020 decision in Allen came two
months after the January due date for payments.262 And the University of Michigan
Library faulted SoundExchange for “ignor[ing] the major adjustments their customers
. . . fac[ed] during the pandemic,” which saw college and university campuses close at
the beginning of March.263 One commenter also noted that SoundExchange made “no
indication . . . of whether the purported rate of non-compliance by public colleges and
universities is significantly higher than the non-compliance by private colleges and
universities.”264

c. Computer Programs
The Software and Information Industry Association (“SIIA”), a trade association for the
software and information industries, provided information regarding alleged
infringement of computer software products by states. It stated that between 2011 and
September 2020, SIIA received “86 reports of infringement by state government entities,
including universities, school districts, police departments, and administrative
agencies.”265 According to SIIA, this total represents approximately one twentieth of the
total number of infringements reported through its online piracy reporting portal.266
These reports indicated that the number of computers involved in these cases “ranged
from as low as five and as high as 30,000—totaling thousands of potential acts of
infringement of member software.”267 SIIA noted that “[a]s a general rule, these works
contained both licenses advising users of the scope of copyright protection as well as a

261

APLU & AAU Reply Comments at 3 (emphasis in original).

Id. at 3 n.12 (noting that SoundExchange “admit[ted] that it ha[d] ‘no direct evidence linking this shift to
Allen v. Cooper’”) (quoting SoundExchange Initial Comments at 11); id. at 3 (“It is hard to imagine . . . that
public university webcasters were emboldened to neglect statutory royalty payments in January 2020 in
prospective reliance on a Supreme Court case that was not decided until late March 2020.”).
262
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University of Michigan Library Reply Comments at 2.

264

APLU & AAU Reply Comments at 3.

SIIA Reply Comments at 8. SIAA noted that it had previously identified seventy-seven alleged instances
of state infringement at a congressional hearing on this issue in 2003. Id. at 7–8; see also Intellectual Property
Protection Restoration Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2344 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 48 (2003) (statement of Mark Bohannon, General
Counsel and Senior Vice President, Public Policy, SIIA). SIIA stated that it was unable to retrieve data for the
years between 2002 and 2011. SIIA Reply Comments at 8.
265
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SIIA Reply Comments at 8.

267

Id.
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properly affixed copyright notice.”268 SIIA did not provide further details on the nature
or resolution of these allegations.
In addition, SIIA cited two recent cases in which software developers brought
infringement claims against state entities in federal court.269 In the first case, a developer
filed suit against the Nebraska Department of Education for allegedly creating an
infringing version of a software product it had previously licensed before terminating
the license in favor of the newly created software.270 The court granted the department’s
motion to dismiss, holding that the state only waived sovereign immunity as to claims
arising from the parties’ contract, but that the infringement claims arose out of the
Copyright Act rather than the parties’ contract.271 In the second case, Oracle filed suit for
copyright infringement, among other claims, against the Oregon Health Insurance
Exchange Information and the State of Oregon, alleging continued use of a software
program despite lack of payment.272 Regarding the infringement claim, the court
concluded that Oregon waived sovereign immunity in its agreement with Oracle.273
In a separate comment, Glenn Forbis, an intellectual property attorney in Michigan,
described alleged instances of infringement suffered by Dassault Systèmes S.A. and its
subsidiaries. Dassault “is the creator of several substantial software solutions in the area
of 3D CAD modeling applications, simulation applications, social and collaborative
application, and information intelligence applications.”274 According to Mr. Forbis, each
month “hundreds of entities . . . use unlicensed and illegal copies of Dassault’s software,
many times downloaded from internet sites,” and “a substantial number of [these users]
are public universities.”275 Mr. Forbis reported that these unlicensed uses “can reach into
the several hundreds of thousands of dollars.”276
Mr. Forbis stated that Dassault has contacted several public universities “seeking
cooperation to cease the ongoing use of the unlicensed copies of Dassault’s software and
to receive just compensation for the past unlicensed use.”277 Many times, however,
Dassault is “ignored,” resulting in the continuance of the unlicensed uses and no
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Id.

269

Id. at 10.

270

eScholar LLC v. Neb. Dep’t of Educ., 497 F. Supp. 3d 414, 420–21 (D. Neb. 2020).

271

Id. at 429–30. The court held that the breach of contract claims could go forward. Id. at 430.
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compensation for past uses.278 In other cases, Mr. Forbis reported, the university
representative “has flatly used the sovereign immunity of the state government from
copyright infringement actions as an excuse to deprive Dassault of relief.”279

d. Photographs and Video
Copyright owners pointed to several examples of state infringement involving
photographic works. This evidence included both aggregated data and descriptions of
specific allegations by individual copyright owners.
The Copyright Alliance provided data that, in its view, indicates the pervasiveness of
state infringement of photographs online.280 It engaged PicRights, “an international
organization that monitors for copyright infringement involving photographs and
assists with enforcement and claims resolution” to search for instances of state
infringement.281 Typically, PicRights analysts crawl the internet searching for
unauthorized uses of images, and, according to the Copyright Alliance, “frequently
come across state entity websites that have reproduced copyright protected works of
their clients.”282 Because “PicRights is familiar with the state sovereign immunity
doctrine and the uncertainty surrounding state remedies,” however, the organization
“does not prioritize tracking or responding to instances of potential state
infringement.”283
At the request of the Copyright Alliance, and for the purpose of this study, PicRights
“conducted targeted searches aimed at uncovering specific instances of state copyright
infringements,” using “state names and a list of keywords that were likely to be
incorporated in the name of a state entity.”284 Running searches for the period between
2017 and 2020, PicRights found “110 instances of potential infringement, with the most
hits identifying websites for institutions of higher learning” in states such as Texas, New
York, California, and Florida.285 PicRights also identified potential infringement on state
entity websites for “state bar associations, visitors’ bureaus, departments of
transportation, and hospitals.”286 According to the Copyright Alliance, “[t]hese results
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are likely only the tip of the iceberg,” indicating that “state entities continue to make
unauthorized use of copyright protected works online.”287
In addition, the Copyright Alliance and several individual photographers provided the
following allegations of specific instances of state infringement:
•

The Copyright Alliance described claims asserted by a Houston-based
photographer, Jim Olive, against the University of Houston.288 Mr. Olive took an
aerial photograph of the City of Houston while harnessed from a helicopter and
made it available on his website for purchase.289 He alleges that the university
downloaded the photograph from his website, removed all identifying marks,
and, without authorization, displayed the photograph on several pages on its
website to market its College of Business.290 Mr. Olive discovered the alleged
infringement three years after the university first began displaying the image.291
In 2017, Mr. Olive sued the university in Texas state court, contending that the
use of the photograph constituted an unlawful taking under the federal and
Texas state constitutions’ takings clauses.292 The Texas Court of Appeals held that
Mr. Olive’s takings claim, based on a single alleged act of copyright infringement,
was not viable under the federal or state takings clauses.293 In 2021, the Texas
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that factual
“[a]llegations of copyright infringement assert a violation of the owner’s
copyright, but not its confiscation, and therefore . . . do not alone allege a
taking.”294

•

The Copyright Alliance also described alleged infringement of the work of David
K. Langford, a photographer who produces Western-themed images.295 In 2010,
Mr. Langford discovered that one of his images had been used without his
authorization as the background on approximately 4.5 million Texas state vehicle
registration stickers.296 He later discovered that the image “had been scanned by
a state prison inmate and reproduced under a Texas Department of Criminal
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Justice contract with the Department of Public Safety.”297 After attempting to
resolve the issue by contacting the agencies directly, Mr. Langford filed suit in
Texas state court for personal property theft under Texas’s Private Property
Rights Protection Act.298 Mr. Langford did not bring a claim for copyright
infringement because he anticipated that the state agency would raise a
sovereign immunity defense.299 Mr. Langford ultimately reached a settlement
with the agency.300
•

Photographer Mike Boatman submitted comments describing alleged instances
of infringement by government entities in two states.301 First, Mr. Boatman
alleged that the City of Memphis, Tennessee distributed three of his images to
Weekly Reader, a national publication circulated to public elementary schools in
the United States.302 Because he was “[b]arred from filing federal copyright
litigation due to sovereign immunity,” he sought damages based on the city’s
alleged failure to return the physical transparencies containing the original
images.303
The second incident Mr. Boatman described involves a photograph that he took
of Kane Wasalenchuk, a professional racquetball player.304 Mr. Boatman alleged
that the University of North Carolina Asheville appropriated his image to market
a physical education course on racquetball to their students.305 Mr. Boatman’s
comment includes a letter he received from the University’s general counsel’s
office after bringing the issue to its attention.306 The letter states that the
photograph had been removed from the University’s website but that “[t]he
University, as a state body, is immune from suit under the legal theory outlined
in your letter, pursuant to 11th Amendment sovereign immunity.”307 It further
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stated that if Mr. Boatman brought suit, the University would “pursue any and
all actions available to it, including Rule 11 sanctions as applicable.”308
•

Ryan French, a photographer and videographer, submitted comments describing
alleged infringement by the Florida Department of Transportation (“FDOT”).
According to Mr. French, in 2011 the agency ran a bicycle safety campaign called
“See the Blind Spots,” which included “public service announcements on
broadcast television statewide.”309 Mr. French alleged that FDOT’s
announcements included “multiple clips of accidents [Mr. French] posted on his
website and YouTube” with his “watermark . . . intentionally blurred.”310 He
stated that when he contacted FDOT, it “would not take responsibility for the
problem,” blaming the “‘mistake’ on the marketing agency . . . hired to produce
the videos.”311 Mr. French explained that “[t]he ad was pulled” and that he “filed
a copyright complaint on the online-PSA hosted on various video platforms, but
was not compensated.”312

•

Rick Allen, the plaintiff in Allen, submitted comments describing a separate
instance of alleged infringement involving the state of Alabama. He alleged that
in 2010, the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources
(“ADCNR”) misappropriated an underwater image he created of a rare shark,
altered the image to remove the attribution, and displayed it on the department’s
website.313 After becoming aware of the infringement, Mr. Allen contacted the
ADCNR with a letter of complaint and an invoice for use of the image.314 While
the ADCNR agreed to remove the image from its site, the agency did not pay the
requested fee.315

•

Pixsy Inc., submitted comments describing its research into alleged state
infringement of photographs and other visual works. Pixsy is an “image
licensing and copyright agent for photographers, agencies, artists, designers and
illustrators,” with “artificial intelligence technology” that can “scan the public

Id.; see also Mike Boatman Initial Comments at 3 (same). In their reply comments, APLU & AAU noted
that Mr. Boatman ultimately reached a settlement with the University for $4,000, an amount they assert is
“above the cost of a license.” APLU & AAU Reply Comments at 12.
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internet” to inform their clients “where and how their images have been used.”316
Pixsy reported 41,245 uses of client images by 1,625 U.S. postsecondary
institutions with .edu domains, which “represents approximately $16.5 million in
image licensing revenue for the creative industries” based on an average
licensing fee amount of $400 per image use.317 According to Pixsy, “[t]he image
industry has found that 85% of image uses online are unauthorized uses.”318
Based on that percentage, it estimated that photographers and artists have likely
lost approximately $14 million in licensing revenue to postsecondary
institutions.319
Pixsy argued that lost licensing fees are often unrecoverable when public
institutions, which represent 30% of postsecondary institutions in the United
States, are responsible for the unauthorized use.320 It alleged that “while some
U.S. State entities pay license fees to cover the use of . . . clients’ images on their
websites, many representatives of State entities refer to State sovereign immunity
and do not pay a license fee as a result.”321 To support its claim, Pixsy provided a
sample of six letters it received from representatives of state entities in response
to requests for license fees.322 In each letter, the state entity agreed to cease its use
of the identified third party image(s), but refused to pay the requested retroactive
licensing fee, citing sovereign immunity.323

e. Books
Copyright owners provided several examples of alleged state infringement relating to
books and similar types of literary works.
•

The Copyright Alliance’s comments described allegations asserted by Dr. Keith
Bell, “a leading expert on sports performance enhancement” and the author of
several books, including Winning Isn’t Normal and The Nuts and Bolts of Psychology
for Swimmers.324 Dr. Bell also testified on his own behalf during the roundtables.
According to the Copyright Alliance, while Dr. Bell “has identified infringement
by a variety of individuals and organizations, ranging from small business to
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Fortune 500 companies,” the “most common and damaging infringement Dr. Bell
comes across has been by state entities, specifically by public schools,
universities, and colleges.”325 Dr. Bell testified that state entities have
“distributed [and] disseminated” his registered books “out to, literally, millions
of people without any kind of remuneration from them.”326 Providing an
example, he alleged that “eight of the[] sports [teams]” at the University of
Louisville “infringed on [his] copyright, [and] gave attribution to anonymous.”327
He reported to the Copyright Alliance that he has “personally sent cease and
desist letters to at least nine universities and colleges” and “more than 100 public
school districts.”328 But he has “not pursued copyright infringement claims
against roughly 120 other universities and colleges and many hundreds of public
schools because of likely sovereign immunity defenses.”329
•

The Copyright Alliance described allegations by Michael Bynum, an author who
has written and edited over 125 books profiling college and professional
athletes.330 The Copyright Alliance recounted that “[a]fter spending over ten
years researching” a “biography of Texas A&M University’s football legend E.
King Gill,” and “sending a draft to members of the Texas A&M Athletic
Department for help locating additional photos for the book, in 2014 Mr. Bynum
became aware that the University had reprinted word-for-word portions of the
unpublished biography and distributed them to thousands of people over the
internet through its newsletter and through social media.”331
Mr. Bynum filed suit against the Texas A&M Athletic Department in federal
court, asserting claims for copyright infringement and unlawful takings, and a
claim under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.332 According to the
Copyright Alliance, “[d]espite presenting clear evidence of the infringement,” the
Southern District of Texas dismissed the claims because “the department is not a
separate legal entity and lacks capacity to be sued,” and would not permit Mr.
Bynum to “substitute the University [] as the proper defendant” because “it is a
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state entity and protected by sovereign immunity.”333 The state unlawful takings
claim was dismissed “as barred by sovereign immunity, and his federal takings
claims were dismissed for not being ripe because plaintiffs failed to allege that he
pursued claims in state court under Texas’s inverse condemnation procedure,
which is required before alleging a federal takings claim.”334
•

Also alleging state infringement by Texas A&M University, Andrea Johnson,
founder of C Math is Easy, an organization that offers in-person and online
tutoring services, testified that the university misappropriated and distributed
several of her math tutoring packets without her authorization.335 Specifically,
Ms. Johnson discovered her “workbook retyped” into a math packet distributed
by the university’s Upward Bound program.336 She asserted that the program
“lifted at least 30, 40 pages of the meat of [her] workbook” and that the infringing
work was then “given to high schools in [her] district.”337 Ms. Johnson explained
that every attorney she approached for help advised that her copyright
infringement claim could not be remedied due to sovereign immunity.338

•

The Copyright Alliance also reported an account involving the work of Dr.
Walter Whittle. As an independent contractor who retains the copyright in the
proprietary materials provided to his clients, Dr. Whittle “has worked to develop
unique competency-based job descriptions for over one third of all school
districts in Ohio.”339 According to the Copyright Alliance, in 2010, Dr. Whittle
discovered that “a South Carolina high school teacher had posted part of his
materials on the internet.”340 Concerned that similar infringements may be
occurring, Dr. Whittle “soon documented 137 violations by separate school
districts.”341 Dr. Whittle ultimately settled twenty-seven of the violations out of
court, but he believes that these settlements “fell well short of compensating him
for his loss and expenses,” which he estimated to be in excess of $685,000.342

Order Granting Partial Dismissal at 14–18, Canada Hockey LLC v. Texas A&M Univ. Athletic Dept., 484 F.
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State representatives responded that these examples fall short of establishing a pattern of
intentional infringement, arguing that the allegations failed to account for fair use and
other defenses available to the state.343 With respect to Dr. Bell’s allegations specifically,
APLU & AAU argued that he is “an odd case study for the Copyright Alliance to
highlight,” given that courts have dismissed several of his claims on the merits.344 In
their view, this indicates that many of his allegations “have serious deficiencies and, at
worse, are pursued in bad faith, or, at best, involve facts subject to reasonable
dispute.”345
State representatives also argued that even “in instances when copyright infringement
by employees of state colleges and universities is intentional, copyright holders do have
recourse against those employees.”346 APLU & AAU cite Mr. Bynum’s case against Texas
A&M Athletic Department as an example, noting that while the court “granted Texas
A&M’s motion to dismiss all claims based on sovereign immunity and also dismissed
two claims against defendant employees under qualified immunity (and failure to state
a claim), the court allowed claims against one remaining employee . . . to proceed.”347

f. Other
The Office received one additional comment describing alleged infringements of works
that do not clearly fall into any of the categories above.348 Patricia Ward Kelly, the
widow of dancer, actor, and director Gene Kelly, submitted comments describing an
instance in which she became aware that an individual “intended to edit a collection of
[Mr. Kelly’s] interviews to be published by The University Press of Mississippi without
obtaining the necessary permissions.”349 Ms. Kelly stated that when her attorneys
contacted the editor and the publisher to inform them that the materials were protected
by copyright, they “refused to provide any information” about the intended contents of
See, e.g., APLU & AAU Reply Comments at 6–9; Roundtable Tr. at 19:05–15 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Benson,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).
343

APLU & AAU Reply Comments at 6; see also Roundtable Tr. at 111:10–112:14 (Dec. 11, 2020) (MacDonald,
University of California, Office of General Counsel) (discussing “Dr. Bell’s recent track record of litigated
matters that have, unfortunately for him, not fared very well”).
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the book.350 Ms. Kelly subsequently engaged in a “legal battle to preserve control over
[Mr. Kelly’s] intellectual property and [her] rights as the designated custodian of that
property,” including filing an infringement suit and seeking an “injunction to block the
publication” of the book.351 The court ultimately dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the
infringement claim was not ripe.352 The court concluded “that no copyright
infringement ha[d] yet occurred,” as the defendant was still “‘early in the process of
researching and selecting interviews [for the book, and she] . . . ha[d] not made any final
decisions yet on what interviews to include.’”353
Ms. Kelly also alleged that the University of Kentucky Press “refused [her] attorney’s
request regarding yet “another publication misappropriating [Mr. Kelly’s] words.”354 In
addition, she stated that “the University Press of Kansas has similarly embarked upon a
publication without any of the necessary permissions granted for the use of Gene’s
intellectual property.”355 Ms. Kelly did not provide further details on either of these
instances.356

Effect on Licensing
In the NOI, the Office inquired into the extent to which sovereign immunity may affect
the licensing or sale of copyrighted works to state entities.357 Specifically, the Office
asked (1) whether copyright owners “provide different payment or licensing terms in
transactions with state entities than are provided in transactions with other parties”; (2)
whether copyright owners have “changed aspects of their sales or licensing practices as
a result of state sovereign immunity”; and (3) whether “different states or state entities
take different approaches to working with copyrighted material.”358

Kelly Initial Comments; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 22. The Association of University
Presses asserted, however, that “copyright to the interviews . . . belongs to other parties, who properly gave
permission for their content to be reproduced.” Association of University Presses Reply Comments at 2.
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In response, several commenters generally described the negative impact that sovereign
immunity has on creators’ licensing markets and licensing opportunities,359 but provided
few specific examples. AIPLA suggested that there may be such an effect in the context
of educational licensing, noting that because a “large percentage of U.S. educational
institutions are public or at least partially state- funded[,] . . . such institutions have
substantial market power to drive down licensing fees.”360 AIPLA contended that states
often acquire educational materials “through individual employees that utilize
discretionary budgets to acquire low-cost copies, which avoids formal school board
ratification, statutory public bidding procedures for government contracts and/or
procurement policies.”361 “In such cases,” it asserted, “state actors that exceed the scope
of a license can later disavow the license and claim that the content owner is ‘chargeable
with notice’ of government contracting procedures that were not followed.”362 AIPLA
did not, however, identify specific state entities that have engaged in such practices.
Other commenters described the ways in which state infringement can result in lost
licensing revenue,363 but did not provide examples of differences in pricing or licensing
terms offered to states compared to those offered to private entities.
Conversely, several commenters and roundtable participants indicated that copyright
owners do not provide different licensing or payment terms to state entities.364 For
See, e.g., Allen Initial Comments at 1 (“All of my intellectual property taken by [states] represents a lost
economic opportunity to license my work and contribute to our economy.”); NPPA Initial Comments at 12
(“[I]f the competitor is an infringing state actor that claims sovereign immunity from copyright
infringement, . . . the licensor’s financial and contractual efforts, as well as its reputation, are damaged. In
addition, the licensor risks losing future business because potential clients are much less likely to pay for the
‘exclusive’ right to use images that are being used freely by a competitor, especially if that competitor is an
infringing state that is free from liability. . . . [U]nrestricted copyright infringement by state actors effectively
destroys the creator’s licensing market for any image the state actor appropriates.”) (footnote omitted).
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See, e.g., Pixsy Reply Comments at 2 (estimating “approximately $14 million in lost licensing revenue for
photographers and artists when postsecondary institutions use their images”); Roundtable Tr. at 72:20–25
(Dec. 11, 2020) (Sedlik, Art Center College of Design, PLUS Coalition) (stating that if a state illegally used
one of his photographs and placed it on the cover of a book, he could “never license that photograph for
another book cover during the copyright life of the work, because no publisher [would] take it for a book
cover if it ha[d] previously been featured on a book cover”).
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See, e.g., ASERL Initial Comments at 2–3; Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 13–14; Library
Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 2; University of Michigan Library Initial Comments 1–2; University
of Minnesota Initial Comments at 2; Roundtable Tr. at 67:10–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright
Alliance); Roundtable Tr. at 72:09–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Sedlik, Art Center College of Design, PLUS Coalition);
Roundtable Tr. at 120:22–121:03 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Molnar, Ohio Attorney General’s Office); Roundtable Tr. at
121:16–18 (Dec. 11, 2020) (MacDonald, University of California, Office of General Counsel). But see News
Media Alliance Initial Comments at 4 (“[A]ll news publishers offer different terms and licenses to their
clients, often depending on the type of client and license sought . . . .”).
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example, the University of Minnesota stated, “[w]e are not familiar with any variations
in copyright-related terms around licensing or sales of copyrighted works to the
University of Minnesota that are due specifically to our status as an arm of the state
government.”365 A representative of the PLUS Coalition, an initiative to facilitate
licensing of image rights, similarly noted that in his experience, “the license terms
employed by visual artists in contracting with the states are no different than the license
terms they use when contracting with other parties.”366 More generally, several
representatives of state universities emphasized the substantial amounts their
institutions spend on licensing fees each year, which they believe refutes the suggestion
that states are exercising undue bargaining power in negotiations for copyrighted
content.367

IV.

STATE POLICIES TO PREVENT INFRINGEMENT

As part of this study, the Office invited comments on policies and practices that state
entities have developed to prevent infringement by their employees.368 In addition, the
Office devoted a session of its roundtable discussion to this topic. The record developed
for this study indicates that many state universities and libraries have developed policies
regarding the proper use of copyrighted materials. As noted below, however, very little
evidence was submitted regarding the policies of other types of state entities.369 As a
result, it is unclear to what extent they have policies similar to those at universities, or to
what extent they may provide education to employees about the appropriate use of
copyrighted material.370
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separate from a lot of other content that we license for.”); id. at 122:09–13 (Levine, University of Michigan
Library) (“[C]urrently, in our library, we spent in the range of $29 million on collections, meaning things that
we license and purchase.”); id. at 247:20–22 (Vockell, University of Texas) (“[O]ur libraries [are] spending $60
million” on licenses.).
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Commenters provided a handful of examples of such policies by other agencies. The News Media
Alliance noted that California’s Attorney General has issued policy guidelines admonishing state agencies to
respect copyrights. News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 5 & n.16. During the roundtables, Maria
Sapiandante, an intellectual property attorney who represents state agencies, noted that the state of
California mandates that its employees undergo training about copyright. Roundtable Tr. at 33:10–19 (Dec.
11, 2020) (Sapiandante, citing and discussing Cal. Gov’t Code 13988).
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A. Legal and Organizational Rules
The Higher Education Opportunity Act
Commenters representing state universities pointed to the Higher Education
Opportunity Act (“HEOA”) as a legal basis to ensure their compliance with copyright
law.371 The HEOA is a federal statute that requires institutions receiving federal funding
to take certain measures to discourage copyright infringement. The HEOA has two
provisions that are particularly relevant to this topic. Section 488(a)(i)(E) requires
institutions to “explicitly inform[] students that unauthorized distribution of
copyrighted material . . . may subject the students to civil and criminal penalties”372 and
to describe “the institution’s policies with respect to unauthorized peer-to-peer file
sharing” and what discipline students may face.373 Section 493 requires an institution to
“develop[] plans to effectively combat the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted
material” and “to the extent practicable, offer alternatives to illegal downloading or
peer-to-peer distribution of intellectual property, as determined by the institution in
consultation with the chief technology officer or other designated officer of the
institution.”374
The first of those provisions is aimed primarily at students, not university employees.
Although the second provision applies more generally to the institution and its policies,
it focuses on distribution and file sharing, rather than copying and use more generally.
Moreover, it is unclear from the record the extent to which university policies under
HEOA focus on actions by employees, as opposed to students. Despite these limitations,
the HEOA’s requirement that the institution have a copyright policy that is
communicated to its constituencies, may reduce the overall incidence of infringement,
including unauthorized copying.

Copyright Policies Developed by State Institutions
Several of the comments submitted by state universities highlighted institutional policies
that have been developed to prevent or respond to copyright infringement. The
University of Minnesota noted the existence of several written policies relating to the use

provide details about the nature or extent of such training. See Roundtable Tr. at 174:13–176:04 (Dec. 11,
2020) (Samberg, University of California, Berkeley).
APLU & AAU Reply Comments at 13; Roundtable Tr. at 96:12–16 (Dec. 11, 2020) (MacDonald, University
of California, Office of the General Counsel).
371

372

20 U.S.C. § 1092(a)(1)(P)(i).

373

Id. § 1092(a)(1)(P)(ii)–(iii).

374

Id. § 1094(a)(29)(A), (B).

55

U.S. Copyright Office

Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity

of copyrighted materials.375 It also has a web page that instructs copyright owners on
the University’s procedures for reporting infringement, including the emails of
university personnel and the information needed to respond to the report.376 In the same
vein, the University of Illinois pointed to its policies to combat infringement,377 and
comments from APLU & AAU provided links to other university policies relating to
copyright infringement.378 Although the extent of the information provided varies, these
websites generally provide basic information about copyright law and a series of
frequently asked questions, many of which deal with file sharing and uses of
copyrighted materials in teaching (both online and in-class).379 Most contain a
description of fair use.380 They also direct students and faculty with specific questions to
an appropriate office of the university.381
Library representatives highlighted similar policies. Yvonne Dooley, a business librarian
and copyright specialist at the University of North Texas, stated that the university has a
University of Minnesota Initial Comments at 4 ( discussing, and providing URLs to, the Board of Regents’
policy on copyright, the University’s, Acceptable Use of Information Technology Resources policy, the
University’s policy on research misconduct policy, and the University’s policy on Teaching and Learning:
Student Responsibilities).
375

376

Id. at 4–6.

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Initial Comments at 1 (describing outreach efforts and
providing a URL for its copyright policy). See University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries Initial
Comments at 2 (stating that “copyright infringement is viewed as a related ethical issue [to plagiarism], and
significant educational outreach is done to prevent such issues before they occur”).
377

APLU & AAU Initial Comments at 5 n.13 (listing several university policies and providing the URLs
where they may be accessed). ASERL also noted that state librarians can (and do) take advantage of libraryfocused copyright programming, such as the “CopyrightX: Libraries” online course and specialized
copyright events targeted at librarians. ASERL Initial Comments at 3–4 & n.11–16 (providing examples of
copyright-focused programming and online classes that “have been joined by thousands of learners drawn
from the library community”).
378

E.g., University of Kentucky, Copyright Resource Center, https://www.uky.edu/copyright (last visited Aug.
10, 2021); Purdue University, University Copyright Office, https://www.lib.purdue.edu/uco (last visited Aug.
10, 2021); The Ohio State University, Copyright Services, https://library.osu.edu/copyright (last visited Aug.
10, 2021); Michigan State University, Office of Copyright, https://lib.msu.edu/copyright (last visited Aug. 10,
2021).
379

E.g., Purdue University, University Copyright Office, https://www.lib.purdue.edu/uco (last visited Aug. 10,
2021); The Ohio State University, Copyright Services, https://library.osu.edu/copyright (last visited Aug. 10,
2021); University of California-Santa Cruz, Fair Use and Copyright, https://guides.library.ucsc.edu/fair-use
(last visited Aug. 10, 2021); University of Michigan, Copyright Services, https://www.lib.umich.edu/researchand-scholarship/copyright-services (last visited Aug. 10, 2021).
380

E.g., University of Kentucky, Copyright Resource Center, https://www.uky.edu/copyright/contact (last
visited Aug. 10, 2021); Michigan State University, Office of Copyright, https://lib.msu.edu/copyright (last
visited Aug. 10, 2021); Purdue University, University Copyright Office, https://www.lib.purdue.edu/uco (last
visited Aug. 10, 2021); The University of Texas System, UTS 107 Use of Copyrighted Materials;
https://www.utsystem.edu/sites/policy-library/policies/uts-107-use-of-copyrighted-materials (last visited
Aug. 10, 2021).
381
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“copyright compliance policy” that gives examples of uses that comply with the law,
imparts information on legal penalties, and describes university discipline policies with
respect to copyright infringement.382 Rachael Samberg, a librarian at the University of
California, Berkeley, spoke about the copyright policies created by the library, including
specific policies governing the digitization of the library’s collection383 According to Ms.
Samberg, within the University of California system, there are multiple layers of policies
relating to copyright—some are system-wide, some campus-wide, and some operate at a
departmental level.384

B. Educational Efforts
Commenters also noted that state institutions invest substantial amounts of time and
effort to educate faculty, students, and other employees about copyright infringement
issues.385 As examples, commenters pointed to disciplinary codes and information
provided over email to inform students and others about university policies concerning
copyright;386 online resources that educate the university community about copyright
infringement and best practices;387 and collaborations with campus partners to provide
copyright instruction.388 In addition, several participants at the roundtable spoke about
outreach efforts to educate university components and other institutions and agencies
on copyright matters. Harold Evans, Associate Vice President, Legal and Research at the
University of Arkansas System, stated that he delivers a “Copyright 101” presentation at
the various campuses, in order “to advise faculty and staff on what their rights and
responsibilities are under the Copyright Act.”389 Raven Lanier, of the University of
Michigan, described her efforts with a variety of institutional constituencies, including
those developing course materials, “to educate and consult on matters of copyright.”390
Douglas Shontz, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel for the University of Illinois, stated
that its copyright librarians has had numerous “one-on-one consultations” with students

382

Roundtable Tr. at 138:03–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Dooley, University of North Texas).

Id. at 148:05–149:03 (Samberg, University of California, Berkeley). Ms. Samberg also adverted to policies
in other areas, such as course materials and copying library materials. Id. at 152:17–20 (Samberg, University
of California, Berkeley). Brandon Butler stated that the University of Virginia library also has a removal
policy when notified that digitized material may be infringing. Id. at 150:01–06 (Butler, ASERL, Software
Preservation Network).
383

384

Id. at 151:05-22 (Samberg, University of California, Berkeley).

385

APLU & AAU Initial Comments at 5–6.

386

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Initial Comments at 1.

387

ASERL Initial Comments at 3.

388

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Initial Comments at 1.

389

Roundtable Tr. at 139:09–21 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Evans, University of Arkansas).

390

Id. at 142:22–143:16 (Lanier, University of Michigan Library).
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and faculty concerning copyright compliance.391 Brandon Butler, a representative of
ASERL, noted that the ASERL has programs to inform their members about best
practices in dealing with copyrighted material, and that it conducts webinars to assist
institutions with copyright compliance.392
Commenters additionally pointed out that many institutions have full-time staff
dedicated to copyright policy and education. The University of Michigan Library noted
that it established a copyright office in the mid-2000s to provide “copyright information
and education to the U-M community through research guides, workshops, and
individual consultations.”393 The University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries hired a
copyright specialist in 2012 to help educate the university community about copyright
law.394 In written comments, the specialist stated that she has spent “hundreds of hours
of consultations and trainings on my campus,” as well as conducting training sessions
on other University of Massachusetts campuses.395 She also indicated that the University
has attorneys and others who can provide personal consultations for students and
faculty regarding claims of copyright infringement.396

C. Cultural Norms and Expectations
Finally, state representatives argued that more informal cultural and reputational
considerations further reduce the likelihood of widespread intentional infringement by
state educational institutions. The University of Massachusetts Libraries noted that
universities treat plagiarism, for example, “as a serious ethical matter warranting
disciplinary action.”397 Other commenters asserted that universities have an interest, as
Id. at 146:12–17 (Shontz, University of Illinois). In addition, the University of Illinois Press stated that it
provides authors who submit manuscripts to it with detailed instructions to prevent copyright
infringement. University of Illinois Library and the University of Illinois Press Reply Comments at 2
(providing the URL containing these instructions); see also Association of University Presses Reply
Comments at 1–2 (noting the resources invested by university presses relating to copyright and referring to
the organization’s website, which contains guidelines for authors relating to copyright infringement).
391

392

Roundtable Tr. at 135:08–36:09 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Butler, ASERL, Software Preservation Network).

University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries Initial Comments at 2. This comment also noted that
other “state colleges and universities employ copyright specialists who provide similar services to their
communities and the public at large.” Id.
393

University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries Initial Comments at 1. The specialist “was hired, not in
response to complaints from rightsholders about infringement, but out of the proactive desire of the
University to assist faculty and staff in understanding their rights and responsibilities under copyright.” Id.
394

395

Id. at 3.

Id. at 2–3. In the last eight years, the University has received “virtually no complaints of infringement.”
Id. at 3.
396

University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries Initial Comments at 2; see also University of Minnesota
Initial Comments at 1 (“The general culture in state governments and educational and research institutions
is one of compliance with relevant legal and ethical considerations as a matter of course.”).
397
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creators of copyrighted material, to respect and support copyrights.398 Sara Benson,
Copyright Librarian at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, stated that “we,
at the universities, have a lot of creators[.] . . . [W]e create scholarship, we create
books.”399 William Thro, of the University of Kentucky, similarly noted that “universities
are creators of copyright and various other intellectual property . . . . We want our
employees to do that, and we want to take advantage of that, so we’re not going to do
anything intentionally to undermine that from happening.”400 Others observed that state
universities and administrators do not want to foster a reputation for being infringers, 401
and that state legislators would not wish the universities to be so perceived.402 As
Yunxaio Xu of the University of Michigan Library stated, “[w]e can’t just go about
infringing copyrights or we wouldn’t even get any funds from our state legislature
anymore.”403

V.

Existing Remedies

The Supreme Court held in Allen that a state does not violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment “unless it fails to offer an adequate remedy” for the relevant
unconstitutional conduct.404 The Court held that the CRCA’s legislative record was
insufficient to establish such a failure, as it reflected little consideration of “the
availability of state-law remedies for copyright infringement.”405 The first part of this
section describes the Office’s findings regarding various state-law causes of action that
have been identified as potential alternative remedies for copyright owners against state
entities. In addition, although the availability of federal remedies does not bear directly
on the abrogation issue, the second part of this section discusses copyright owners’
ability to obtain injunctive relief against state officials in federal court, as well as other
University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries Initial Comments at 7 (“[N]ot only do educators and
librarians not infringe ‘intentionally or recklessly’, but that our community is among the most respectful and
supportive of rightsholders’ interests and prerogatives.”) (emphasis in original); id. at 6 (“The one consistent
thread that runs through all my consultations is concern on the parts of librarians, academic authors, and
administrators, for ‘doing the right thing.’”).
398

399

Roundtable Tr. at 21:06–08 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Benson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).

400

Id. at 27:17–21 (Thro, University of Kentucky).

APLU & AAU Initial Comments at 6; Roundtable Tr. at 163:19–164:05 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Lanier, University
of Michigan Library); Roundtable Tr. at 161:01–03 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Samberg, University of California,
Berkley) (“[T]he reputation of the university is at stake whenever the university is taking action with respect
to its policies and decision-making on copyright”); see Roundtable Tr. at 158:17–19 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Butler,
ASERL, Software Preservation Network) (“[A]cademics generally are afraid to engage in anything they
think might come within a mile of something unlawful”).
401

Roundtable Tr. at 168:09–11 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Evans, University of Arkansas) (“[P]ublic universities have to
be very concerned about taking actions that will upset members of the state legislature”).
402

403

Id. at 216:09–11 (Xu, University of Michigan Library).

404

Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1004.

405

Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1006 (2020).
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potential alternative federal causes of action, to provide Congress with a fuller picture of
the overall state of the law in this area.

A. Potential Remedies in State Court
Waiver to Suit in State Court
Before turning to specific causes of action, the Office notes at the outset that the
availability of any state-law claim against a state is dependent upon the state having
waived its sovereign immunity to suit in its own courts. As part of this study, the Office
surveyed the constitutional and statutory provisions of every state and the District of
Columbia pertaining to waivers of immunity. A chart summarizing the Office’s findings
is provided in Appendix E. Most states have waived their sovereign immunity with
respect to at least some state-law claims. Twenty-eight states constitutionally authorize
their state legislatures to specify the procedures and requirements for private suits
against states and state entities. An additional nineteen states and the District of
Columbia do not have express constitutional provisions addressing the issue but have
enacted statutes permitting such suits. By contrast, three state constitutions direct that
the state shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.406
Among the states that have waived immunity, the procedural and substantive
requirements for bringing such actions vary. Thirty-seven states waive immunity for tort
actions against the state, and fifteen states permit contract claims. Some states require
pre-authorization by a designated official prior to filing a claim or review of the findings
of the state official by the state legislature,407 while others limit jurisdiction to particular
causes of action to be brought in specially designated courts or claims commissions.408

406

See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14; ARK. CONST. art. 5V, § 20; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35.

See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-160(a) (effective June 28, 2021) (“Whenever the Claims Commissioner deems
it just and equitable, the Claims Commissioner may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in
the opinion of the Claims Commissioner, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a
private person, could be liable.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-32-7 (2018) (“After the conclusion of . . . [the]
hearing, the commissioner shall prepare his findings, fully itemized, in respect to the amount of the claim or
damages” and “[s]uch findings shall be filed in the office of the clerk of courts of the county in which the
petition was filed and a duplicate thereof filed in the Office of the Governor, who shall submit the same to
the next session of the Legislature for consideration, compromise, settlement, or rejection by appropriate
action.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-907 et seq. (providing for consideration of claims by legislature’s joint
committee on special claims against the state).
407

See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 19-10-201–223, 21-5-701–708, 6-82-501–507 (2021) (establishing a claims
commission for the hearing and adjudication of claims against the state of Arkansas, its agencies, and its
institutions); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8 (effective Nov. 27, 2018) (establishing exclusive jurisdiction in
Court of Claims for state-law, contract, and tort claims against state); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (“The North
Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for the purpose of hearing and passing upon
tort claims against the State Board of Education, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments,
408
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Effect of Federal Preemption
Even where a state has waived its immunity with respect to particular causes of action
brought in state court, the doctrine of federal preemption remains a hurdle. Section 301
of the Copyright Act preempts state law claims regarding “all legal or equitable rights
that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103” of the Act.409 Under this provision, state courts are precluded from
adjudicating claims if (1) the work at issue falls within the “subject matter of copyright,”
and (2) the claimed rights are “equivalent to” the exclusive rights specified in section
106.410
Courts generally hold that a right is “equivalent” to a section 106 right if no extra
element is required to prove a violation of the right instead of or in addition to the
elements required to prove copyright infringement.411 The Second Circuit has clarified
that “[w]hile we have indeed begun by inquiring whether ‘an extra element is required
instead of or in addition to’ what is required for a copyright infringement claim, not all
‘extra elements’ are sufficient to remove the claim from the ‘general scope’
of copyright.”412 The “critical inquiry” is whether such additional elements “change[]
the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement
claim.”413
Courts have held that section 301 preempts a variety of tort claims, including some that
appear to require an “extra element,” when the underlying nature of the claim sought to
institutions and agencies of the State.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-32-8, 21-32-3–7 (2018) (providing for
advisory proceedings before commissioner).
409

17 U.S.C. § 301(a).

410

Id.; see Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).

See Maloney v. T3Media, Inc., 853 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2017) (“To survive preemption, the state cause of
action must protect rights which are qualitatively different from the copyright rights. The state claim must
have an extra element which changes the nature of the action”) (quoting Laws v. Sony Music Ent., Inc., 448
F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006)); Forest Park Pictures v. Universal TV Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 430 (2d Cir.
2012) (“[I]f an extra element is required instead of or in addition to the acts of reproduction, performance,
distribution or display, in order to constitute a state-created cause of action, there is no preemption”)
(quoting Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir.1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 287 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (“If there is no ‘extra element,’ or the ‘extra
elements’ are merely ‘illusory,’ then the claim is equivalent to a copyright action,” and it is preempted)
(citing Wrench v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 454 (6th Cir. 2001)).
411

Jackson v. Roberts (In re Jackson), 972 F.3d 25, 43–44 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai,
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992)).
412

Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood &
Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
413
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vindicate an exclusive section 106 right, including tortious interference with a contract or
a business relationship,414 misappropriation,415 conversion of intangible property,416
unjust enrichment,417 and unfair competition.418 In other cases, however, courts have
held that claims based on conversion of personal property,419 unfair trade practices,420

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that plaintiff’s
tortious interference claim based on defendant’s publication of excerpts from plaintiff’s manuscript was
preempted because it sought to recover the right to authorize the creation of derivative works) rev’d on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
414

NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 851–54 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff’s commercial
misappropriation claim based on defendant’s delivery of real-time game scores was preempted because
plaintiff’s allegations were “virtually synonymous” with “wrongful copying” and “are in no meaningful
fashion distinguishable from infringement of a copyright”); see Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal.
State Univ. Sys., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1098 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that plaintiff’s misappropriation of trade
secret claim was preempted because it lacked the ‘extra element’ of ‘disclosure’ of a secret in contravention
of a specific duty to keep that information confidential) (quoting Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F.Supp.2d
1129, 1195 (C.D. Cal.2001)) (internal quotations omitted).
415

Harper & Row, Publishers., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that plaintiff’s
conversion claim based on defendant’s publication of excerpts from plaintiff’s manuscript was preempted
because the right plaintiff sought to protect was “control over reproduction and derivative use
of copyrighted material.”); see R.D. Wolf, Inc. v. Brancard, No. CV010507650S, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 720
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2004) (holding that plaintiff’s conversion claim was preempted because plaintiff
did not seek relief for the actual physical deprivation of the architectural plans (the property), but for the
subsequent actions taken with the plans by defendant); Richdale Dev. Co. v. McNeil Co., 508 N.W.2d 853 (Neb.
1993) (holding that plaintiff’s conversion claim was preempted because the essence of the claim was
plaintiff’s damage resulting from reproduction and distribution of architectural plans and not physical
deprivation of the plans).
416

Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phx. Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff’s unjust
enrichment claim based on defendants turning plaintiff’s book into a motion picture was preempted because
the “specific right they are trying to enforce is the right of adaptation -- i.e., the right to prepare or authorize
preparation of a derivative work based on a novel or screenplay”).
417

Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiff’s unfair
competition claim based on defendant’s “publishing and placing on the market” plaintiff’s copyrighted
images was preempted); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiff’s
unfair competition claim based on defendants’ use of plaintiff’s book in a motion picture was preempted “to
the extent it seeks protection against copying” of plaintiff’s book).
418

Nika Corp. v. City of Kan. City, 582 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (holding that plaintiff’s conversion of
personal property claim based on city’s conversion of certain documents and materials which plaintiff
claimed were its exclusive property after termination of contract was not preempted).
419

Balboa Ins. Co. v. Trans Glob. Equities, 1351, 267 Cal. Rptr. 787, 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1990) (holding
that “copyright does not preempt a cause of action based on breach of confidence”); see Comput. Assocs. Int’l.,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 717 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that unfair competition claims based upon breaches
of confidential relationships” are not preempted by federal copyright law).
420
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trade secret misappropriation,421 and civil theft or fraud422 include a “sufficiently
significant” extra element to avoid preemption.
If a state law claim based on copyright infringement by a state entity is not preempted,
the copyright owner nevertheless will have more limited remedies than are available
under federal copyright law. The Copyright Act allows a copyright owner who timely
registers its copyright to collect statutory damages ranging from $750 to $150,000 per
work infringed and recover attorneys’ fees.423 The Act also allows a copyright owner
seeking actual damages to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, after
which the infringer has the burden to “prove his or her deductible expenses and the
elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.”424 A
copyright owner bringing a state-law claim is not eligible for statutory damages and
generally is not eligible for attorneys’ fees; it must prove its actual damages under the
relevant state law. Some states limit the sum of monetary awards available against a
state, so that the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff may exceed the award permitted
under the law.425
Commenters representing copyright owners suggested that these limits on remedies
makes litigation against states a more daunting and expensive prospect. The News
Media Alliance pointed to the CalPERS infringement case involving Dow Jones as an
example. Dow Jones estimated that its actual damages were “approximately $22 million
and its statutory damages award would have been about $7.3 million” at a $750
statutory rate.426 But because CalPERS asserted sovereign immunity, Dow Jones

Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 717 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that “[t]he defendant’s
breach of duty is the gravamen of [certain] trade secret claims, and supplies the ‘extra element’ that
qualitatively distinguishes such trade secret causes of action from claims for copyright infringement that are
based solely upon copying”).
421

Korman v. Iglesias, 736 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that plaintiff’s claim for civil theft under
Florida Statutes §§ 772.11 and 812.014 was not preempted by the Copyright Act because the civil theft cause
of action did not contain the same elements as a copyright cause of action; defendant’s scienter, knowingly
making false representations, did not correspond to the scienter set forth in 17 U.S.C.S. § 506).
422

17 U.S.C. §§ 412, 504(c)(1)–(2). Statutory damages and attorneys’ fees are available only for infringement
that begins on or after the effective date of registration of the work(s) at issue or within three months of first
publication. 17 U.S.C. § 412.
423

424

17 U.S.C. § 504(b).

See e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-15 (2018) (“In any claim or suit for damages against a governmental
entity or its employee brought under the provisions of this chapter, the liability shall not exceed” “the sum
of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars” “for all claims arising out of a single occurrence”); MINN. STAT. § 3.736
subd. 4 & 4a (2020) (establishing limits on monetary liability of the state).
425

Roundtable Tr.at 47:09–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Linder, Dow Jones & Company); Brief for Dow Jones &
Company, Inc. as Amicus Curiae 8–9 n.7, Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
426
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ultimately accepted a settlement offer of $3.4 million.427 Copyright owners also
expressed concern that “the damages for a claim of breach of contract are both lower and
less certain than those available under the Copyright Act,” so that “the remedies
available in such cases do not necessarily justify the costs.”428 In contrast, state
representatives expressed concern that allowing suits seeking statutory damages could
have a chilling effect on legitimate activities of state research libraries429 and lead to
increased litigation, much of which they believe may be frivolous.430

Contract Claims
Claims involving a breach of contract are less likely to be preempted by section 301
because the claim requires the existence of a contract, which is not an element of a claim
for copyright infringement.431 Some representatives of state university libraries argued
that the increased digitization of copyrighted works makes the presence of a contract
more likely.432 The Library Copyright Alliance explained, “[a]n increasing percentage of
library acquisition budgets are devoted to electronic licenses of content rather than
purchases of monographs and print issues of serials.”433 If a license is involved and the
library violates the terms of that license, “the copyright owner can sue the library under

Brief for Amicus Curiae Dow Jones & Company, Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 8–9 n.7, Allen v. Cooper,
140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (No. 18-877); Roundtable Tr. at 47:90–13, 47:24–48:01 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Linder, Dow Jones
& Company) (discussing the approximate amount of damages Dow Jones & Company could potentially
have received as a result of the infringement).
427

428

News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 7.

Library Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 5 (“The elimination of sovereign immunity with respect
to copyright claims would have a negative impact on the digital preservation activities of state-run
collecting institutions.”).
429

University of Michigan Library Initial Comments at 2 (“Without sovereign immunity, states will face a
greater number of complaints from people who are primarily looking for a quick windfall.”); ASERL Initial
Comments at 2 (“[a]brogation would be a boon to bad actors interested in harassing and extorting state
institutions”); Roundtable Tr. at 168:24–169:13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Samberg, University of California, Berkley).
430

See e.g., Ryan v. Editions Ltd., 786 F.3d 754, 761 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that the court has “long recognized
that a contractually-based claim generally possesses the extra element necessary to remove it from the ambit
of the Copyright Act’s express preemption provision”); Lee v. Mt. Ivy Press, L.P., 827 N.E.2d 727 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2005) (holding that plaintiff’s state law claims against publisher for breach of contract, conversion, fraud,
and a violation of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A were not preempted by section 301 because each
claim had an extra element that rendered it qualitatively different from a federal copyright claim); Durgom v.
Janowiak, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1999) (holding that defendant’s nonpayment of royalties
was contract issue not preempted by federal copyright law).
431

Library Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 4–5; ASERL Initial Comments at 2; see Roundtable Tr. at
229:15–22 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Band, Library Copyright Alliance) (arguing that “preemption is not a problem in
the vast majority of cases because . . . the content is licensed by the state entity . . . so there’s always a
contract action”).
432

433

Library Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 4.
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state law for breach of contract.”434 Thus, it argued that breach of contract claims are a
viable option for an increasing number of copyright owners.
Copyright owners disagreed. First, they disputed that infringements by states typically
occur in the context of a licensing agreement.435 A representative of the PLUS Coalition,
a licensing initiative for image rights, contended that “the vast majority of infringements
do not involve a contractual relationship between the rights holder and the state
entity.”436 Instead, “the state entity may obtain copies from sources such as Google
[I]mages, social media, websites,” and exploit those copies “without the creators’
knowledge.”437
Second, copyright owners noted that, despite the existence of an “extra element,” some
courts “will reject contract claims that are at their core about copyright violation[s].”438
Indeed, certain courts have held that “pre-emption should continue to strike down
claims that, although denominated ‘contract’ nonetheless complain directly about the
reproduction of expressive materials.”439 These courts adopt a fact-specific approach
that may bar a copyright owner’s contract claim if “the right in question is infringed by
the mere act of reproduction, performance, distribution or display.”440

Takings Claims
A copyright owner whose work has been infringed by a state actor could also potentially
bring a suit alleging that the infringement constitutes a taking of property without just
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or the state
constitution.441 In Florida Prepaid, the Supreme Court cited a takings claim as a possible
remedy for patent infringement by the state.442 Likewise, several academic
434

Id.

Roundtable Tr. at 267:07–10 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Sedlik, Art Center College of Design, PLUS Coalition); id. at
236:24–237:05 (Bynum, Author) (“[I]n my case . . . I never had a contract with Texas A&M. They were just
people that came in the middle of the night and took my work and posted it out to 350,000 people.”).
435

436

Roundtable Tr. at 267:07–10 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Sedlik, Art Center College of Design, PLUS Coalition).

437

Id. at 267:10–14 (Sedlik, Art Center College of Design, PLUS Coalition).

438

Roundtable Tr. at 233:07–11 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Calzada, National Press Photographers Association).

Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1][a] ] at 1–19 and 1–22).
439

Id. (quoting Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431 (8th Cir. 1993))
(internal quotations omitted) (finding that because the alleged implied-in-fact contract between plaintiff and
defendants did not regulate the parties’ conduct beyond mere use of plaintiff’s ideas, the rights protected by
that contract were equivalent to the exclusive rights protected by the Copyright Act of 1976, and thus
preempted).
440

441

U.S. CONST. AMEND. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).

Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 644 n.9 (1999) (“It is worth
mentioning that the State of Florida provides remedies to patent owners for alleged infringement on the part
442

65

U.S. Copyright Office

Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity

commentators have posited that a takings claim would be available in at least some
circumstances of state copyright infringement.443
This theory, however, has rarely been tested, and the viability of such a claim remains
uncertain. Copyright owners who have sought to bring takings claims have
encountered difficulty establishing their basic elements. For example, University of
Houston System v. Jim Olive Photography centers around a photograph depicting the
Houston skyline taken by Jim Olive, a professional photographer.444 An employee of the
University of Houston’s College of Business obtained a copy of the photograph from
Olive’s website, where it was being offered for license, and uploaded it onto the college’s
website without authorization or payment.445 Olive asserted takings claims under both
the federal and Texas state constitutions against the university.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the allegations of infringement of Olive’s copyright
did not state a claim for a per se taking under the federal or state constitution.446 A per se
taking involves “an ‘actual taking of possession and control’ by the government.”447
Copyright infringement does not qualify as such, the court held, because it does not
destroy the copyright owner’s bundle of legal rights with respect to the copyrighted
work.448 The court further held that copyright infringement does not amount to
“physical occupation’ of property” because copyright is ’nonrivalrous,’ meaning that
‘another person can use it without simultaneously depriving anyone else of its use.’”449
The court thus affirmed the dismissal of Olive’s claims.

of the State. Aggrieved parties may pursue . . . a judicial remedy through a takings or conversion claim.”)
(citing Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 626 So.2d 1333 (Fla. 1993)).
See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2000)
(inverse condemnation claim available for state infringement); Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of
Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 562–63 (1998) (takings claim is a
“plausible avenue for relief” if the government use destroys virtually all of the property’s value”); Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign’s Prerogative, 67 TEX. L. REV. 685,
693–726 (1989) (arguing that state use of copyright should be governed by Fifth Amendment takings
jurisprudence rather than conventional remedies available against private party infringers).
443

444

Univ. of Hous. Sys. v. Jim Olive Photography, 580 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019).

445

Id. at 363.

Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Hous. Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764, 774–77 (Tex. 2021). The court assumed without
deciding that copyright qualified as property for the purpose of takings law. Id. at 770.
446

447

Id. at 772–73 (quoting Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 351, 362 (2015)).

448

Id. at 774–77.

Id. at 776 (quoting Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?,
50 Fla. L. Rev. 529, 562–63 (1998)).
449
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Likewise, in Smith v. Lutz, a Texas appeals court upheld dismissal of a programmer’s
takings claim against the University of Texas for infringing copyrighted software.450 The
court held that a takings claim was unavailable due to a lack of evidence that the
University intended to act under its eminent domain powers.451

B. Available Remedies against State Entities in Federal Court
Injunctive Relief
One remedy for copyright infringement by a state entity that survives Allen is a suit for
injunctive relief in federal court. In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits in federal court seeking injunctive relief
against state officers.452 Copyright owners accordingly can, and do, bring copyright
infringement suits against state officers seeking injunctive relief.453 Fifty percent of
respondents to the Copyright Alliance survey indicated they would bring a suit against
a state for injunctive relief only.454 Plaintiffs in six of the cases on the lists AIPLA and Mr.
Bynum submitted requested only injunctive relief in their complaints.
The ability to seek an injunction in federal court provides some relief to copyright
owners whose works have been infringed by state entities. First, bringing a suit for an
injunction allows copyright owners to have their claims decided upon the merits.455
Second, if they prove infringement and meet the other requirements for such equitable
relief, the copyright owner can obtain an injunction against the defendant.456 Third,
several commenters maintained that the monetary cost of defending against a claim
seeking an injunction and the adverse publicity the state would receive based on a claim
of copyright infringement are powerful deterrents.457

450

Smith v. Lutz, 149 S.W.3d 752, 760–61 (Tex. App.–Austin 2004).

451

Id.

452

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

See, e.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Albert, 906 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2018) (discussing copyright infringement
claims by three academic publishers seeking injunctive relief against several officials of Georgia State
University); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing copyright infringement
claims by a group of authors and authors’ associations seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against
several state university presidents and the HathiTrust).
453

454

Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 13.

455

Library Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 4.

See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (laying out four-factor test for obtaining a
permanent injunction).
456

University of Michigan Library Reply Comments at 3; Library Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 4;
ASERL Initial Comments at 1.
457
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There are, however, significant limitations to the relief an injunction provides. As
discussed in comments from the Copyright Alliance and the News Media Alliance, the
most obvious is the inability to recover damages,458 which prevents the copyright owner
from recovering lost profits and any decrease in the value of the copyrighted work. SIIA
pointed out that many copyright owners invest in the creation of ancillary works in
addition to the specific work that may have been infringed, and the value of those
ancillary products may also be affected by the infringement.459 NPPA explained that the
inability to obtain damages is particularly harmful for works for which the timing of
first publication is critical, such as a photograph of a news or sporting event, because the
entire value of the work may be destroyed by an act of infringement during the key time
period.460 Copyright owners also noted that the inability to recover damages can make
the cost of bringing a suit prohibitive, particularly for copyright owners with limited
resources.461
Additionally, as the Copyright Office has previously noted, an injunction provides
limited relief against future infringement because it can only be issued and enforced
against specific individuals, not the state generally.462 Even then, enforcement of the
injunction can require the filing of a motion for contempt and additional litigation with
the attendant costs.463 These limitations prevent copyright owners from obtaining
complete relief when their copyrights are infringed, which as former Register of

Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 30–32; News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 8–9; see also U.S.
Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-01- 811, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: STATE IMMUNITY IN INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS 13
(2001), https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/232603.pdf.
458

See SIIA Reply Comments at 8–10 (providing the example of educational publishers who create software
as well as “back end servers, artificial intelligence that adapts learning to the ability of a student, and the
creation of entire learning platforms on which this content can be analyzed, discussed, taught, tested, and
commented on”).
459

NPPA Initial Comments at 13 (stating that the value of a photograph is often highest when it is first
published).
460

AIPLA Initial Comments at 5 (stating that nonprofits are particularly unlikely to seek injunctive relief);
Roundtable Tr. at 196:16–20 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Calzada, National Press Photographers Association) (“Playing
whack-a-mole in federal court is an expensive proposition and it’s really not something that most
photographers have the resources to engage in.”); id. at 199:06–14 (Madigan, Copyright Alliance) (“[A]s to
injunctions . . . when we . . . asked the folks who would not be willing to pursue injunctions, why they
wouldn’t, we heard a lot about how expensive they are, how they only offer prospective relief, how they do
nothing to remedy for past injuries.”); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT LIABILITY OF STATES AND
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 13–14 (1988), https://www.copyright.gov/reports/copyright-liability-of-states1988.pdf.
461

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT LIABILITY OF STATES AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 15 (1988),
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/copyright-liability-of-states-1988.pdf.
462

463

Id.
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Copyrights Marybeth Peters testified is “central to the balance of interests in the
Copyright Act.”464

Personal-Capacity Suits against State Officials
Another available remedy for copyright infringement by a state entity in federal court is
a suit for damages against a state official in his or her personal capacity.465 During the
roundtable, a representative of the Ohio Attorney General’s Office described such suits
as a “pretty easy workaround” to enable recovery against the state, noting that the state
will indemnify the individual defendant for any damages.466 But this potential remedy,
too, has limitations. As an initial matter, it is unclear from the record to what extent, or
under what circumstances, other states will indemnify officials found liable in such
cases.467 To the extent a state does not do so, the copyright owner’s ability to recover
damages may be limited by the individual official’s ability to satisfy a judgment.
In addition, to be able to bring such a suit, the copyright owner must know, or must
uncover, the identity of the specific individual responsible for the infringement. The
individual state official may also be protected from liability by qualified immunity,
which shields government officials if “their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”468 In the copyright context, a state official will be immune from liability unless
it was clearly established at the time of the alleged infringement that the conduct of the
state official constituted copyright infringement. In several cases, copyright owners
have been unable to prove that a state official should have known that his or her conduct

Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2344 Before the Subcomm. on Courts.,
the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 18 (2003) (statement of
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office),
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju87815.000/hju87815_0f.htm.
464

See, e.g., Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 122 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirming district court
ruling that state official could be sued in her personal capacity for damages for copyright infringement);
Lane v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 687 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D. Mass. 1988) (denying summary judgment when
copyright law was clear on the relevant issue at the time state official infringed work such that there was no
qualified immunity).
465

466

Roundtable Tr. at 94:04–14 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Molnar, Ohio Attorney General’s Office).

See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167–68 (1985) (noting that an individual state official, not the state, is
liable for any damages award); Roundtable Tr. at 61:16–62:06 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Thro, University of Kentucky)
(“As to whether the state would indemnify, that’s going to be an open question in terms of state law. We do
not indemnify if you’re clearly and unambiguously acting outside the scope of your employment”); id. at
189:09–12 (Evans, University of Arkansas) (“Our state law does cover the indemnification of employees who
are acting in good faith in the course of their duties and responsibilities to the state entity.”).
467

468

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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was infringing due to the unsettled nature of the legal issue involved.469 Such a
conclusion may be particularly likely in fact-specific inquiries such as fair use and the
work-made-for-hire doctrine.

3. Constitutional Claims
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Georgia that a federal statute’s abrogation of
state sovereign immunity is valid insofar as the statute creates a private right of action
for damages against states “for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.”470 Although commenters did not address this theory, the district court in
Allen recently cited Georgia in concluding that a copyright owner may be able to bring a
claim against a state to the extent the infringement amounts to a constitutional
violation.471 At least one circuit court has suggested that a plaintiff faced with an
Eleventh Amendment bar to a copyright suit might be able to find recovery in federal
court for a takings clause violation.472 As discussed above, however, the likelihood that a
copyright owner could successfully argue that infringement of its copyright constituted
a taking remains uncertain under current case law.

VI.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The congressional request initiating this study asked that the Office conduct research “to
determine whether there is sufficient basis for federal legislation abrogating State
sovereign immunity when States infringe copyrights.”473 As part of that analysis, the
See, e.g., Isaenko v. Univ. of Minn., 57 F. Supp. 3d 985, 1013–16 (D. Minn. 2014) (dismissing claims against
university employees in their individual capacities due to law not clearly establishing at the relevant time
that the conduct constituted copyright infringement); Molinelli–Freytes v. Univ. of P.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 150,
157 (D.P.R. 2011) (finding qualified immunity because the potential application of the work-for-hire doctrine
in academic context was not settled at the relevant time); Ass’n for Info. Media & Equip. v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 2:10–cv–09378–CBM (MANx), 2012 WL 7683452, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012) (finding qualified
immunity because a reasonable person could have believed that defendant’s use of the copyrighted work
was fair use); Campinha–Bacote v. Bleidt, No. H–10–3481, 2011 WL 4625394, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 3,
2011) (finding qualified immunity because defendant could have reasonably believed her conduct would
not violate copyright law).
469

United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (holding abrogation was valid with respect to a claim that
state violated the Fourteenth Amendment based on the conditions in which it confined a paraplegic prisoner
and distinguishing invalid abrogation when claims did not rest on allegations of unconstitutional state
conduct).
470

Allen v. Cooper, No. 5:15-cv-00627-BO, *23 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 18, 2021). The court noted that it had never
ruled on whether Allen had a valid “case-by-case” abrogation claim under Georgia based on his allegations
that “defendants’ conduct amounted to a taking without compensation and simultaneously violated both
the CRCA and the Fifth Amendment.” Id. The court authorized Allen to amend his complaint to allege
additional facts regarding his takings claim and the intentionality of the state’s conduct. Id. at *24.
471

472

Lane v. First National Bank of Boston, 871 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1988).

473

Request Letter at 1.

70

U.S. Copyright Office

Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity

Office was asked to “study the extent to which copyright owners are experiencing
infringements by state entities without adequate remedies under state law” and to
“consider the extent to which such infringements appear to be based on intentional or
reckless conduct.”474 The inquiry thus involves both a factual and a legal component.
First, the Office has collected and analyzed the allegations of state infringement
submitted by copyright owners in this study, as well as the information provided by
state institutions in response. Second, the Office has attempted to determine whether
these allegations, taken as a whole, are likely to be considered sufficient to meet the
standard for abrogation set forth in Supreme Court case law, given the available
remedies.
With respect to the factual record, the Office can report that the number of allegations of
state infringement provided in response to the NOI is substantially greater than the
number cited in the Oman Report. Commenters submitted lists collecting over 130
copyright infringement suits brought against state entities in thirty-six states. Nearly all
of these cases were filed between 2000 and 2020. In addition, the survey results
submitted by the Copyright Alliance include allegations of state infringement reported
by 115 copyright owners, with the majority of respondents stating that their works have
been infringed by state entities on multiple occasions. The Office also received
individual anecdotes from approximately a dozen copyright owners.
The evidence indicates that state infringement constitutes a legitimate concern for
copyright owners. While the merits of individual claims may often be uncertain, it
seems clear that there are in fact instances in which some state entities infringe
copyrights—whether intentionally, recklessly, or negligently—and that those
infringements can cause harm to the value of the copyrighted works. Moreover,
copyright owners’ inability to bring copyright infringement claims for damages in such
cases can leave them with inadequate remedies. While some may be able to assert tort
or contract claims in state court, many such claims will be preempted by the Copyright
Act, and in any event do not provide the same remedies as are available for copyright
infringement. Likewise, recent cases cast doubt on the viability of claims seeking to
recover under a takings theory. And although copyright owners may seek injunctive
relief or bring personal-capacity suits against state officials in federal court, injunctions
do not compensate copyright owners for monetary harm, and qualified immunity or
lack of resources may prevent monetary relief against individual state infringers.
The Office also is mindful that, at least in the copyright context, conclusive evidence of
intentional or reckless state infringement may be elusive. Sovereign immunity itself
may dissuade copyright owners from bringing suit and often prevents adjudication of

474

Id. at 2.
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the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, making it inherently difficult to develop any record of
unconstitutional conduct.
The Office also heard from representatives of a number of state entities, primarily
universities and libraries, who provided information about their efforts to educate their
communities about copyright through the adoption of policies and educational
programs. They also expressed concern about the potential impact on their operations if
infringement suits for damages were permitted to proceed.
As to the legal analysis, the Office notes as a preliminary matter that the standard
according to which the evidence is to be weighed is not entirely clear. There has been
only a limited number of instances in which the Supreme Court has found sufficient
evidence to support abrogation of state sovereign immunity. As discussed, in the more
than two decades since it articulated the “congruence and proportionality” test in City of
Boerne, the Court has upheld congressional abrogation provisions on only two occasions.
Those cases arose in the different contexts of disability- and sex-based discrimination,
respectively. Thus, while Florida Prepaid and Allen provide examples of evidentiary
records that are insufficient for abrogation in the intellectual property context, the Court
has provided less guidance as to the nature and volume of evidence that would be
sufficient in this area.
It appears, however, that the threshold as enunciated by the Supreme Court since the
CRCA was enacted has been set quite high. In general, the Court’s decisions indicate
that the instances of unlawful conduct must be sufficiently numerous to establish a
pattern. In Lane, the Court found it significant that Congress had “gathered evidence
from every State in the Union” and found “hundreds of examples of unequal treatment
of persons with disabilities by States and their political subdivisions.”475 Similarly, in
Hibbs, the Court noted that nineteen states had laws limiting how many hours women
could work and that many states offered their employees different durations of parental
leave depending on the sex of the parent.476 Conversely, where the evidence consisted of
no more than “half a dozen examples,” the Court found that the record “f[e]ll far short
of even suggesting [a] pattern of unconstitutional discrimination.”477 In Florida Prepaid,
the Court concluded that “Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the
States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations,” where the legislative history
“provide[d] only two examples of patent infringement suits against the States.”478 And
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Lane, 541 U.S. at 516, 526 (internal citations omitted).

476

Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729–31.

477

Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369–70.
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527 U.S. at 640.
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in Allen, the Court likewise found insufficient evidence of a pattern based on “a dozen
possible examples of state infringement.”479
Further, the analysis is not limited to simply tallying the number of allegations of
infringement against states. As discussed, only intentional or possibly reckless
infringements can rise to the level of a due process violation. Moreover, although the
Court has said little regarding the need to assess the validity of the claims, it suggested
in Allen that uncorroborated allegations alone are not sufficient.480
In light of these precedents, we are unable to conclude with certainty that the evidence
provided in this study would be held sufficient to establish a pattern of unconstitutional
conduct. Although the record includes more examples of potential infringement than in
Florida Prepaid and Allen, it falls short of the evidence of pervasive unconstitutional
conduct by state entities in Lane and Hibbs. Nor has the Office been presented with
evidence of any state policies permitting or encouraging infringement, as was the case in
Hibbs. To the contrary, we received considerable evidence of policies and programs
adopted by a number of state entities in order to deter infringement. With respect to
litigated cases, the lists provided by commenters do not by themselves indicate the
extent to which the cases involved credible allegations of intentional infringement. Only
about half of the cases provided to the Office resulted in a written decision, with the
majority dismissing the copyright claims on sovereign immunity grounds, and nearly all
of the others decided in favor of the state. Similar challenges arise in assessing the
survey evidence and individual anecdotes. While the number of alleged infringements
reported appears significant on its face, the Office has no basis to evaluate whether any
given respondent had a valid copyright interest, whether the state may have had
meritorious defenses, and whether any infringement was intentional or reckless.
Given that the evidence gathered here far exceeds that underlying the CRCA, Congress
may still choose to proceed with adopting new abrogation legislation. In light of the
foregoing concerns, however, there is a material risk that a court could find even this
more robust record insufficient to meet the constitutional abrogation standard. The
Office nevertheless continues to believe that infringement by state entities is an issue
worthy of congressional action.
The Office has long been of the view that “[t]he ability of copyright owners to protect
their property and to obtain complete relief when their rights are violated is central to
the balance of interest[s] in the Copyright Act,” and that state infringers should be
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140 S. Ct. at 1006.

Id. (noting that Oman Report “listed seven court cases brought against States (with another two dismissed
on the merits) and five anecdotes taken from public comments (but not further corroborated)”).
480
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subject to infringement liability to the same extent as other parties.481 The Office
appreciates the concerns of the universities, libraries, and other state entities represented
in this study, and their implementation of policies and educational programs to ensure
respect for copyright. We note that these entities will generally be able to invoke
protection from non-meritorious infringement suits under the Copyright Act’s
exceptions and limitations, including fair use, exceptions for reproduction by libraries
and archives, and limitations on remedies.482 State users of copyrighted works, however,
are not limited to these institutions. Other state entities, ranging from athletic
departments to tourism offices to radio stations, may make use of copyrighted works for
a variety of purposes, including some that affect the works’ markets. While the Office
received little evidence relating to these types of entities, there would seem to be little
justification for immunizing them from damages if they intentionally engage in the same
conduct for which a private party could be held liable.
Previous Congresses have considered legislation that would have avoided the need for
abrogation by establishing a waiver-based framework for infringement suits against
states. Under that model, a state’s ability to recover damages for infringement of its own
intellectual property rights would be conditioned on its waiving sovereign immunity
from infringement suits.483 If Congress decides not to proceed with new abrogation
legislation, the Office would support further consideration of a waiver approach, as well
as other options to ensure that copyright owners have meaningful remedies when states
infringe their rights. As always, the Office stands ready to provide technical advice or
other assistance to Congress on any legislative proposals.

Sovereign Immunity and the Protection of Intellectual Property: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 10–11 (2002) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office)
(stating that “the current state of affairs is unjust and unacceptable”).
481

482

17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 108, 504(c)(2).

See Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1191, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Intellectual
Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2344 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003); State Sovereign Immunity and Protection
of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Judiciary Comm.,
106th Cong. (2000).
483
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II. Special Issues for Comment
OSHA has a particular interest in
comments on the following issues:
• Whether the proposed information
collection requirements are necessary
for the proper performance of the
agency’s functions, including whether
the information is useful;
• The accuracy of OSHA’s estimate of
the burden (time and costs) of the
information collection requirements,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
• The quality, utility, and clarity of
the information collected; and
• Ways to minimize the burden on
employers who must comply; for
example, by using automated or other
technological information collection
and transmission techniques.
III. Proposed Actions
OSHA is requesting that OMB extend
the approval of the collection of
information (paperwork) requirements
contained in the Anhydrous Ammonia
Storage and Handling Standard. There is
a slight adjustment decrease in burden
hours for this ICR. The burden hours
have decreased a total of 1 hour (from
337 to 336 hours).
Type of Review: Extension of a
currently approved collection.
Title: Anhydrous Ammonia Storage
and Handling Standard (29 CFR
1910.111).
OMB Number: 1218–0208.
Affected Public: Business or other forprofit; farms.
Number of Respondents: 201,300.
Frequency of Response: On occasion.
Total Responses: 2,013.
Average Time per Response: 10
minutes (10/60 hour) for a worker to
replace or revise markings on ammonia
containers.
Estimated Total Burden Hours: 336.
Estimated Cost (Operation and
Maintenance): $0.

lotter on DSK9F5VC42PROD with NOTICES

IV. Public Participation—Submission of
Comments on This Notice and Internet
Access to Comments and Submissions
You may submit comments in
response to this document as follows:
(1) Electronically at http://
www.regulations.gov, which is the
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal; (2) by
facsimile; or (3) by hard copy. All
comments, attachments, and other
material must identify the agency name
and the OSHA docket number for this
ICR (Docket No. OSHA–2010–0050).
You may supplement electronic
submissions by uploading document
files electronically. If you wish to mail
additional materials in reference to an
electronic or facsimile submission, you
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Jkt 250001

must submit them to the OSHA Docket
Office (see the section of this notice
titled ADDRESSES). The additional
materials must clearly identify your
electronic comments by your name,
date, and the docket number so the
agency can attach them to your
comments.
Because of security procedures, the
use of regular mail may cause a
significant delay in the receipt of
comments. For information about
security procedures concerning the
delivery of materials by hand, express
delivery, messenger, or courier service,
please contact the OSHA Docket Office
at (202) 693–2350, (TTY (877) 889–
5627).
Comments and submissions are
posted without change at http://
www.regulations.gov. Therefore, OSHA
cautions commenters about submitting
personal information such as your social
security number and date of birth.
Although all submissions are listed in
the http://www.regulations.gov index,
some information (e.g., copyrighted
material) is not publicly available to
read or download from this website. All
submissions, including copyrighted
material, are available for inspection
and copying at the OSHA Docket Office.
Information on using the http://
www.regulations.gov website to submit
comments and access the docket is
available at the website’s ‘‘User Tips’’
link. Contact the OSHA Docket Office
for information about materials not
available from the website, and for
assistance in using the internet to locate
docket submissions.
V. Authority and Signature
Loren Sweatt, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health,
directed the preparation of this notice.
The authority for this notice is the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3506 et seq.) and Secretary of
Labor’s Order No. 1–2012 (77 FR 3912).
Signed at Washington, DC, on May 28,
2020.
Loren Sweatt,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor
for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2020–11986 Filed 6–2–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–26–P
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U.S. Copyright Office
[Docket No. 2020–9]

Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and
Request for Public Comment
Copyright Office, Library of
Congress.
ACTION: Notice of inquiry.
AGENCY:

The U.S. Copyright Office is
initiating a study to evaluate the degree
to which copyright owners are
experiencing infringement by state
entities without adequate remedies
under state law, as well as the extent to
which such infringements appear to be
based on intentional or reckless
conduct. The Office seeks public input
on this topic to assist it in preparing a
report to Congress.
DATES: Written comments are due on or
before August 3, 2020.
ADDRESSES: For reasons of government
efficiency, the Copyright Office is using
the regulations.gov system for the
submission and posting of public
comments in this proceeding. All
comments are therefore to be submitted
electronically through regulations.gov.
Specific instructions for submitting
comments are available on the
Copyright Office website at http://
www.copyright.gov/docs/
sovereignimmunitystudy. If electronic
submission of comments is not feasible
due to lack of access to a computer and/
or the internet, please contact the Office,
using the contact information below, for
special instructions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Regan A. Smith, General Counsel and
Associate Register of Copyrights,
regans@copyright.gov; Kevin R. Amer,
Deputy General Counsel, kamer@
loc.gov; or Mark T. Gray, AttorneyAdvisor, mgray@loc.gov. They can be
reached by telephone at 202–707–3000.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On March
23, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Allen v. Cooper,1 holding
that the Copyright Remedy Clarification
Act of 1990 (‘‘CRCA’’), which attempted
to make states subject to liability for
copyright infringement to the same
extent as other parties, did not validly
abrogate states’ sovereign immunity
against suit. Following the decision,
Senators Thom Tillis and Patrick Leahy
sent a letter to the Copyright Office
requesting that the Office ‘‘research this
issue to determine whether there is
sufficient basis for federal legislation
SUMMARY:
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abrogating State sovereign immunity
when States infringe copyrights.’’ 2
I. Background

lotter on DSK9F5VC42PROD with NOTICES

a. The Copyright Remedy Clarification
Act
Under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, ‘‘a federal court generally
may not hear a suit brought by any
person against a nonconsenting State.’’ 3
The Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, however, ‘‘can authorize
Congress to strip the States of
immunity.’’ 4 Section 1 of that
Amendment provides that states may
not ‘‘deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of
law,’’ 5 and section 5 gives Congress the
‘‘power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation,’’ those prohibitions,6
including by subjecting states to suit in
federal court.7
Enacted on November 15, 1990, the
CRCA amended the Copyright Act to
expressly provide that states are not
immune from suit for copyright
infringement.8 Congress adopted the
legislation in response to a 1985
Supreme Court decision, Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon, in which the
Court held that to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress must
use ‘‘unequivocal’’ language making its
intention explicit.9 At the time, the
Copyright Act was silent on whether
states were subject to liability,10
although some pre-Atascadero courts
had held that Congress intended states
to be subject to infringement claims.11
2 Letter from Sens. Thom Tillis & Patrick Leahy
to Maria Strong, Acting Register of Copyrights, U.S.
Copyright Office at 1 (Apr. 28, 2020), available at
https://www.copyright.gov/rulemaking/statesovereign-immunity/letter.pdf (‘‘Request Letter’’).
3 Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1000.
4 Id. at 1003.
5 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec. 1.
6 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec. 5.
7 Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1003.
8 Public Law 101–553, sec. 2(a)(2), 101 Stat. 2749
(1990), codified at 17 U.S.C. 511.
9 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985).
10 See 17 U.S.C. 501(a) (1977) (‘‘Anyone who
violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner as provided by sections 106 through 118, or
who imports copies or phonorecords into the
United States in violation of section 602, is an
infringer of the copyright.’’).
11 See Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278,
1285 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming copyright damages
and attorneys’ fees award under 1909 Act because
language providing for damages against infringers
was ‘‘sweeping and without apparent limitation,
suggesting that Congress intended to include states
within the class of defendants’’); Johnson v. Univ.
of Va., 606 F. Supp. 321, 324 (W.D. Va. 1985)
(‘‘[B]ased on the Mills Music analysis of the 1909
Act, and this court’s examination of the operative
language of the 1976 Act, the court determines that
the 1976 Act waived the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity from liability for damages
and equitable relief for copyright infringements.’’).
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Shortly after the Atascadero decision,
Congress asked then-Register of
Copyrights Ralph Oman to study what
‘‘practical problems’’ copyright owners
faced in enforcing their rights against
state governments.12 The Office
subsequently issued a request for public
comment 13 and received approximately
forty responses.14 Most comments were
submitted by copyright owners, some of
whom expressed concern about the risk
of future infringement by state entities,
while others discussed past acts of
infringement committed by states.15 The
Office summarized these comments in a
public report (the ‘‘Oman Report’’),
which ultimately recommended that
Congress ‘‘amend the Copyright Act
. . . to ensure that copyright owners
have an effective remedy against
infringing states.’’ 16
But see Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 782 (8th Cir.
1962) (dismissing copyright claim against school
district on Eleventh Amendment grounds because
the district was ‘‘an instrumentality of the State of
Iowa, constituting a part of its educational system
and engaged in performing a state governmental
function under state law and at state expense’’).
12 Letter from Reps. Robert W. Kastenmeier &
Carlos Moorhead, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, to Ralph Oman, Register
of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office at 1 (Aug. 3,
1987), reproduced in U.S. Copyright Office,
Copyright Liability of States and the Eleventh
Amendment, A Report of the Register of Copyrights
(June 1988), https://www.copyright.gov/reports/
copyright-liability-of-states-1988.pdf.
13 Request for Information: Eleventh Amendment,
52 FR 42045 (Nov. 2, 1987).
14 The public comments can be viewed at https://
archive.org/details/
Copyright11thAmendmentStudyComments.
15 U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Liability of
States and the Eleventh Amendment: A Report of
the Register of Copyrights 6 (June 1988) (‘‘Oman
Report’’) (‘‘The major concern of copyright owners
appears to be widespread, uncontrollable copying
of their works without remuneration’’), available at
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/copyrightliability-of-states-1988.pdf. The CRCA’s legislative
history reveals similar concerns about prospective
infringement. See Copyright Remedy Clarification
Act and Copyright Office Report on Copyright
Liability of States, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 102 (1989) (testimony of
Barbara Ringer, former Register of Copyrights) (until
Atascadero, states believed ‘‘you have got to pay,’’
but now ‘‘their lawyers are going to tell them you
don’t have to pay,’’ and ‘‘gradually, and maybe not
so gradually, this free ride will become quite the
rule rather than the exception unless you do
something’’); Copyright Remedy Clarification Act,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 69 (1989) (prepared
statement of Copyright Remedies Coalition)
(expressing concern that ‘‘states may well confuse
insulation from damages with full immunity from
any copyright liability, causing them to believe that
their activities are beyond the reach of the
Copyright Act’’).
16 Oman Report at 104. The Office’s specific
legislative recommendations turned on whether
Congress could abrogate state immunity under
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution (the
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After the Office issued its report, the
CRCA was introduced in Congress, and
Congress held hearings on the issue of
state infringement. The final legislation
amended the Copyright Act to provide
that ‘‘[a]ny State, any instrumentality of
a State, and any officer or employee of
a State or instrumentality of a State
acting in his or her official capacity,
shall not be immune, under the
Eleventh Amendment . . . or under any
other doctrine of sovereign immunity,
from suit in Federal court by any
person’’ for copyright infringement.17 It
further provided that ‘‘[a]ny State . . .
shall be subject to the provisions of this
title in the same manner and to the same
extent as any nongovernmental
entity.’’ 18
b. Florida Prepaid v. College Savings
Bank
Nine years after enactment of the
CRCA, the Supreme Court issued an
opinion in Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank,19 which
addressed whether Congress had validly
abrogated states’ immunity from patent
infringement suits when it adopted the
Patent Remedy Act. In Florida Prepaid,
the Court set out a number of
requirements that Congress needed to
meet for such abrogation to constitute a
valid exercise of Congress’s authority
under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. First, Congress was
required to identify a ‘‘pattern of patent
infringement’’ by state governments.20
Second, the infringement must
constitute a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment such that patent owners
‘‘Intellectual Property Clause’’). The Supreme Court
had not yet addressed that question. Shortly before
the report was completed, however, the Court
granted certiorari in United States v. Union Gas Co.,
832 F.2d 1343, 1356 (3d Cir. 1987), certiorari
granted sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
485 U.S. 958 (1988), in which the Third Circuit had
held that Article I could be a basis for abrogation.
The Oman Report recommended that if the
Supreme Court affirmed that decision, Congress
should revise section 501 of the Copyright Act to
‘‘clarify its intent to abrogate states’ Eleventh
Amendment Immunity pursuant to its [Intellectual
Property Clause] power.’’ Oman Report at 104.
Otherwise, the Report recommended that Congress
‘‘amend the jurisdictional provision in 28 U.S.C.
1338(a), to provide that where states are defendants,
private individuals may sue them in state court for
copyright damages.’’ Id. at 104–05.
17 17 U.S.C. 511(a); see also id. at 511(b) (‘‘In a
suit described in subsection (a) for a violation
described in that subsection, remedies (including
remedies both at law and in equity) are available
for the violation to the same extent as such
remedies are available for such a violation in a suit
against any public or private entity other than a
State, instrumentality of a State, or officer or
employee of a State acting in his or her official
capacity.’’).
18 Id. at 501(a).
19 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
20 Id. at 640.
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were being deprived of property
‘‘without due process of law.’’ 21 The
Court explained that such a deprivation
occurs ‘‘only where the State provides
no remedy, or only inadequate
remedies, to injured patent owners for
its infringement of their patent.’’ 22 The
Court cautioned that, because states do
not violate due process when they
commit a ‘‘negligent act that causes
unintended injury to a person’s
property,’’ patent infringement that was
merely negligent rather than intentional
or reckless did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.23 Third, there
must be ‘‘congruence and
proportionality’’ between the
constitutional violations Congress seeks
to remedy and the means adopted for
that purpose.24
The Court in Florida Prepaid struck
down the Patent Remedy Act for failure
to meet these requirements. It
concluded that Congress had not
identified a pattern of infringement
because (1) Congress had ‘‘little
evidence of infringing conduct’’ by state
actors; 25 (2) Congress ‘‘barely
considered’’ the adequacy of state-law
remedies for patent infringement by the
state; 26 (3) the legislative record did not
reflect a pattern of intentional or
reckless infringements, but instead
consisted only of ‘‘a handful of
instances of state patent infringement
that do not necessarily violate the
Constitution’’; 27 and (4) the legislation
was not limited to ‘‘cases involving
arguable constitutional violations, such
as where a State refuses to offer any
state-court remedy,’’ or cases where the
infringement was not negligent or
committed pursuant to state policy.28
After the Court’s decision, Congress
considered, but did not pass, legislation
that would have conditioned states’
ability to recover damages for
infringement of their own intellectual
property on their waiver of immunity to
infringement damages.29
21 Id.

at 642.
at 643.
23 Id. at 645.
24 Id. at 639 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
25 Id. at 640–41.
26 Id. at 643–44.
27 Id. at 645–66.
28 Id. at 646–47.
29 See Sovereign Immunity and Protection of
Intellectual Property, Hearing Before Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 3–4 (Feb. 27, 2000)
(prepared statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy), https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG107shrg85184/pdf/CHRG-107shrg85184.pdf
(discussing Intellectual Property Protection
Restoration Act of 2001 and stating that ‘‘no
condition could be more reasonable or
proportionate than the condition that in order to
obtain full protection for your federal intellectual
property rights, you must respect those of others’’);
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c. Allen v. Cooper
This year, the Supreme Court decided
Allen v. Cooper, a case considering the
validity of the CRCA’s abrogation of
state immunity. In Allen, a videographer
brought an infringement action against
North Carolina after the state published
his videos and photographs of a sunken
pirate ship online without
authorization. North Carolina contended
that it was immune to suit and that the
CRCA failed to properly abrogate its
immunity. Applying the analysis from
Florida Prepaid, the Court held that the
CRCA failed the congruence and
proportionality test for substantially the
same reasons that applied to the Patent
Remedy Act.30 With respect to the
legislative record, the Court found the
evidence of copyright infringement
supporting the CRCA to be ‘‘scarcely
more impressive than what the Florida
Prepaid Court saw,’’ amounting to ‘‘only
a dozen possible examples of state
infringement.’’ 31 The Court also pointed
to congressional testimony and
statements by Members of Congress
suggesting that copyright infringement
by states currently was not a widespread
problem.32
The Court further held that Congress
had failed to make a sufficient showing
of unconstitutional infringement by
states. Under its precedent, the Court
noted, ‘‘a merely negligent act does not
‘deprive’ a person of property,’’ and
therefore ‘‘an infringement must be
intentional, or at least reckless, to come
within the reach of the Due Process
Clause.’’ 33 In the case of the CRCA, only
two of the infringements cited in the
legislative record appeared to be
intentional.34 Moreover, the record
contained ‘‘no information about the
availability of state-law remedies for
copyright infringement (such as contract
or unjust enrichment suits)—even
though they might themselves satisfy
due process.’’ 35 The Court thus
concluded that the balance struck by the
CRCA ‘‘between constitutional wrong
Intellectual Property Restoration Act of 2003,
Hearing Before House Subcomm. on Courts, the
internet, and Intellectual Property, 108th Cong.
(June 17, 2003) (prepared statement of Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at https://
www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat061703.html
(stating that proposed legislation ‘‘provides
significant incentives for a State to waive its
immunity, but does so in a way that is inherently
proportional and fair to the States and copyright
owners’’).
30 Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 999.
31 Id. at 1006.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1004. The Court had previously reserved,
but not decided, the question ‘‘whether reckless
conduct suffices’’ to violate due process. Id. (citing
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986)).
34 Id. at 1006.
35 Id. at 1006–07.
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and statutory remedy’’ was ‘‘askew.’’ 36
The ‘‘exceedingly slight’’ evidence of
Fourteenth Amendment injury,
combined with the fact that the statute
extended to ‘‘every infringement case
against a State,’’ meant that ‘‘the law’s
‘indiscriminate scope’ [was] ‘out of
proportion’ to any due process
problem.’’ 37
At the conclusion of the opinion, the
Court observed that its decision ‘‘need
not prevent Congress from passing a
valid copyright abrogation law in the
future.’’ 38 It noted that in adopting the
CRCA, ‘‘Congress acted before this Court
created the ‘congruence and
proportionality’ test,’’ and therefore it
‘‘likely did not appreciate the
importance of linking the scope of its
abrogation to the redress or prevention
of unconstitutional injuries—and of
creating a legislative record to back up
that connection.’’ 39 Under that
standard, ‘‘if [Congress] detects
violations of due process, then it may
enact a proportionate response,’’ and
[t]hat kind of tailored statute can
effectively stop States from behaving as
copyright pirates.’’ 40
d. Current Study
On April 28, 2020, Senators Thom
Tillis and Patrick Leahy sent a letter to
the Copyright Office noting that the
Allen decision has ‘‘created a situation
in which copyright owners are without
remedy if a State infringes their
copyright and claims State sovereign
immunity,’’ and expressing concern
‘‘about the impact this may have on
American creators and innovators.’’ 41
The letter states that the Senators ‘‘have
heard from affected copyright owners
that in recent years State infringements
of copyright have become much more
common.’’ 42 To determine whether
there is a sufficient basis for federal
legislation, the letter asks that the Office
‘‘study the extent to which copyright
owners are experiencing infringements
by state entities without adequate
remedies under state law. As part of this
analysis, the Office should consider the
36 Id.
37 Id.

at 1007.
(quoting Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646–

47).
38 Id.; see also id. at 1009 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(‘‘One might . . . expect that someone injured by
a State’s violation of [its] duty [not to infringe
copyright] could ‘resort to the laws of his country
for a remedy,’ . . . . Or more concretely, one might
think that Walt Disney Pictures could sue a State
(or anyone else) for hosting an unlicensed screening
of the studio’s 2003 blockbuster film, Pirates of the
Caribbean (or any one of its many sequels).’’
(citation omitted)).
39 Id. at 1007.
40 Id.
41 Request Letter at 1.
42 Id. at 2.
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extent to which such infringements
appear to be based on intentional or
reckless conduct.’’ 43 The letter requests
that the Office provide a public report
summarizing the findings of this study,
as well as the facts and analyses upon
which those findings are based, by April
30, 2021.44
Pursuant to this request, the Office is
seeking public input in multiple phases.
The Office is providing 60 days for
written comments from interested
parties on the topics outlined below. To
fulfill the request from Congress and the
requirements of the Court, the Office
seeks factual evidence and other
verifiable information to support this
inquiry. For each question, to the extent
available, please include empirical data
or other quantitative analysis in your
response. If describing a litigation
matter, please include information
sufficient for the Office to identify such
matter, such as the relevant court,
docket number, asserted claims, and
dates. As applicable, the Office
encourages commenters to append
relevant materials, such as pleadings,
opinions, or other documentary
evidence, in support of their comments.
If participants currently gathering
empirical research and analyses find
themselves unable to complete them
within the 60-day period for
submissions, they are encouraged to
contact the Office promptly, describing
the nature of the research and indicating
the time required for completion. To the
extent possible, the Office will seek to
accommodate such submissions by
providing an additional comment
period limited to the provision of
empirical data at a later date, but
encourages all commenters to meet the
noticed deadline if possible, so that the
Office may fully consider the
submissions in light of the
congressional deadline.
After this comment period has closed,
the Office intends to host one or more
public roundtables to seek additional
input, potentially virtually. The Office
may request further written comments
on particular issues discussed in
response to this notice and/or at the
public roundtables.
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II. Subjects of Inquiry
The Copyright Office invites written
comments on the subjects below. A
party choosing to respond to this Notice
of Inquiry need not address every
43 Id.
44 Id. Senators Tillis and Leahy also sent a letter
to the Patent and Trademark Office requesting a
study of patent and trademark infringement by state
entities. See Letter from Sens. Thom Tillis & Patrick
Leahy to Andrei Iancu, Director, U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (Apr. 28, 2020).
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subject, but the Office requests that
responding parties clearly identify and
separately address each subject for
which a response is submitted. The
Office also requests that commenters
explain their interest in the study and,
with respect to each answer, the basis
for their knowledge (e.g., the commenter
is a copyright owner, artist, academic, or
state official).
1. Please provide information
regarding specific instances of
infringing conduct committed by a state
government entity, officer, or employee,
including, where relevant:
a. The work(s) infringed;
b. The act(s) of alleged infringement;
c. When the infringement occurred;
d. The state actor(s) who committed
the infringement;
e. Whether the infringement was
intentional or reckless, and the basis for
that conclusion;
f. Whether the infringement was
committed pursuant to a state policy;
g. Whether the state was contacted by
or on behalf of the copyright owner in
response to the infringement, and if so,
how the state responded;
h. Whether a lawsuit was filed as a
result of the infringement, and if so,
where the case was filed, what claim(s)
were brought regarding the
infringement, whether the case remains
pending, and if not, how it was
resolved; and
i. If a lawsuit was not filed, why the
copyright owner chose not to do so,
including whether it attempted to
resolve the matter privately in lieu of
litigation, and any relevant details with
respect to those attempts.
2. To what extent does state sovereign
immunity affect the licensing or sale of
copies of copyrighted works to state
entities? For example:
a. Do copyright owners provide
different payment or licensing terms in
transactions with state entities than are
provided in transactions with other
parties?
b. Have copyright owners changed
aspects of their sales or licensing
practices as a result of state sovereign
immunity?
c. Do different states or state entities
take different approaches to working
with copyrighted material? Are there
particular states that more frequently
infringe?
3. What remedies are available for
copyright owners when states infringe
their works?
a. To what extent did copyright
owners file suits under the Copyright
Act against state entities prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v.
Cooper?
b. In your opinion, does the
availability of injunctive relief against
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state officials provide an adequate
remedy to address the needs of
copyright owners in response to
instances of state copyright
infringement?
c. To what extent are there state law
causes of action that may provide a
remedy for copyright infringements by
state entities? Are there state court cases
in which a copyright owner has been
awarded a judgment on such a claim?
d. To the extent state law provides a
cause of action relevant to copyright
infringement, how do the elements of
the cause of action and/or available
remedies differ from those applicable to
claims under the Copyright Act?
e. In your opinion, are those remedies
adequate to address the needs of
copyright owners in response to
instances of state copyright
infringement?
4. How can Congress determine
whether copyright infringement by a
state is common or infrequent? What
metrics should be used in making such
a determination?
5. Has the prevalence of infringement
by states increased in recent years?
a. What empirical evidence is
available to determine whether and to
what extent there has been a change
over time?
b. To what extent, if any, have
instances of actual or threatened
infringement by states increased since
the decision in Allen, or can they be
expected to increase?
6. How do different states handle
claims of infringement? Please discuss,
as relevant:
a. Whether any state agencies carry
insurance policies that would cover
infringement by a state employee, and if
so, whether those insurance policies
distinguish between infringement that is
intentional, reckless, or negligent;
b. Any laws, regulations, or policies
that state entities have adopted to
minimize the likelihood of, or to
provide a remedy for, copyright
infringement by a state entity;
c. How frequently copyright owners
claim a state actor has infringed their
rights, either privately or in litigation;
d. How state entities typically
respond to credible claims of copyright
infringement, including any formal or
informal policies providing for
negotiations with or payment to the
copyright owner, as well as whether the
Attorney General’s office is notified of
such claims;
e. What state entities are eligible to
assert sovereign immunity as a defense
to copyright infringement claims;
f. Whether state entities have the right
to waive sovereign immunity as a
defense to an infringement lawsuit in
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federal court, and what authority
permits or prevents such waiver; and
g. Whether any states record and/or
track copyright infringement claims
received by state entities.
7. Please identify any pertinent issues
not referenced above that the Copyright
Office should consider in conducting its
study.
Dated: May 29, 2020.
Regan A. Smith,
General Counsel and Associate Register of
Copyrights.
[FR Doc. 2020–12019 Filed 6–2–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 1410–30–P

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION
[Notice (20–051)]

Notice of Intent To Grant an Exclusive
License
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
ACTION: Notice of intent to grant
exclusive invention license.
AGENCY:

NASA hereby gives notice of
its intent to grant an exclusive invention
license in the United States to practice
the invention described and claimed in
NASA Case Number MFS–33884–1,
entitled ‘‘Ruggedizing a Commercial
Camera for Space Flight Environments,’’
to Imperx, Inc., having its principal
place of business in Boca Raton, Florida.
NASA has not yet made a determination
to grant the requested license and may
deny the requested license even if no
objections are submitted within the
comment period.
DATES: The prospective exclusive
license may be granted unless NASA
receives written objections including
evidence and argument, no later than
June 18, 2020 that establish that the
grant of the license would not be
consistent with the requirements
regarding the licensing of federally
owned inventions as set forth in the
Bayh-Dole Act and implementing
regulations. Competing applications
completed and received by NASA no
later than June 18, 2020 will also be
treated as objections to the grant of the
contemplated exclusive license.
Objections submitted in response to this
notice will not be made available to the
public for inspection and, to the extent
permitted by law, will not be released
under the Freedom of Information Act.
ADDRESSES: Objections relating to the
prospective license may be submitted to
James J. McGroary, Chief Patent
Counsel/LS01, NASA Marshall Space
Flight Center, Huntsville, AL 35812,
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(256) 544–0013. Email
james.j.mcgroary@nasa.gov.

I. Introduction
The Commission gives notice that the
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kyle Postal Service filed request(s) for the
Costabile, Technology Transfer, ST22,
Commission to consider matters related
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center,
to negotiated service agreement(s). The
Huntsville, AL 35812, (256) 316–9556.
request(s) may propose the addition or
Email kyle.p.costabile@nasa.gov.
removal of a negotiated service
agreement from the market dominant or
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This
the competitive product list, or the
notice of intent to grant an exclusive
modification of an existing product
invention license is issued in
accordance with 35 U.S.C. 209(e) and 37 currently appearing on the market
dominant or the competitive product
CFR 404.7(a)(1)(i). The patent rights in
list.
these inventions have been assigned to
Section II identifies the docket
the United States of America as
number(s) associated with each Postal
represented by the Administrator of the
Service request, the title of each Postal
National Aeronautics and Space
Service request, the request’s acceptance
Administration. The prospective
date, and the authority cited by the
exclusive license will comply with the
Postal Service for each request. For each
requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37
request, the Commission appoints an
CFR 404.7.
officer of the Commission to represent
Information about other NASA
inventions available for licensing can be the interests of the general public in the
proceeding, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 505
found online at http://
(Public Representative). Section II also
technology.nasa.gov.
establishes comment deadline(s)
Helen M. Galus,
pertaining to each request.
Agency Counsel for Intellectual Property.
The public portions of the Postal
[FR Doc. 2020–11933 Filed 6–2–20; 8:45 am]
Service’s request(s) can be accessed via
the Commission’s website (http://
BILLING CODE 7510–13–P
www.prc.gov). Non-public portions of
the Postal Service’s request(s), if any,
can be accessed through compliance
POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION
with the requirements of 39 CFR
1
[Docket Nos. MC2020–143 and CP2020–153; 3011.301.
The
Commission
invites comments on
MC2020–144 and CP2020–154; MC2020–145
and CP2020–155; MC2020–146 and CP2020– whether the Postal Service’s request(s)
in the captioned docket(s) are consistent
156]
with the policies of title 39. For
New Postal Products
request(s) that the Postal Service states
concern market dominant product(s),
AGENCY: Postal Regulatory Commission.
applicable statutory and regulatory
ACTION: Notice.
requirements include 39 U.S.C. 3622, 39
U.S.C. 3642, 39 CFR part 3030, and 39
SUMMARY: The Commission is noticing a
CFR part 3040, subpart B. For request(s)
recent Postal Service filing for the
Commission’s consideration concerning that the Postal Service states concern
competitive product(s), applicable
negotiated service agreements. This
statutory and regulatory requirements
notice informs the public of the filing,
invites public comment, and takes other include 39 U.S.C. 3632, 39 U.S.C. 3633,
39 U.S.C. 3642, 39 CFR part 3035, and
administrative steps.
39 CFR part 3040, subpart B. Comment
DATES: Comments are due: June 5, 2020.
deadline(s) for each request appear in
ADDRESSES: Submit comments
section II.
electronically via the Commission’s
II. Docketed Proceeding(s)
Filing Online system at http://
www.prc.gov. Those who cannot submit
1. Docket No(s).: MC2020–143 and
comments electronically should contact CP2020–153; Filing Title: USPS Request
the person identified in the FOR FURTHER to Add Priority Mail Contract 621 to
INFORMATION CONTACT section by
Competitive Product List and Notice of
telephone for advice on filing
Filing Materials Under Seal; Filing
alternatives.
Acceptance Date: May 28, 2020; Filing
Authority: 39 U.S.C. 3642, 39 CFR
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
3040.130 et seq., and 39 CFR 3035.105;
David A. Trissell, General Counsel, at
Public Representative: Christopher C.
202–789–6820.
Mohr; Comments Due: June 5, 2020.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. Docketed Proceeding(s)
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1 See Docket No. RM2018–3, Order Adopting
Final Rules Relating to Non-Public Information,
June 27, 2018, Attachment A at 19–22 (Order No.
4679).
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requires the employer to make a
thorough periodic inspection of alloy
steel chain slings in use on a regular
basis, but at least once a year. Paragraph
(b)(6)(ii) requires the employer to make
and maintain a record of the most recent
month in which each alloy steel chain
was inspected and make the record
available for examination.
Paragraph (c)(15)(ii) requires that all
welded end attachments of wire rope
slings be proof tested by the
manufacturer at twice their rated
capacity prior to initial use, and that the
employer retain a certificate of the proof
test and make it available for
examination.
Paragraphs (e)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii)
require that synthetic web slings be
marked or coded to show the
manufacturer’s name or trademark, the
rated capacity for the type of hitch, and
the type of synthetic webbing material.
Paragraph (f)(2) requires that all hooks
for which no applicable manufacturer’s
recommendations are available be tested
twice before they are put into use. The
employer shall maintain a record of the
dates and results of the tests.

jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES

II. Special Issues for Comment
OSHA has a particular interest in
comments on the following issues:
• Whether the proposed information
collection requirements are necessary
for the proper performance of the
agency’s functions, including whether
the information is useful;
• The accuracy of OSHA’s estimate of
the burden (time and costs) of the
information collection requirements,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
• The quality, utility, and clarity of
the information collected; and
• Ways to minimize the burden on
employers who must-comply; for
example, by using automated or other
technological information collection
and transmission techniques.
III. Proposed Actions
There is an adjustment decrease of
3,269 burden hours (from 52,428 hours
to 49,159 hours). This decrease is a
result of new data indicating a decrease
in the number of cranes and derricks
from 122,091 to 115,829.
Type of Review: Extension of a
currently approved collection.
Title: Rigging Equipment for Material
Handling (29 CFR 1926.251).
OMB Control Number: 1218–0233.
Affected Public: Business or other forprofits.
Number of Respondents: 115,829.
Total Responses: 306,729.
Frequency of Responses: On occasion.
Average Time per Response: Average
of 3 minutes (3/60 hour) for an
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employer to maintain and disclose a
certificate to 30 minutes (30/60 hour) for
an employer to acquire information and
make a tag for a sling.
Estimated Total Burden Hours:
49,159.
Estimated Cost (Operation and
Maintenance): $0.
IV. Public Participation—Submission of
Comments on This Notice and Internet
Access to Comments and Submissions
You may submit comments in
response to this document as follows:
(1) Electronically at http://
www.regulations.gov, which is the
Federal eRulemaking Portal; (2) by
facsimile (fax); or (3) by hard copy. All
comments, attachments, and other
material must identify the agency name
and the OSHA docket number for the
ICR (OSHA Docket No. 2010–0038). You
may supplement electronic submissions
by uploading document files
electronically. If you wish to mail
additional materials in reference to an
electronic or facsimile submission, you
must submit them to the OSHA Docket
Office (see the section of this notice
titled ADDRESSES). The additional
materials must clearly identify your
electronic comments by your name,
date, and the docket number so the
agency can attach them to your
comments.
Because of security procedures, the
use of regular mail may cause a
significant delay in the receipt of
comments. For information about
security procedures concerning the
delivery of materials by hand, express
delivery, messenger, or courier service,
please contact the OSHA Docket Office
at (202) 693–2350, (TTY (877) 889–
5627).
Comments and submissions are
posted without change at http://
www.regulations.gov. Therefore, OSHA
cautions commenters about submitting
personal information, such as social
security numbers and dates of birth.
Although all submissions are listed in
the http://www.regulations.gov index,
some information (e.g., copyrighted
material) is not publicly available to
read or download through this website.
All submissions, including copyrighted
material, are available for inspection
and copying at the OSHA Docket Office.
Information on using the http://
www.regulations.gov website to submit
comments and access the docket is
available at the website’s ‘‘User Tips’’
link. Contact the OSHA Docket Office
for information about materials not
available through the website, and for
assistance in using the internet to locate
docket submissions.
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V. Authority and Signature
Loren Sweatt, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health,
directed the preparation of this notice.
The authority for this notice is the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3506 et seq.) and Secretary of
Labor’s Order No. 1–2012 (77 FR 3912).
Signed at Washington, DC, on June 18,
2020.
Loren Sweatt,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor
for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2020–13520 Filed 6–23–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–26–P

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Copyright Office
[Docket No. 2020–9]

Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and
Request for Public Comment
U.S. Copyright Office, Library
of Congress.
ACTION: Notice of Inquiry; extension of
comment period.
AGENCY:

The U.S. Copyright Office is
extending the deadline for the
submission of written comments in
response to its June 3, 2020, notice of
inquiry regarding its state sovereign
immunity policy study. In addition, the
Office is providing for a second round
of written comments.
DATES: Initial written comments in
response to the notice of inquiry
published June 3, 2020, at 85 FR 34252,
must be received no later than 11:59
p.m. Eastern Time on September 2,
2020. Written reply comments and
empirical research studies must be
received no later than 11:59 p.m.
Eastern Time on October 2, 2020.
ADDRESSES: For reasons of government
efficiency, the Copyright Office is using
the regulations.gov system for the
submission and posting of public
comments in this proceeding. All
comments are therefore to be submitted
electronically through regulations.gov.
Specific instructions for submitting
comments are available on the
Copyright Office website at http://
www.copyright.gov/docs/
sovereignimmunitystudy. If electronic
submission of comments is not feasible
due to lack of access to a computer and/
or the internet, please contact the Office,
using the contact information below, for
special instructions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kevin Amer, Deputy General Counsel,
SUMMARY:
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kamer@copyright.gov; Mark T. Gray,
Attorney-Advisor, mgray@
copyright.gov; or Jalyce E. Mangum,
Attorney-Advisor, jmang@copyright.gov.
They can be reached by telephone at
202–707–3000.

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION

On June 3,
2020, the U.S. Copyright Office issued a
notice of inquiry (‘‘NOI’’) commencing a
policy study on state sovereign
immunity from copyright infringement
suits.1 Congress has requested that the
Office ‘‘research this issue to determine
whether there is sufficient basis for
federal legislation abrogating State
sovereign immunity when States
infringe copyrights.’’ 2 To assist
Congress in making that assessment, the
Office solicited public comment on
several issues concerning the degree to
which copyright owners face
infringement from state actors today,
whether such infringement is based on
intentional or reckless conduct, and
what remedies, if any, are available to
copyright owners under state law.
To ensure that members of the public
have sufficient time to comment, and to
ensure that the Office has the benefit of
a complete record, the Office is
extending the deadline for the
submission of comments to 11:59 p.m.
Eastern Time on September 2, 2020.
The Office has also determined that
interested parties should be given an
opportunity to address any comments
submitted in response to the NOI. In
addition, as noted in the NOI,3 the
Office is seeking to provide sufficient
time for parties engaged in empirical
research in this area to complete and
submit their findings. Accordingly, the
Office is providing for a second round
of written comments. Additional
comments must be submitted no later
than October 2, 2020. In general, these
comments should be limited to issues or
concerns presented in the initial
comments. The Office will, however,
consider any empirical research
submitted by the October 2 deadline as
part of the record in this proceeding.

AGENCY:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Dated: June 22, 2020.
Regan A. Smith,
General Counsel and Associate Register of
Copyrights.
[FR Doc. 2020–13725 Filed 6–23–20; 8:45 am]
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BILLING CODE 1410–30–P
1 85

FR 34252 (June 3, 2020).
from Sens. Thom Tillis & Patrick Leahy
to Maria Strong, Acting Register of Copyrights, U.S.
Copyright Office at 1 (Apr. 28, 2020), https://
www.copyright.gov/rulemaking/statesovereignimmunity/letter.pdf.
3 See 85 FR at 34255.
2 Letter
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[NOTICE: (20–053)]

Name of Information Collection: COVID
19 Census of NASA Grantees
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA).
ACTION: Notice of information
collection—Renewal with change of an
Existing Information Collection.
The National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, as part of its
continuing effort to reduce paperwork
and respondent burden, invites the
general public and other Federal
agencies to take this opportunity to
comment on proposed and/or
continuing information collections.
DATES: Comments are due by August 24,
2020.
ADDRESSES: All comments should be
addressed to Claire Little, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration,
300 E Street SW, Washington, DC
20546–0001 or call 202–358–2375.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Requests for additional information or
copies of the information collection
instrument(s) and instructions should
be directed to R. Travis Kantz, NASA
Clearance Officer, NASA Headquarters,
300 E Street SW, JF0000, Washington,
DC 20546; 281–792–7885 or email
R.Travis.Kantz@nasa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:

I. Abstract
NASA is requesting an extension with
change to this existing collection in
order to continue to gather information
consistent with OMB and NASA COVID
guidance. This data will help inform
NASA about the status and ongoing
implementation issues surrounding
COVID mitigation for NASA grantees
and will improve the quality and
responsiveness of NASA in responding
to grantee issues which impact scientific
research funded by NASA.
This information may be disclosed as
necessary to NASA personnel,
contractors, and partners to administer
NASA Education programs. It also may
be disclosed to NASA administrators
and managers, Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) officials, and
members of Congress for the purposes of
accountability and tracking of program
and project efficiency and effectiveness.
II. Methods of Collection
Interview.
III. Data
Title: COVID 19 Census of NASA
Grantees.
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OMB Number: 2700–0177.
Type of review: Renewal with Change.
Affected Public: Educational
institutions from k-12, universities,
community and tribal colleges,
museums.
Estimated Annual Number of
Activities: 12.
Estimated Number of Respondents
per Activity: 156.
Annual Responses: 12.
Estimated Time per Response: 15
minutes.
Estimated Total Annual Burden
Hours: 22464.
Estimated Total Annual Cost:
$10,953,446.
IV. Request for Comments
Comments are invited on: (1) Whether
the proposed collection of information
is necessary for the proper performance
of the functions of NASA, including
whether the information collected has
practical utility; (2) the accuracy of
NASA’s estimate of the burden
(including hours and cost) of the
proposed collection of information; (3)
ways to enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and (4) ways to minimize the
burden of the collection of information
on respondents, including automated
collection techniques or the use of other
forms of information technology.
Comments submitted in response to
this notice will be summarized and
included in the request for OMB
approval of this information collection.
They will also become a matter of
public record.
Roger Kantz,
NASA PRA Clearance Officer.
[FR Doc. 2020–13538 Filed 6–23–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7510–13–P

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION
[Notice: 20–058]

NASA Advisory Council; Aeronautics
Committee; Meeting
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
ACTION: Notice of meeting.
AGENCY:

In accordance with the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as
amended, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA)
announces a meeting of the Aeronautics
Committee of the NASA Advisory
Council (NAC). This meeting will be
held for soliciting, from the aeronautics
community and other persons, research
and technical information relevant to
program planning.

SUMMARY:
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local workforce entities would receive
funding and technical assistance from
ETA in order to better serve disability
beneficiaries, with a portion of Ticket
funding reserved for rewarding strong
performance and program innovation.
States and localities would be allowed
greater flexibility in tailoring services to
fit local circumstances. The redesigned
program would retain key features of the
current program, such as benefits
counseling and suspension of SSA
medical Continuing Disability Reviews
(CDRs) while program participants
pursue employment.3
In close coordination with SSA and
ETA, DOL’s Office of Disability
Employment Policy (ODEP) will provide
policy analysis and guidance to support
the transfer and improvement of the
program.

jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES

Request for Information
Through this RFI, we are soliciting
feedback from interested and affected
parties on the potential benefits and
challenges in transferring the Ticket
program to DOL and serving program
participants through the public
workforce systems, in order to enable
them to increase employment and
earnings and maximize self-sufficiency.
We are also interested in evidence
supporting or challenging the
assumptions underlying this proposal.
Responses to this RFI will inform
decisions regarding the development,
design, and implementation of the
redesigned program. As such, responses
supported by substantial evidence and
careful reasoning will be afforded
greatest weight. This RFI notice is for
internal planning purposes only and
should not be construed as a solicitation
or as an obligation on the part of DOL
or any participating federal agencies.
We ask respondents to address the
following questions in the context of the
preceding discussion in this document.
Respondents do not need to address
every question and should focus on
those that relate to their expertise or
perspective. To the extent possible,
please clearly indicate the question(s)
addressed in your response. We ask that
each respondent include the name and
street address of his or her institution or
affiliation, if any, and the name, title,
street address, email address, and
telephone number of a contact person
for his or her institution or affiliation, if
any.
3 Medical CDRs are periodic reviews of an
individual’s medical impairment(s) to determine
continuing eligibility for SSI and/or SSDI.
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Questions
Workforce System Capacity
1. How might state workforce systems
use new Ticket program funding to
increase capacity to effectively serve
SSA disability beneficiaries, given that
the number of SSA disability
beneficiaries who will seek services in
a particular locality is unknown?
2. How might state workforce systems
integrate the provision of the Ticket
program with other existing WIOA
services? What opportunities and
challenges will arise in doing so?
3. How could DOL’s ETA help
prepare state workforce systems for a
potentially significant increase in SSA
disability beneficiaries seeking services?
4. What ongoing federal support
would be most helpful to state
workforce systems as they administer
the Ticket program?
5. How could state workforce systems
provide quality remote services, when
necessary, to serve SSA disability
beneficiaries regionally or nationwide?
6. What are key considerations in
transferring SSA’s Work Incentives
Planning and Assistance (WIPA)
services to state workforce agencies?
Participant Experience and Outcomes
7. What specific program changes
could improve experiences and
outcomes for persons accessing the
redesigned Ticket program services
through the workforce system?
8. What is the capacity of the
workforce system to effectively serve
young adults or transition-age youth
(i.e., ages 14–18) under a redesigned
Ticket program? What capacity and
coordination issues would arise in
serving transition-age youth?
Employment Networks and Vocational
Rehabilitation
9. What lessons can be taken from
current EN models (e.g., communitybased, nonprofit, workforce ENs) or
collaborative AJC program models that
can inform the new Ticket program?
10. How can VR entities partner with
state workforce systems to support SSA
disability beneficiaries in the redesigned
Ticket program?
Funding Structure, Performance Metrics
and Performance-Based Payments
11. What payment structures and
which WIOA performance indicators (if
any) would encourage state workforce
systems to provide robust employment
and training services to persons with
disabilities, leading to job placement
and ongoing support to ensure job
retention?
12. Which of the WIOA performance
indicators (if any) could serve as
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potential interim measures to trigger
partial performance-based payments?
13. What are appropriate intervals
(medium- and long-term) for
performance-based payments?
14. How would workforce entities and
DOL track and measure program
success? Would workforce entities
require access to new administrative
data sources?
General
15. What challenges within the
current Ticket program would
potentially remain in a redesigned
program administered by state
workforce entities, and what could DOL
do to address or mitigate them?
16. What strengths of the current
Ticket program contribute to the success
of individual Ticket holders, and how
could these be preserved in the
redesigned program?
17. Are there current or recent state
examples of integrated systems that
offer lessons for successful
implementation of the redesigned Ticket
program?
18. What are the implications of the
current COVID–19 pandemic for
redesigning the Ticket program at this
time, such as employer demand,
workforce system capacity, and remote
services?
19. Are there additional
considerations in transferring the Ticket
program from SSA to DOL?
Signed at Washington, DC, this __th day of
September, 2020.
Jennifer Sheehy,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Disability
Employment Policy.
[FR Doc. 2020–21533 Filed 9–28–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–FK–P

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Copyright Office
[Docket No. 2020–9]

Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and
Request for Public Comment
U.S. Copyright Office, Library
of Congress.
ACTION: Notice of inquiry; extension of
comment period.
AGENCY:

The U.S. Copyright Office is
extending the deadline for the
submission of reply comments and
empirical research studies in response
to the June 3 and June 24, 2020, notices
regarding its state sovereign immunity
policy study.
DATES: Written reply comments and
empirical research studies in response
SUMMARY:
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to the notices published June 3, 2020, at
85 FR 34252, and June 24, 2020, at 85
FR 37961, must be received no later
than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on
October 22, 2020.
ADDRESSES: For reasons of government
efficiency, the Copyright Office is using
the regulations.gov system for the
submission and posting of public
comments in this proceeding. All
comments are therefore to be submitted
electronically through regulations.gov.
Specific instructions for submitting
comments are available on the
Copyright Office website at http://
www.copyright.gov/docs/
sovereignimmunitystudy. If electronic
submission of comments is not feasible
due to lack of access to a computer and/
or the internet, please contact the Office,
using the contact information below, for
special instructions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kevin Amer, Deputy General Counsel,
kamer@copyright.gov; Mark T. Gray,
Attorney-Advisor, mgray@
copyright.gov; or Jalyce E. Mangum,
Attorney-Advisor, jmang@copyright.gov.
They can be reached by telephone at
202–707–3000.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 3,
2020, the U.S. Copyright Office issued a
notice of inquiry (‘‘NOI’’) commencing a
policy study on state sovereign
immunity from copyright infringement
suits.1 Congress has requested that the
Office ‘‘research this issue to determine
whether there is sufficient basis for
federal legislation abrogating State
sovereign immunity when States
infringe copyrights.’’ 2 To assist
Congress in making that assessment, the
Office solicited public comment on
several issues concerning the degree to
which copyright owners face
infringement from state actors today,
whether such infringement is based on
intentional or reckless conduct, and
what remedies, if any, are available to
copyright owners under state law.
On June 24, 2020, the Office issued an
additional notice providing for a second
round of written comments to permit
interested parties the opportunity to
address any comments submitted in
response to the NOI and to allow parties
engaged in empirical research to
complete and submit their findings.3 To
ensure that members of the public have
sufficient time to comment, and to
ensure that the Office has the benefit of
1 85

FR 34252 (June 3, 2020).
from Sens. Thom Tillis & Patrick Leahy
to Maria Strong, Acting Register of Copyrights, U.S.
Copyright Office at 1 (Apr. 28, 2020), https://
www.copyright.gov/rulemaking/statesovereignimmunity/letter.pdf.
3 85 FR 37961 (June 24, 2020); see 85 FR at 34255.
2 Letter
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a complete record, the Office is
extending the deadline for the
submission of additional comments
and/or empirical research to 11:59 p.m.
Eastern Time on October 22, 2020.
Dated: September 24, 2020.
Regan A. Smith,
General Counsel and Associate Register of
Copyrights.
[FR Doc. 2020–21566 Filed 9–28–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 1410–30–P

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION
[Notice: (20–078)]

NASA Astrophysics Advisory
Committee; Meeting.
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
ACTION: Notice of meeting.
AGENCY:

In accordance with the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, the
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) announces a
meeting of the Astrophysics Advisory
Committee. This Committee reports to
the Director, Astrophysics Division,
Science Mission Directorate, NASA
Headquarters. The meeting will be held
for the purpose of soliciting, from the
scientific community and other persons,
scientific and technical information
relevant to program planning.
DATES: Monday, October 19, 2020, 11:00
a.m.–5:00 p.m., Tuesday, October 20,
2020, 11:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m., and
Wednesday, October 21, 2020, 11:00
a.m.–5:00 p.m., Eastern Time.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms.
KarShelia Henderson, Science Mission
Directorate, NASA Headquarters,
Washington, DC 20546, (202) 358–2355
or khenderson@nasa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
meeting will be available to the public
by WebEx.
On Monday, October 19, the event
address for attendees is: https://
nasaenterprise.webex.com/
nasaenterprise/onstage/g.php?MTID=
e8ac0c8ba6c20d6158a15014539ff4fe5,
the event number is 199 918 6105, and
event password is ixXyezN@783.
On Tuesday, October 20, the event
address for attendees is: https://
nasaenterprise.webex.com/
nasaenterprise/onstage/
g.php?MTID=e2402f4eea7472e33
624d6ab4cfee14f5, the event number is
199 163 7113, and the event password
is TSpcp97Hd*5.
On Wednesday, October 21, the event
address for attendees is: https://
SUMMARY:
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nasaenterprise.webex.com/
nasaenterprise/onstage/
g.php?MTID=eb739cd4ce1f20ff
24be91839cbc1d217, the event number
is 199 599 3836, and the event password
is bKsf3Unn$57.
The agenda for the meeting includes
the following topics:
—Astrophysics Division Update
—Updates on Specific Astrophysics
Missions
—Reports from the Program Analysis
Groups
—Reports from Specific Research and
Analysis Programs
The agenda will be posted on the
Astrophysics Advisory Committee web
page: https://science.nasa.gov/
researchers/nac/science-advisorycommittees/apac.
The public may submit and upvote
comments/questions ahead of the
meeting through the website https://
arc.cnf.io/sessions/h259/#!/dashboard
that will be opened for input on October
5, 2020.
It is imperative that the meeting be
held on this date to accommodate the
scheduling priorities of the key
participants.
Patricia Rausch,
Advisory Committee Management Officer,
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.
[FR Doc. 2020–21428 Filed 9–28–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7510–13–P

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
Notice of Permits Issued Under the
Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978
AGENCY:
ACTION:

National Science Foundation.

Notice of permit issued.

The National Science
Foundation (NSF) is required to publish
notice of permits issued under the
Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978.
This is the required notice.

SUMMARY:

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Nature McGinn, ACA Permit Officer,
Office of Polar Programs, National
Science Foundation, 2415 Eisenhower
Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22314; 703–
292–8030; email: ACApermits@nsf.gov.
On August
20, 2020, the National Science
Foundation published a notice in the
Federal Register of a permit application
received. The permit was issued on
September 23, 2020 to:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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Name of applicant organization

State

Rhode Island Legal Services, Inc ................................................................................................
South Carolina Legal Services, Inc .............................................................................................
South Carolina Legal Services, Inc .............................................................................................
Dakota Plains Legal Services, Inc ...............................................................................................
East River Legal Services ...........................................................................................................
Dakota Plains Legal Services, Inc ...............................................................................................
Legal Aid Society of Middle Tennessee and the Cumberlands ..................................................
Memphis Area Legal Services, Inc ..............................................................................................
West Tennessee Legal Services, Inc ..........................................................................................
Legal Aid of East Tennessee ......................................................................................................
Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc .................................................................................................
Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc .................................................................................................
Lone Star Legal Aid .....................................................................................................................
Legal Aid of NorthWest Texas .....................................................................................................
Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc .................................................................................................
Utah Legal Services, Inc ..............................................................................................................
Utah Legal Services, Inc ..............................................................................................................
Utah Legal Services, Inc ..............................................................................................................
Central Virginia Legal Aid Society, Inc ........................................................................................
Southwest Virginia Legal Aid Society, Inc ...................................................................................
Legal Aid Society of Eastern Virginia ..........................................................................................
Virginia Legal Aid Society, Inc .....................................................................................................
Central Virginia Legal Aid Society, Inc ........................................................................................
Blue Ridge Legal Services, Inc ...................................................................................................
Legal Services of Northern Virginia, Inc ......................................................................................
Legal Services of the Virgin Islands, Inc .....................................................................................
Legal Services Vermont ...............................................................................................................
Northwest Justice Project ............................................................................................................
Northwest Justice Project ............................................................................................................
Northwest Justice Project ............................................................................................................
Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc ....................................................................................................
Wisconsin Judicare, Inc ...............................................................................................................
Wisconsin Judicare, Inc ...............................................................................................................
Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc ....................................................................................................
Legal Aid of West Virginia, Inc ....................................................................................................
Legal Aid of Wyoming, Inc ...........................................................................................................
Legal Aid of Wyoming, Inc ...........................................................................................................
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These grants will be awarded under
the authority conferred on LSC by
section 1006(a)(1) of the Legal Services
Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. 2996e(a)(l).
Grant awards are made to ensure civil
legal services are provided in every
service area, although no listed
organization is guaranteed a grant
award. Grants will become effective,
and grant funds will be distributed, on
or about January 1, 2021.
LSC issues this notice pursuant to 42
U.S.C. 2996f(f). Comments and
recommendations concerning potential
grantees are invited and should be
delivered to LSC within 30 days from
the date of publication of this notice.
Dated: October 30, 2020.
Stefanie Davis,
Senior Assistant General Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2020–24513 Filed 11–4–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7050–01–P
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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Copyright Office
[Docket No. 2020–9]

Sovereign Immunity Study:
Announcement of Public Roundtables
U.S. Copyright Office, Library
of Congress.
ACTION: Notice of public roundtables.
AGENCY:

The U.S. Copyright Office is
conducting a study to evaluate the
degree to which copyright owners are
experiencing infringement by state
entities without adequate remedies
under state law, as well as the extent to
which such infringements appear to be
based on intentional or reckless
conduct. To aid its analysis, the Office
is announcing public roundtables to
provide the opportunity for members of
the public to address the following
topics: Evidence of actual or threatened
copyright infringement by states; state
policies and practices for minimizing
copyright infringement and addressing
infringement claims; and alternative

SUMMARY:

PO 00000
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RI
SC
SC
SD
SD
SD
TN
TN
TN
TN
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
UT
UT
UT
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VA
VI
VT
WA
WA
WA
WI
WI
WI
WI
WV
WY
WY

Service area
RI–1
MSC
SC–8
NSD–1
SD–2
SD–4
TN–10
TN–4
TN–7
TN–9
MSX–2
NTX–1
TX–13
TX–14
TX–15
MUT
NUT–1
UT–1
MVA
VA–15
VA–16
VA–17
VA–18
VA–19
VA–20
VI–1
VT–1
MWA
NWA–1
WA–1
MWI
NWI–1
WI–2
WI–5
WV–5
NWY–1
WY–4

Estimated
Annualized
2021 Funding
1,036,191
166,572
6,466,912
1,098,419
461,315
501,191
3,347,711
1,661,056
765,560
2,703,092
2,081,141
36,819
12,888,876
9,794,740
12,318,247
99,574
96,783
2,516,704
200,938
928,630
1,682,317
865,389
1,404,007
922,443
1,711,145
208,408
558,386
757,981
335,121
6,318,864
428,697
182,487
1,081,437
4,132,260
2,966,918
203,288
565,108

remedies under state law for copyright
infringement.
DATES: The roundtables will be held on
Friday, December 11, 2020. Attendees
will be able to join the event online
starting at approximately 8:30 a.m., and
the event will run until approximately
5:00 p.m.
ADDRESSES: The Office will conduct the
roundtables remotely using the Zoom
videoconferencing platform. Requests to
participate as a panelist in a roundtable
session should be submitted by 11:59
p.m. Eastern Time on November 16,
2020 using the form available at https://
www.copyright.gov/policy/statesovereign-immunity/hearingrequest.html. Any person who is unable
to send a request via the website should
contact the Office using the contact
information below to make an
alternative arrangement for submission
of a request to participate. Additional
information will be made available at
https://www.copyright.gov/policy/statesovereign-immunity/roundtable.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kevin R. Amer, Deputy General

E:\FR\FM\05NON1.SGM
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Counsel, kamer@copyright.gov; Mark T.
Gray, Attorney-Advisor, mgray@
copyright.gov; or Jalyce E. Mangum,
Attorney-Advisor, jmang@copyright.gov.
They can be reached by telephone at
202–707–3000.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 3,
2020, the U.S. Copyright Office issued a
notice of inquiry (‘‘NOI’’) commencing a
policy study on state sovereign
immunity from copyright infringement
suits.1 Congress has requested that the
Office ‘‘research this issue to determine
whether there is sufficient basis for
federal legislation abrogating State
sovereign immunity when States
infringe copyrights.’’ 2 To assist
Congress in making that assessment, the
Office solicited public comment on
several issues concerning the degree to
which copyright owners face
infringement from state actors today,
whether such infringement is based on
intentional or reckless conduct, and
what remedies, if any, are available to
copyright owners under state law. Initial
comments were due on September 2,
2020, and reply comments and
empirical studies were due on October
22, 2020. Information about the study,
including the NOI and public
comments, may be accessed on the
Copyright Office website at https://
www.copyright.gov/policy/statesovereign-immunity/.
The Office is now announcing that it
will hold roundtable discussions on
December 11, 2020, to allow interested
members of the public to discuss and
provide additional information on the
topics of the study. The roundtables will
be held virtually over Zoom to allow
maximum participation and avoid the
need for participants to travel. Each
roundtable session will cover a topic
relevant to the study, as discussed
below. Depending on the level of
interest, the Office may hold multiple
sessions on the same topic to
accommodate a greater number of
participants and provide additional time
for discussion.
Members of the public who seek to
participate in a roundtable should
complete and submit the form available
on the Office website at https://
www.copyright.gov/policy/statesovereign-immunity/hearingrequest.html no later than November 16,
2020. Shortly thereafter, the Office will
notify participants of their selection and
panel assignments. In order to
1 85

FR 34252 (June 3, 2020).
from Sens. Thom Tillis & Patrick Leahy
to Maria Strong, Acting Register of Copyrights, U.S.
Copyright Office at 1 (Apr. 28, 2020), https://
www.copyright.gov/policy/state-sovereignimmunity/letter.pdf.
2 Letter
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accommodate the expected level of
interest, the Office plans to assign no
more than one representative per
organization to each session.
The Office will post a tentative
agenda for the roundtables on its
website on or about December 4, 2020.
The Office also will provide sign-up
information for members of the public
who wish to observe, but not participate
in, one or more of the roundtable
sessions. The sessions will be video
recorded and transcribed, and copies of
the recording and transcript will be
made available on the Copyright Office
website
Roundtable Subjects of Inquiry
The roundtables will consist of
sessions on the following topics: (1)
Evidence of actual or threatened
copyright infringement by states; (2)
state policies and practices for
minimizing copyright infringement and
addressing infringement claims; and (3)
alternative remedies under state law for
copyright infringement.
Evidence of Actual or Threatened
Copyright Infringement by States
Congress has asked the Office to
‘‘study the extent to which copyright
owners are experiencing infringements
by state entities without adequate
remedies under state law.’’ 3 To this
end, the Office seeks evidence
concerning actual or threatened
copyright infringement by states,
including both specific instances of
infringing conduct and empirical
information relating to broader trends.
Relevant issues include, but are not
limited to, the prevalence and outcomes
of infringement suits brought against
state actors; whether the frequency of
infringement by states has changed over
time and whether it is likely to increase
or decrease in the future; and the extent
to which state immunity affects sales
and licensing practices in transactions
involving state entities. In addition, in
light of the Supreme Court’s articulation
of the standard of intent required to
establish unconstitutional
infringement,4 the Office is particularly
interested in information that would
allow it to assess the extent to which
state infringements have involved
intentional or reckless conduct.
State Policies and Practices for
Minimizing Copyright Infringement and
Addressing Infringement Claims
The Office is interested in whether or
to what extent states have adopted
policies to address complaints of
3 Id.
4 See

PO 00000

copyright infringement and/or to
decrease the likelihood of inadvertent
infringement by state employees and
institutions. The Office is particularly
interested in testimony by state officials
about their own practices, but the Office
also invites participation by
organizations or individuals who have
navigated the relevant processes or
otherwise have experience with this
topic.
Alternative Remedies Under State Law
for Copyright Infringement
The Supreme Court’s decision in
Allen v. Cooper requires Congress to
consider whether states ‘‘fail[] to offer
an adequate remedy for an
infringement.’’ 5 The Office accordingly
is interested in hearing from members of
the public about what remedies states
provide for infringement of copyright, as
well as whether those remedies are
adequate for enforcement purposes. The
Office would be particularly interested
in hearing from those who have asserted
alternative state-law remedies in court
and how such cases were resolved.
Discussion of these issues should
include consideration of the
relationship of any state-law cause of
action to the preemption provisions
under section 301 of the Copyright Act.6
Dated: November 2, 2020.
Regan A. Smith,
General Counsel andAssociate Register of
Copyrights.
[FR Doc. 2020–24577 Filed 11–4–20; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 1410–30–P

MORRIS K. UDALL AND STEWART L.
UDALL FOUNDATION
Sunshine Act Meetings
10 a.m. to 12 p.m. (MST),
Friday, November 20, 2020.
PLACE: The offices of the Morris K.
Udall and Stewart L. Udall Foundation,
130 South Scott Avenue, Tucson, AZ
85701.
STATUS: This meeting will be open to the
public. Due to COVID–19, visitors are
currently prohibited from entering the
Udall Foundation offices. Members of
the public who would like to attend this
meeting should contact Elizabeth
Monroe at monroe@udall.gov prior to
November 20 to request the
teleconference connection information.
MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: (1) Call to
Order and Chair’s Remarks; (2)
Executive Director’s Remarks; (3)
Remarks from Senator Tom Udall; (4)
TIME AND DATE:

5 Id.

Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020).
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u.s. copyright office

commenting parties and
roundtable participants

U.S. Copyright Office

Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity

Parties Who Submitted Initial Comments in
Response to the June 3, 2020 Notice of Inquiry
American Intellectual Property Law
Association (AIPLA)
Allen, Frederick
Association of Public and Land-grant
Universities and the Association of
American Universities (APLU-AAU)

Library Copyright Alliance (LCA)
McMahan, Kelley
Miglavs, Jnis
National Press Photographers
Association (NPPA)

Association of Southeastern Research
Libraries (ASERL)

National Writers Union (NWU)

B., Mat

Petersen, Elsa

Boatman, Mike

Peterson, Amos

Bolar, Shelia

Searcy, Steven

Cacciottolo, Neil J.

SoundExchange

Flynn, Joshua
Fons, Eric

University of Illinois at Urbana
Champaign

French, Ryan

University of Massachusetts

Gigante, Alexander

University of Michigan Library

Hawkins, Kevin

University of Minnesota

Hockley Photography

Whidbey Writers Group

News Media Alliance (NMA)

Kelly, Patricia

C-1

U.S. Copyright Office

Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity

Parties Who Submitted Reply Comments in
Response to the June 3, 2020 Notice of Inquiry
Association of Public and Land-grant
Universities and the Association of
American Universities (APLU & AAU)

Fakouri, Maryam

Association of Southeastern Research
Libraries (ASERL) and the Greater
Western Library Alliance (GWLA)

Pixsy Inc.

Association of University Presses
(AUPresses)

Software and Information Industry
Association (SIIA)

Bynum, Michael
Caldwell, Kenneth

University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign

Copyright Alliance

University of Michigan Library

Forbis, Glenn

Songwriters Guild of America (SGA) &
Society of Composers & Lyricists (SCL)

Enriquez, Ana

C-2

U.S. Copyright Office
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Virtual Roundtable Participants
(December 11, 2020)
Allen, Frederick (Nautilus Productions)

MacDonald, Agnus (University of
California, Office of General Counsel)

Band, Jonathan (Library Copyright
Alliance) (LCA)

Madigan, Kevin (Copyright Alliance)

Bell, Keith

Molnar, Isaac (Ohio Attorney General’s
Office)

Benson, Sara (University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign)
Butler, Brandon (Association of
Southeastern Research Libraries (ASERL);
Software Preservation Network (SPN))
Bynum, Michael
Calzada, Alicia (National Press
Photographers Association) (NPPA)
Dooley, Yvonne (University of North
Texas)

Munter, Johannes (News Media Alliance)
(NMA)
Murphy, Kristen (American Chemical
Society) (ACS)
Olson, Darcee (Louisiana State
University)
Samberg, Rachael (University of
California, Berkeley)
Sapiandante, Maria

Evans, Harold (University of Arkansas)

Sedlik, Jeff (Art Center College of Design)

Johnson, Andrea (C MATH is EASY)

Shontz, Douglas (University of Illinois;
Association of Public and Land-Grant
Universities)

Klaus, Kurt (Dunlap Bennett & Ludwig,
PLLC)
Laiho, Devin (Colorado Attorney
General’s Office)
Lanier, Raven (University of Michigan
Library)
Levine, Melissa (University of Michigan
Library)
Linder, Craig (Dow Jones & Company)

Smith, Kevin (University of Kansas)
Thro, William (University of Kentucky)
Vockell, Marc (University of Texas)
Wassom, Brian (American Intellectual
Property Law Association) (AIPLA)
Xu, Yuanxiao (University of Michigan
Library)
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Waivers of Immunity by State

AL1
AK2

Does State
Constitution
Permit the
Legislature to
Waive Sovereign
Immunity?
No
Yes

AZ3
AR4

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

CA5
CO6
CT7

Yes
Not specified
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

DE8

Yes

Yes

DC9
FL10
GA11
HI12
ID13
IL14
IN15
IA16
KS17

–
Yes
Yes
Not specified
Yes
Yes
Yes
Not specified
Not specified

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

KY18
LA19
ME20
MD21
MA22

Yes
Yes
Not specified
Yes
Not specified

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

MI23

Yes

Yes

State

Does State
Law Permit
Actions
Against the
State?
–
Yes

Types of Claims
Available

Forums
Available

–
Contract, quasi-contract,
or tort claims
Not specified
Not specified

–
State court

Not specified
Specified tort claims
Claims for which a private
person could be liable;
suits must be authorized
by Claims Commissioner
Tort, contract, and liability
insurance claims
Contract and tort claims
Tort claims
Contract and tort claims
Tort claims
Tort claims
State-law claims
Contract and tort claims
Tort claims
Torts and other approved
claims
Contract claims
Contract and tort claims
Specified tort claims
Contract and tort claims
Tort claims
Tort claims where
immunity is specifically
waived and employment
related claims
E-1

State court
State claims
commission
State court
State court
State court

State court
DC court
State court
State court
State court
State court
State court
State court
State court
State court
State court
State court
State court
State court
State court
State court
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MN24

Does State
Constitution
Permit the
Legislature to
Waive Sovereign
Immunity?
Not specified

MS25
MO26
MT27
NE28
NV29
NH30
NJ31

Not specified
Not specified
Yes
Yes
Yes
Not specified
Not specified

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

NM32

Not specified

Yes

NY33

Yes

Yes

NC34

Not specified

Yes

Tort claims

ND35

Yes

Yes

OH36

Yes

Yes

OK37
OR38
PA39

Not specified
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Contract and tort claims;
claims involving title to
property
Claims available to private
parties
Tort claims
Contract and tort claims
Specified tort claims

State

Does State
Law Permit
Actions
Against the
State?

Types of Claims
Available

Forums
Available

Yes

Tort claims and
employment-related
claims under certain
federal statutes

Tort claims
Tort claims
Tort claims
Tort claims
Tort claims
Contract and tort claims
Act or omission of a public
employee within scope of
employment; contract
claims
Torts claims where
immunity is specifically
waived and claims related
to religious freedom
Claims for which
individuals and
corporations can be liable

State court
for tort
claims;
federal court
or other court
of competent
jurisdiction
for federal
claims
State court
State court
State court
State court
State court
State court
State court

E-2

State court

State court

State
commission
State court

State court
State court
State court
State court
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RI40
SC41

Does State
Constitution
Permit the
Legislature to
Waive Sovereign
Immunity?
Not specified
Yes

SD42

Yes

Yes

Tort claims
Tort claims unless listed
under exceptions to
waiver of immunity.
Claims involving real or
personal property; waiver
of immunity to the extent
of liability insurance
coverage by the state.

TN43

Yes

Yes

Specified state-law claims

TX44

Not specified

Yes

UT45
VT46
VA47
WA48
WV49
WI50
WY51

Not specified
Not specified
Not specified
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Specified tort and contract
claims
Specified state-law claims
Tort claims
Tort claims
Tort claims
–
Contract and tort claims
Contract and tort claims

State

Does State
Law Permit
Actions
Against the
State?
Yes
Yes

Types of Claims
Available

Forums
Available

Not specified
State court

State court
for claims
involving
property; not
specified for
other claims
State
commission
State court
State court
State court
State court
State court
–
State court
State court

ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (“[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or
equity.”).
2
ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 21 (“The legislature shall establish procedures for suits against the State.”);
ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (“A person or corporation having a contract, quasi-contract, or tort claim
against the state may bring an action against the state in a state court that has jurisdiction over the claim.”).
3
ARIZ. CONST. art. 4IV, pt. 2, § 18 (“The legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts
suits may be brought against the state.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-821.01 (“Persons who have claims against
a public entity, public school or a public employee shall file claims with the person or persons authorized to
accept service for the public entity, public school or public employee as set forth in the Arizona rules of
civil procedure within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues.”); id. § 12-401 (“Actions
against counties shall be brought in the county sued unless several counties are defendants, when it may be
brought in any one of the counties . . . . Actions against public officers shall be brought in the county in
which the officer, or one of several officers, holds office.”).
4
ARK. CONST. art. 5V, § 20 (“The State of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her courts.”);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 19-10-201–223, 21-5-701–708, 6-82-501–507 (establishing a claims commission for
the hearing and adjudication of claims against the state of Arkansas, its agencies, and its institutions).
1
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CAL. CONST. art. III, § 5 (“Suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as
shall be directed by law.”); CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 815–996.6 (California Tort Claims Act); CAL. GOV. CODE
§ 945 (“A public entity may sue and be sued”); see id. § 955 (“The proper court for trial of actions against
the State for the taking or damaging of private property for public use is a court of competent jurisdiction in
the county in which the property is situate.”); id. § 955.2 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
where the State is named as a defendant in any action or proceeding for death or injury to person or
personal property and the injury or the injury causing death occurred within this State, the proper court for
the trial of the action is a court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the injury occurred or where
the injury causing death occurred.”).
6
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-104 (“Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the governing
body of a public entity, by resolution, may waive the immunity granted in section 24-10-106 for the types
of injuries described in the resolution. Any such waiver may be withdrawn by the governing body by
resolution.”); id. § 24-10-106 (“This section provides for partial waiver of immunity for tort actions against
the state.”); COLO. R. CIV. P. 98 (noting that actions against a public officer “shall be tried in the county
where the claim, or some part thereof, arose”).
7
CONN. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (“Claims against the State shall be resolved in such manner as may be provided
by law.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4-159(c), (e) (“The General Assembly may grant the claimant permission
to sue the state under the provisions of this section when the General Assembly deems it just and equitable
and believes the claim to present an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person,
could be liable. . . . The review by the General Assembly of claims submitted to it by the Office of the
Claims Commissioner under this section shall be conducted in accordance with such procedures as the
General Assembly may prescribe.”); id. § 4-160(a) (“Whenever the Claims Commissioner deems it just and
equitable, the Claims Commissioner may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in the opinion
of the Claims Commissioner, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private
person, could be liable.”); id. § 4-160(d) (“The claimant shall bring such action against the state as party
defendant in the judicial district in which the claimant resides or, if the claimant is not a resident of this
state, in the judicial district of Hartford or in the judicial district in which the claim arose.”); Miller v. Egan,
265 Conn. 301, 338, 828 A.2d 549, 559 (Conn. 2003) (finding that when plaintiff brings action for money
damages against state, he must proceed through Office of the Claims Commissioner pursuant to chapter;
otherwise, the action will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under doctrine of sovereign
immunity); LaPaglia v. Conn. Valley Hosp., No. CV175039918S, 2018 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3191, at *20
(Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2018) (finding no exception to the application of sovereign immunity to the plaintiff’s
copyright infringement claim).
8
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“Suits may be brought against the State, according to such regulations as shall be
made by law.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4001–05, 4010–13; id. tit. 18, § 6511 (“The defense of
sovereignty is waived and cannot and will not be asserted as to any risk or loss covered by the state
insurance coverage program, whether same be covered by commercially procured insurance or by selfinsurance, and every commercially procured insurance contract shall contain a provision to this effect,
where appropriate.”).
9
D.C. CODE § 2-359.04 (“Unless otherwise specifically provided by law of the District, the District
government and every officer, department, agency, or other unit of the District government shall not raise
the defense of sovereign immunity in the courts of the District in an action based upon a written
procurement contract executed on behalf of the District government.”); id. § 2-402 (“The Mayor of the
District of Columbia is empowered to settle, in his discretion, claims and suits, either at law or in equity,
against the District of Columbia whenever the cause of action . . . [a]rises out of the negligence or wrongful
act . . . [or] [a]rises out of the existence of facts and circumstances which place the claim or suit within the
doctrines and principles of law decided by the courts in the District of Columbia or by the Supreme Court
of the United States to be controlling in the District of Columbia. ”).
10
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13 (“Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit against the state as to
all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (“In accordance with s. 13,
Art. X of the State Constitution, the state, for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives
sovereign immunity for liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act.”); id. (noting that the
action shall be heard in the county where the property is located or where the cause of action accrued. If it’s
5
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an action against a state university, a county where the university’s main campus is location or where the
cause of action accrued).
11
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. IX (“The General Assembly may waive the state’s sovereign immunity from
suit by enacting a State Tort Claims Act . . . The state’s defense of sovereign immunity is hereby waived as
to any action ex contractu for the breach of any written contract now existing or hereafter entered into by
the state or its departments and agencies. . . . [the state] may be subject to suit and may be liable for injuries
and damages caused by the negligent performance of, or negligent failure to perform, their ministerial
functions and may be liable for injuries and damages if they act with actual malice or with actual intent to
cause injury in the performance of their official functions. . . . No waiver of sovereign immunity under this
Paragraph shall be construed as a waiver of any immunity provided to the state or its departments, agencies,
officers, or employees by the United States Constitution.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-1 (“The defense of
sovereign immunity is waived as to any action ex contractu for the breach of any written contract existing
on April 12, 1982, or thereafter entered into by the state, departments and agencies of the state, and state
authorities.”); id. § 50-21-23 (“The state waives its sovereign immunity for the torts of state officers and
employees while acting within the scope of their official duties or employment and shall be liable for such
torts in the same manner as a private individual or entity would be liable under like circumstances . . . [t]he
state shall have no liability for losses resulting from conduct on the part of state officers or employees
which was not within the scope of their official duties or employment.”) id. § 50-21-28 (providing that
contract claims shall be heard in the Superior Court of Fulton County and tort actions shall be heard in the
state or superior court in the county where the tort occurred.).
12
HAW. REV. STAT. § 662-2 (“The State hereby waives its immunity for liability for the torts of its
employees and shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.”); id. § 662-3
(“The circuit courts of the State and, except as otherwise provided by statute or rule, the state district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all tort actions on claims against the State, for money damages, accruing
on and after July 1, 1957, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the State while acting within the scope of the employee’s
office or employment.”).
13
IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 18 (“The governor, secretary of state, and attorney general shall constitute a
board of examiners, with power to examine all claims against the state . . . [a]nd no claim against the state,
except salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law, shall be passed upon by the legislature without
first having been considered and acted upon by said board.”); IDAHO CODE § 6-903 (“Except as otherwise
provided in this act, every governmental entity is subject to liability for money damages arising out of its
negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions and those of its employees acting within the course and
scope of their employment or duties[.]”); id. § 6-915 (“Actions against the state or its employee shall be
brought in the county in which the cause of action arose or in Ada County.”).
14
ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (“Except as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in
this State is abolished.”); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8 (establishing exclusive jurisdiction in Court of
Claims for state-law, contract, and tort claims against state).
15
IND. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (“Provision may be made, by general law, for bringing suit against the State;
but no special law authorizing such suit to be brought, or making compensation to any person claiming
damages against the State, shall ever be passed.”); IND. CODE § 34-13-1-1 (“Any person having a claim
against the State arising out of an express or implied contract may bring suit within ten (10) years after
accrual of the claim[.]”); id. § 34-13-2-3 (“This chapter shall not be construed as[] a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, consent by the state of Indiana or its employees to be
sued in any federal court, or consent to be sued in any state court beyond the boundaries of Indiana.”); id. §
34-13-3-1 (“This chapter applies only to a claim or suit in tort.”).
16
See IOWA CODE § 699.5 (“A suit shall not be permitted for a claim under this chapter unless the attorney
general has made final disposition of the claim. However, if the attorney general does not make final
disposition of a claim within six months after the claim is made in writing to the director of the department
of management, the claimant may, by notice in writing, withdraw the claim from consideration and begin
suit”); id. § 699.13 (Claims against the state are barred unless notice is provided in writing within two years
of the claim.); see id. § 699.2 (defining “claim” as “[a]ny claim against the state of Iowa for money only,
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on account of damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death, caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the state while acting within the scope of the
employee’s office or employment, under circumstances where the state, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death.”); id. § 699.6 (“Judgments in the district courts in
suits under this chapter shall be subject to appeal to the supreme court of the state in the same manner and
to the same extent as other judgments of the district courts.”); id. §§ 25.1, 25.2 (providing for consideration
of specified claims against the state by department of management and state appeal board).
17
See KAN. STAT. ANN. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6103(a) (“Subject to the limitations of this act, each
governmental entity shall be liable for damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
of its employees while acting within the scope of their employment under circumstances where the
governmental entity, if a private person, would be liable under the laws of this state”); id. § 61-2802
(governing procedure for claims filed in the district court against “any officers of the state, or any
subdivisions thereof”); id. § 46-907 et seq. (providing for consideration of claims against state by
legislature’s joint committee on special claims against the state); id. § 46-919 (“A recommendation by the
joint committee on special claims against the state that an award be made to any claimant shall not be
construed as a waiver of immunity from liability on the part of the state or any agency thereof nor shall
such recommendation impose liability upon the state or any agency thereof in the amount recommended.”).
18
KY. CONST. § 231 (“The General Assembly may, by law, direct in what manner and in what courts suits
may be brought against the Commonwealth.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45A.245 (“Any person, firm or
corporation, having a lawfully authorized written contract with the Commonwealth at the time of or after
June 21, 1974, may bring an action against the Commonwealth on the contract, including but not limited to
actions either for breach of contracts or for enforcement of contracts or for both. Any such action shall be
brought in the Franklin Circuit Court and shall be tried by the court sitting without a jury”).
19
LA. CONST. art. X, § 10(A)–(B) (“Neither the state, a state agency, nor a political subdivision shall be
immune from suit and liability in contract or for injury to person or property. . . . The legislature may
authorize other suits against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision. A measure authorizing suit
shall waive immunity from suit and liability.”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5106 (“No suit against the state or a
state agency or political subdivision shall be instituted in any court other than a Louisiana state court.”).
20
ME. STAT. tit. 14, § 8103 (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all governmental entities
shall be immune from suit on any and all tort claims seeking recovery of damages. When immunity is
removed by this chapter, any claim for damages shall be brought in accordance with the terms of this
chapter.”); id. § 8104-A (“Except as specified in section 8104-B, a governmental entity is liable for
property damage, bodily injury or death in the following instances. . . . ownership; maintenance or use of
vehicles, machinery and equipment . . . construction, operation or maintenance of any public building . . .
[d]ischarge of pollutants . . . [and] [r]oad construction, street cleaning or repair.”); id. § 8106 (“The
Superior Court shall have original jurisdiction over all claims permitted under this chapter”).
21
MD. CONST. art. V, § 6 (“It shall be the duty of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and the Clerks of any
intermediate courts of appeal, respectively, whenever a case shall be brought into said Courts, in which the
State is a party or has interest, immediately to notify the Attorney General thereof.”); MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE GOV’T §12-104 (“Subject to the exclusions and limitations in this subtitle and notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the immunity of the State and of its units is waived as to a tort action, in a court of
the State[.]”); id. § 12-201 (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by a law of the State, the State, its
officers, and its units may not raise the defense of sovereign immunity in a contract action, in a court of the
State, based on a written contract that an official or employee executed for the State or 1 of its units while
the official or employee was acting within the scope of the authority of the official or employee.”).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (“Public employers shall be liable for injury or loss of property or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any public employee while acting
within the scope of his office or employment[.]”); id. § 12 (“Claims against the commonwealth, except as
otherwise expressly provided in this chapter or by any general or special provision of law, may be enforced
in the superior court.”).
23
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 22 (“Procedures for the examination and adjustment of claims against the state
shall be prescribed by law.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in this act,
a governmental agency is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise
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or discharge of a governmental function.”); id. §§ 15.361–15.369 (“AN ACT to provide protection to
employees who report a violation or suspected violation of state, local, or federal law”); id. § 15.361(a)
(“Employee includes a person employed by the state or a political subdivision of the state except state
classified civil service.”); id. § 600.6419(1)(a) (establishing jurisdiction in court of claims over “any claim
or demand, statutory or constitutional, liquidated or unliquidated, ex contractu or ex delicto, or any demand
for monetary, equitable, or declaratory relief or any demand for an extraordinary writ against the state or
any of its departments or officers,” subject to specified exceptions).
24
MINN. STAT. § 1.05 (waiving sovereign immunity for violations of certain federal statutes and allowing
aggrieved party to bring action against the state in federal court or in any other court of competent
jurisdiction); id. § 3.736 subdiv. 1 (“The state will pay compensation for injury to or loss of property or
personal injury or death caused by an act or omission of an employee of the state while acting within the
scope of office or employment . . . .”); id. subdiv. 2 (“[Such] claim shall be brought under this section as a
civil action in the courts of the state.”); id. subdiv. 4 & 4a (establishing limits on monetary liability of the
state); id. subdiv. 8 (“A state agency . . . may procure insurance against liability of the agency and its
employees for damages resulting from the torts of the agency and its employees. Procurement of the
insurance is a waiver of the limits of governmental liability under subdivisions 4 and 4a only to the extent
that valid and collectible insurance . . . exceeds those limits and covers the claim.”).
25
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-5 (“Notwithstanding the immunity granted in Section 11-46-3, or the
provisions of any other law to the contrary, the immunity of the state and its political subdivisions from
claims for money damages arising out of the torts of such governmental entities and the torts of their
employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment is hereby waived . . . only to the
extent of the maximum amount of liability provided for in Section 11-46-15.”); id. § 11-46-13(2) (“The
venue for any suit filed under the provisions of this chapter against the state or its employees shall be in the
county in which the act, omission or event on which the liability phase of the action is based, occurred or
took place.”).
26
MO. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (“Such sovereign or governmental tort immunity as existed at common law in
this state . . . shall remain in full force and effect; except that, the immunity of the public entity from
liability and suit for compensatory damages for negligent acts or omissions is hereby expressly waived[.]”);
id. § 508.060 (“All actions whatsoever against any county shall be commenced in the circuit court of such
county”); see id. § 508.010 (limited the venue for tort suits within the state).
27
MONT. CONST. art II, § 18 (“The state, counties, cities, towns, and all other local governmental entities
shall have no immunity from suit for injury to a person or property, except as may be specifically provided
by law by a 2/3 vote of each house of the legislature.”); id. art. III, § 39 (listing express limitations on the
legislature’s powers, not limiting the power to makes laws waiving sovereign immunity); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-9-102 (“Every governmental entity is subject to liability for its torts and those of its employees
acting within the scope of their employment or duties whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary
function.”); id. § 2-9-105 (“The state and other governmental entities are immune from exemplary and
punitive damages.”); id. § 2-9-311 (“The district court shall have jurisdiction over any action brought under
parts 1 through 3 of this chapter”).
28
NEB. CONST. art V, § 22 (“The state may sue and be sued, and the Legislature shall provide by law in
what manner and in what courts suits shall be brought.”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-8,209–81-8,239.11
(noting that the state shall be liable for “damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the state, while acting within
the scope of his or her office or employment, under circumstances in which the state, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death”); id. § 81-8,214 (“The district court,
sitting without a jury, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on any suit
or tort claim.”).
29
NEV. CONST. art IV, § 22 (“Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit against the State as
to all liabilities originating after the adoption of this Constitution”); N.R.S. §§ 41.031 through 41.0337
(Nevada Tort Claims Act); id. § 41.031 (“Nevada hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and
consents to have its liability determined in accordance with the same rules of law as are applied to civil
actions against natural persons, except as otherwise provided.”); id. (“An action against the State of Nevada
must be filed in the county where the cause or some part thereof arose or in Carson City.”).
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N.H. REV. STAT. § 541-B:1IIa (defining a “claim” as “any request for monetary relief for either [b]odily
injury, personal injury, death or property damages caused by the failure of the state or state officers,
trustees, officials, employees, or members of the general court to follow the appropriate standard of care
when that duty was owed to the person making the claim, including any right of action for money damages
which either expressly or by implication arises from any law, unless another remedy for such claim is
expressly provided by law; or [p]roperty damages suffered by a state employee or official during the
performance of that employee's or official's duties while on state business where compensation is
appropriate under principles of equity and good conscience.”); id. § 541-B:9-a (“When a claim filed
pursuant to this chapter is against both the state and an agent, official or employee of the state, the court
shall determine whether the state is responsible for the actions of the agent, employee or official. If the
court determines that the state is responsible for the actions of the agent, employee or official; the agent,
employee or official shall be dismissed as a defendant and the plaintiff shall proceed solely against the
state.”); id. § 541-B-9 (the board of claims and the superior court share jurisdiction depending on amount of
claim); id. § 491:8 (“The superior court shall have jurisdiction to enter judgment against the state of New
Hampshire founded upon any express or implied contract with the state, including specific performance and
other equitable remedies that are not limited to money damages.”).
31
N.J.S.A. § 59:2-2 (“A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a
public employee within the scope of his employment in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances.”); id. § 59:13-3 (“The State of New Jersey hereby waives its
sovereign immunity from liability arising out of an express contract or a contract implied in fact and
consents to have the same determined in accordance with the rules of law applicable to individuals and
corporations; provided, however, that there shall be no recovery against the State for punitive or
consequential damages arising out of contract nor shall there be any recovery against the State for claims
based upon implied warranties or upon contracts implied in law.”); id. § 59:9-1 (“Tort claims under this act
shall be heard by a judge sitting without a jury or a judge and jury where appropriate demand therefor is
made in accordance with the rules governing the courts of the State of New Jersey.”); id. § 59:13-4 (“The
courts of competent jurisdiction of the State of New Jersey shall have jurisdiction over all claims against
the State for breach of a contract, either express or implied in fact.”).
32
N.M.R.A. §§ 41-4-1 through 41-4-12 (granting immunity from tort liability except for claims resulting
from injury caused by law enforcement officers and the negligent operation or maintenance of motor
vehicles, aircraft and watercraft; buildings, public parks, machinery, equipment and furnishings; airports;
public utilities; medical facilities; health care providers; or highways and streets); id. § 28-22-3 (“A person
whose free exercise of religion has been restricted by a violation of the New Mexico Religious Freedom
Restoration Act may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government agency”); id. § 41-4-1 (“A. Exclusive original jurisdiction for any
claim under the Tort Claims Act [41-4-1 NMSA 1978] shall be in the district courts of New Mexico.
Appeals may be taken as provided by law. B. Venue for any claim against the state or its public employees,
pursuant to the Tort Claims Act [41-4-1 NMSA 1978], shall be in the district court for the county in which
a plaintiff resides, or in which the cause of action arose, or in Santa Fe county. Venue for all other claims
pursuant to the Tort Claims Act, shall be in the county in which the principal offices of the governing body
of the local public body are located.”).
33
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 18b (“The legislature may provide for the manner of trial of actions and
proceedings involving claims against the state”); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (“The state hereby waives its
immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined
in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or
corporations, provided the claimant complies with the limitations of this article.”); id. § 9(2) (Court of
Claims has jurisdiction “[t]o hear and determine a claim of any person, corporation or municipality against
the state for the appropriation of any real or personal property or any interest therein, for the breach of
contract, express or implied, or for the torts of its officers or employees while acting as such officers or
employees, providing the claimant complies with the limitations of this article.”); Morell v.
Balasubramanian, 514 N.E.2d 1101 (N.Y. 1987) (State immune when performing governmental act
(legislating, judging, or making discretionary decisions) as opposed to proprietary act (act substitutes for or
supplement traditionally private enterprises).); see Student Lifeline, Inc. v. State of N.Y., 847 N.Y.S.2d 905,
30
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905 (Ct. Cl. 2007) (finding that the court is “divested of jurisdiction over” copyright infringement aspect of
plaintiff’s claims).
34
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (“The North Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for
the purpose of hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State Board of Education, the Board of
Transportation, and all other departments, institutions and agencies of the State.”).
35
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice administered
without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state in such manner, in such courts, and in
such cases, as the legislative assembly may, by law, direct.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.02 (“An action
respecting the title to property, or arising upon contract, may be brought in the district court against the
state the same as against a private person.”); id. § 32.12.2-02 (“The state may only be held liable for money
damages for an injury proximately caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of a state
employee acting within the employee’s scope of employment under circumstances in which the employee
would be personally liable to a claimant in accordance with the laws of this state, or an injury caused from
some condition or use of tangible property under circumstances in which the state, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant.”); id. § 32-12.2.10 (“This chapter does not waive the state’s immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution in any manner, and this chapter may not
be construed to abrogate that immunity.”).
36
OH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner, as
may be provided by law.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02 (subject to exceptions, “[t]he state hereby
waives its immunity from liability . . . and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the
court of claims created in this chapter in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between
private parties . . . .”); id. § 2743.03(A)(1) (court of claims has “original jurisdiction of all civil actions
against the state permitted by the waiver of immunity contained in section 2743.02 of the Revised Code.”).
37
OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 152.1 (“A. The State of Oklahoma does hereby adopt the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. The state, its political subdivisions, and all of their employees acting within the scope of their
employment, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, shall be immune from liability for
torts. B. The state, only to the extent and in the manner provided in this act, waives its immunity and that of
its political subdivisions. In so waiving immunity, it is not the intent of the state to waive any rights under
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 153 (“The state or a
political subdivision shall be liable for loss resulting from its torts or the torts of its employees acting
within the scope of their employment subject to the limitations and exceptions specified in The
Governmental Tort Claims Act and only where the state or political subdivision, if a private person or
entity, would be liable for money damages under the laws of this state.”); id. § 163(A) (“Venue for actions
against the state within the scope of this act shall be either the county in which the cause of action arose or
Oklahoma County, except that a constitutional state agency, board or commission may, upon resolution
filed with the Secretary of State, designate another situs for venue in lieu of Oklahoma County.”).
38
ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (“Provision may be made by general law, for bringing suit against the State, as
to all liabilities originating after, or existing at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; but no special
act authorizeing [sic] such suit to be brought, or making compensation to any person claiming damages
against the State, shall ever be passed.”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.265 (waiver for torts); id. § 30.320
(waiver for contracts); id. § 30.310 (“A suit or action may be maintained by the State of Oregon or any
county, incorporated city, school district or other public corporation of like character in this state, in its
corporate name, upon a cause of suit or action accruing to it in its corporate character, and not otherwise, in
the following cases: (1) Upon a contract made with the public corporation. (2) Upon a liability prescribed
by law in favor of the public corporation. (3) To recover a penalty or forfeiture given to the public
corporation. (4) To recover damages for injury to the corporate rights or property of the public
corporation.”).
39
PA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts
and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8521(b) (“Nothing
contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in
Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”); id. §
8522 (list of exemptions from sovereign immunity); id. § 8523 (“Actions for claims against a
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Commonwealth party may be brought in and only in a county in which the principal or local office of the
Commonwealth party is located or in which the cause of action arose or where a transaction or occurrence
took place out of which the cause of action arose. If venue is obtained in the Twelfth Judicial District
(Dauphin County) solely because the principal office of the Commonwealth party is located within it, any
judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County shall have the power to transfer the action to any
appropriate county where venue would otherwise lie.”).
40
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-1(a) (The state of Rhode Island and any political subdivision thereof, including
all cities and towns, shall . . . hereby be liable in all actions of tort in the same manner as a private
individual or corporation . . . .”); see Rosen v. Chang, 758 F. Supp. 799, 804 (D.R.I. 1991) (“Both federal
and state courts have interpreted R.I.G.L. § 9–31–1 as a waiver of the State’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity to tort suits in federal court.”).
41
S.C. CONST. ANN. art. XVII, § 2 (“The General Assembly may direct, by law, in what manner claims
against the State may be established and adjusted.”); S.C. CODE ANN. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-40 (“The
State, an agency, a political subdivision, and a governmental entity are liable for their torts in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, subject to the limitations
upon liability and damages, and exemptions from liability and damages, contained herein.”); id. § 15-78-60
(exceptions to waiver of immunity); id. § 15-78-100(b) (“Jurisdiction for any action brought under this
chapter is in the circuit court and brought in the county in which the act or omission occurred.”).
42
S.D. CONST. article III, § 27 (“The Legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts
suits may be brought against the state.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-32-8 (“In any and all actions to
determine adverse claims to real or personal property, or involving the possession of real or personal
property, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens upon real or personal property, or to partition the same,
the state of South Dakota may be sued and made defendant in the courts of this state.); id. § 21-32-16 (“To
the extent such liability insurance is purchased pursuant to § 21-32-15 and to the extent coverage is
afforded thereunder, the state shall be deemed to have waived the common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity and consented to suit in the same manner that any other party may be sued.”); see also id. § 2132–7 (providing for advisory proceeding before commissioner).
43
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17 (“Suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as
the Legislature may by law direct.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-307(a)(1) (“[The Tennessee Claims
Commission] has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all monetary claims against the state based on the acts
or omissions of ‘state employees,’” for certain enumerated claims), (f) (“No language contained in this
chapter is intended to be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the state of Tennessee from suit in
federal courts guaranteed by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”); see id. §
20-13-102 (“No court in the state shall have any power, jurisdiction or authority to entertain any suit
against the state, or against any officer of the state acting by authority of the state, with a view to reach the
state, its treasury, funds or property, and all such suits shall be dismissed as to the state or such officers, on
motion, plea or demurrer of the law officer of the state, or counsel employed for the state.”).
44
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.021 (“A governmental unit in the state is liable for: (1)
property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the
negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment if: (A) the property damage, personal
injury, or death arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; and
(B) the employee would be personally liable to the claimant according to Texas law; and (2) personal injury
and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit
would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.”); id. § 101.102 (“A suit
under this chapter shall be brought in state court in the county in which the cause of action or a part of the
cause of action arises.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034 (“In order to preserve the legislature’s interest in
managing state fiscal matters through the appropriations process, a statute shall not be construed as a
waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language. In a
statute, the use of ‘person,’ as defined by Section 311.005 to include governmental entities, does not
indicate legislative intent to waive sovereign immunity unless the context of the statute indicates no other
reasonable construction. Statutory prerequisites to a suit, including the provision of notice, are
jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity.”); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.152
(“A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter into a contract and
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that enters into a contract subject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of
adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract, subject to the terms and conditions of this subchapter.”);
Univ. of Hous. Sys. v. Jim Olive Photography, 580 S.W.3d 360, 366 (Tex. App. 2019) (“Texas has not
waived sovereign (governmental) immunity in the Texas Tort Claims Act for copyright infringement by a
governmental unit.”).
45
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301 (“Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any
contractual obligation” and enumerated state-law claims); id. § 63G-7-403 (action may be brought in the
district court).
46
12 V.S.A. § 5601(a) (” The State of Vermont shall be liable for injury to persons or property or loss of
life caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the State while acting within the
scope of employment, under the same circumstances, in the same manner, and to the same extent as a
private person would be liable to the claimant except that the claimant shall not have the right to levy
execution on any property of the State to satisfy any judgment. The Superior Courts of the State shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of any actions brought hereunder.”).
47
VA. ST. §§ 8.01-195.3 (“Subject to the provisions of this article, the Commonwealth shall be liable for
claims for money only accruing on or after July 1, 1982, and any transportation district shall be liable for
claims for money only accruing on or after July 1, 1986, on account of damage to or loss of property or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee while acting
within the scope of his employment under circumstances where the Commonwealth or transportation
district, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury or death.”); Va.
Code Ann. § 8.01-195.4 (“The general district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear,
determine, and render judgment on any claim against the Commonwealth or any transportation district
cognizable under this article when the amount of the claim does not exceed $4,500, exclusive of interest
and any attorneys’ fees. Jurisdiction shall be concurrent with the circuit courts when the amount of the
claim exceeds $4,500 but does not exceed $25,000, exclusive of interest and such attorneys’ fees.
Jurisdiction of claims when the amount exceeds $25,000 shall be limited to the circuit courts of the
Commonwealth.”).
48
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 26 (“The legislature shall direct by law, in what manner, and in what courts, suits
may be brought against the state.”); REV. CODE WASH. (ARCW) § 4.92.010 (“Any person or corporation
having any claim against the state of Washington shall have a right of action against the state in the
superior court.”).
49
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35 (“The State of West Virginia shall never be made defendant in any court of
law or equity, except the State of West Virginia, including any subdivision thereof, or any municipality
therein, or any officer, agent, or employee thereof, may be made defendant in any garnishment or
attachment proceeding, as garnishee or suggestee.”).
50
WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 27 (The legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits
may be brought against the state.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(4) (“No suit may be brought against any
volunteer fire company organized under ch. 213, political corporation, governmental subdivision or any
agency thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be
brought against such corporation, subdivision or agency or volunteer fire company or against its officers,
officials, agents or employees for acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasijudicial functions.”); id. § 893.82(3) (“[N]o civil action or civil proceeding may be brought against any
state officer, employee or agent for or on account of any act growing out of or committed in the course of
the discharge of the officer’s, employee’s or agent’s duties . . . unless within 120 days of the event causing
the injury, damage or death giving rise to the civil action or civil proceeding, the claimant in the action or
proceeding serves upon the attorney general written notice of a claim stating the time, date, location and the
circumstances of the event giving rise to the claim for the injury, damage or death and the names of persons
involved, including the name of the state officer, employee or agent involved.”); see Holytz v. City of
Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 39, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) ( “[S]o far as governmental responsibility for torts is
concerned, the rule is liability - the exception is immunity.”); Energy Complexes v. Eau Claire County, 152
Wis. 2d 453, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989) (finding that the section 893.80(4) immunity provision does not apply
to breach of contract suits).

E-11

U.S. Copyright Office

Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity

WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (“Suits may be brought against the state in such manner and in such courts as the
legislature may by law direct.”); WYO. STAT. § 1-39-104(a) (“Any immunity in actions based on a contract
entered into by a governmental entity is waived except to the extent provided by the contract if the contract
was within the powers granted to the entity and was properly executed and except as provided in section 139-120(b)”); id. § 1-39-105–112 (waiving immunity for actions arising from the negligent operation or
maintenance of any motor vehicle, aircraft or watercraft; any building, recreation area or public park;
airports; public utilities; medical facilities; and the negligence of health care providers or peace officers);
id. § 1-39-117 (“Original and exclusive jurisdiction for any claim filed in state court under this act shall be
in the district courts of Wyoming.”).
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